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ABSTRACT 
  This Article frames the history of the Anglo-American bankruptcy 
tradition as a search for solutions to the basic problem that has from 
the first underlain the bankruptcy process: how to obtain the 
assistance of a debtor in his financial dismantling. The pivotal 
moment in this story came in the years 1705 and 1706, when the 
English Parliament drafted a bill making the bankrupt’s refusal to 
cooperate with the commissioners running his bankruptcy a capital 
crime. Almost as an afterthought, they also introduced discharge of 
debt. Incentivizing cooperation with discharge would have a fruitful 
future. Coercing the debtor to be honest, however, proved a failure. 
Fraud flourished, and few perpetrators were executed, in part because 
creditors and jurors found putting bankrupts to death a bit excessive. 
And yet, despite the failure of the English experiment with harsh 
penalties, the desire to punish debtors has remained a part of the 
culture of bankruptcy to this day. 
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Around eight o’clock in the morning on Wednesday, November 
11, 1761, the condemned prisoner, John Perrott, was taken from his 
cell in London’s Newgate Prison.1 He spent some time praying with 
the prison chaplain and receiving the Sacrament; then his leg shackles 
were knocked off and his hands bound. At a quarter after ten, he 
appeared “pale and trembling” in the prison yard.2 According to a 
newspaper account, standing in the yard awaiting his fate, “his 
behaviour there was so decent and so Christian, that it greatly 
affected every person present.”3 A few minutes later the under sheriff 
came to transport Perrott to his execution. He was loaded onto a cart 
and carried the short distance to the scaffold erected at the ancient 
hanging place in West Smithfield. Once there, Perrott looked about 
anxiously, concerned to see his hearse.4 Reassured of its presence, he 
 
 1. LLOYD’S EVENING POST (London), Nov. 9, 1761, at 463; LLOYD’S EVENING POST, 
Nov. 13, 1761, at 478; PUB. LEDGER (London), Nov. 12, 1761, at 1082. 
 2. 2 ANDREW KNAPP & WILLIAM BALDWIN, THE NEWGATE CALENDAR 325 (London, J. 
Robins & Co. 1825). 
 3. LLOYD’S EVENING POST, Nov. 9, 1761, at 463. 
 4. 4 WILLIAM JACKSON, THE NEW AND COMPLETE NEWGATE CALENDAR 211–12 
(London, Alex Hogg 1795). 
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prayed fervently and at around eleven o’clock was “launched into 
eternity.”5 
Hanging was a spectator sport in eighteenth-century England, 
and the accounts of Perrott’s execution suggest that the usual crowd 
turned out to watch him swing.6 They came to see off not a murderer, 
rapist, or highwayman, but rather a bankrupt, albeit a quite 
spectacular and long remembered one.7 Perrott was one of likely only 
four Englishmen hanged for the crime of fraudulent bankruptcy 
between 1706 and 1820,8 and he was later occasionally—though 
mistakenly—believed to have been the last bankrupt hanged.9 
Made a capital offense in 1706 by the Act of 4 & 5 Anne, the 
crime of fraudulent bankruptcy was statutorily defined as a debtor’s 
failure to cooperate fully with his creditors by appearing before the 
bankruptcy commissioners and disclosing all of his assets after 
becoming a bankrupt.10 The death penalty was abolished for such post 
bankruptcy crime in 1820, and the offense and the men who were 
executed under it have become something of a curiosity, relegated to 
offhand dismissal in current historical scholarship.11 By contrast, 
 
 5. 4 THE BLOODY REGISTER: A SELECT AND JUDICIOUS COLLECTION OF THE MOST 
REMARKABLE TRIALS 275 (London 1764); PUB. LEDGER, Nov. 12, 1761, at 1082. 
 6. See PUB. LEDGER, Nov. 12, 1761, at 1082 (detailing the reaction of observers to 
Perrott’s behavior in the prison yard and his “exhort[ing]” the crowd before his execution); see 
also V.A.C. GATRELL, THE HANGING TREE: EXECUTION AND THE ENGLISH PEOPLE, 1770–
1868, at 56 (1994) (describing the practice of crowds watching executions). 
 7. See SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, AND OF 
THE OPERATION THEREOF, MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, 1818, H.C. 127, at 21 (testimony of Basil 
Montagu) (calling Perrott’s case “well known”); ALFRED MARKS, TYBURN TREE: ITS HISTORY 
AND ANNALS 227 (1908) (referring to “[t]he most remarkable case . . . of John Perrott”); LEEDS 
MERCURY, Apr. 10, 1813, at 3 (“Only one instance has occurred, we believe, within the memory 
of man of any bankrupt, before John Senior, suffering capital punishment for the concealment 
of his effects, and that individual was John Perrott . . . who suffered in the year 1761. Perrott’s 
case, it is said, made a considerable sensation at the time . . . .”). 
 8. See infra note 222 and accompanying text. 
 9. For example, an editor’s note to a nineteenth-century edition of Blackstone’s 
Commentaries called Perrott the last bankrupt hanged. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: IN FOUR BOOKS: ADAPTED TO THE PRESENT 
STATE OF THE LAW BY ROBERT MALCOLM KERR *482 n.a (London, John Murray 3d ed. 1862). 
In fact, the last bankrupt was hanged in York in 1813. See infra text accompanying notes 228–32. 
 10. 4 & 5 Ann., c. 17, §§ 1, 18 (1705 [1706 n.s.]); see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *156 (defining fraudulent bankruptcy). 
 11. See 1 Geo. IV, c. 115 (1820) (abolishing the death penalty for fraudulent bankruptcy); 
Jay Cohen, The History of Imprisonment for Debt and Its Relation to the Development of 
Discharge in Bankruptcy, 3 J. LEGAL HIST. 153, 156–57 (1982) (discussing 4 & 5 Anne but not 
mentioning the capital felony provision); John C. McCoid, II, Discharge: The Most Important 
Development in Bankruptcy History, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 163, 167 (1996) (giving little attention 
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discharge of debt, which was also introduced in the 1706 Act of Anne, 
is recognized as a crucial pivot point in the history of bankruptcy.12 
For the first time, the law took the interests of the bankrupt into 
account, however feebly and perhaps even unintentionally.13 Since 
then, Anglo-American bankruptcy law has paid increasing attention 
to the needs of debtors, and discharge remains one of its defining 
elements.14 
This Article argues that the role of discharge as an innovation 
that changed the nature of bankruptcy cannot be fully appreciated 
without taking the capital punishment provision into account. The 
two options in the 1706 law—assist the debtor or punish the debtor—
represented parallel solutions to the fundamental contradiction on 
which bankruptcy has from the beginning been built, namely that the 
debtor must assist in his own financial dissolution.15 In modern 
bankruptcy, since the introduction of discharge in the eighteenth 
century and of voluntary bankruptcy in the nineteenth, this assistance 
has come to be viewed as a tradeoff that the debtor makes to be freed 
of the burden of unpayable debts.16 But this balancing of the interests 
and duties of debtors and creditors did not exist in early bankruptcy. 
Whereas today the debtor who turns over his assets may walk away 
with a discharge, prior to 1706, the debtor had to participate in his 
 
to the capital punishment clause in a study of the 1706 Act); Charles Jordan Tabb, The History 
of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 11 (1995) (“While 
obviously quite dramatic, the importance of the death penalty for fraudulent bankrupts should 
not be overstated . . . .”). 
 12. McCoid, supra note 11, at 164. 
 13. Some scholarly disagreement exists about the extent to which Parliament viewed 
discharge as a concession to debtors versus merely a way to help creditors get repaid. See, e.g., 
id. at 163 & n.4 (collecting sources that characterize discharge as a creditor’s remedy); Ian P.H. 
Duffy, English Bankrupts, 1571–1861, 24 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 283, 286 (1980) (discussing 
discharge’s underpinnings as a concession to non-fraudulent debtors). 
 14. The heart of modern American bankruptcy law is the discharge by which the debtor, in 
exchange for providing the bankruptcy trustee with information about his or her finances, 
turning over his or her assets, and in some instances paying some portion of what he or she 
owes, is discharged of most debts. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 521, 523(a), 541, 727(a) (2006); see also Local 
Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (listing discharge and debtor rehabilitation as 
“primary purposes” of American bankruptcy law); Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy 
in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1393, 1394–96 (1985) (describing the modern 
discharge process as a “fresh-start policy”). 
 15. See, e.g., SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, 
supra note 7, at 47 (testimony of Germain Lavie, solicitor) (testifying before the House of 
Commons committee on bankruptcy reform in 1818 that “[i]t is the co-operation of the 
bankrupt, and the assistance that he affords in the settlement of his affairs, that I consider 
essential”). 
 16. See supra note 14. 
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complete financial and personal degradation without having the right 
to expect anything, except almost certain incarceration in debtors’ 
prison, in return. 
This need for debtor cooperation in the face of solely negative 
incentives created a compliance problem that helped make early 
bankruptcy unpopular and ineffective.17 Societies have since 
discovered that, in bankruptcy, balance matters. In many areas of law, 
no balancing of interests is necessary. The law of sales, for example, 
functions equally well whether the acceptance of a contract is valid on 
dispatch or on receipt, whether a thief in the chain of title does or 
does not vitiate ownership by a good faith purchaser, or whether a 
valid contract does or does not require consideration. But in 
bankruptcy the particular rules are not neutral because societal and 
economic factors larger than the mere preferences of private parties 
are at stake.18 A credit economy relies on the promise that current 
debts will be paid in the future. If such promises are not kept, the 
economy falters. But if all promises to pay are fully enforced, 
entrepreneurial activities will decline and too many productive 
citizens will lose their incentive to earn in the face of perpetually 
paying past debts with future earnings.19 The idea behind creating a 
 
 17. See, e.g., 1 THE MANUSCRIPTS OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS, 1693–1695, at 360 (1900) 
(quoting the 1694 draft of a bill commencing, “[w]hereas the laws heretofore made against 
bankrupts are defective in many cases, and it is found by experience that few of their creditors, 
even after a tedious and oppressive prosecution of Commissions of Bankruptcy recover their 
debts or any considerable part thereof”); SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF 
THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note 7, at 50 (testimony of Sir Samuel Romilly, Member, Select 
Comm. Appointed to Consider of the Bankrupt Laws, and of the Operation Thereof) (“The 
bankrupt laws appear to me to be in many respects extremely defective, and to require much 
alteration.”); DANIEL DEFOE, AN ESSAY UPON PROJECTS 192 (London, Thomas Ballard 2d ed. 
1702) (1697) [hereinafter DEFOE, ESSAY] (“This Law . . . tends wholly to the Destruction of the 
Debtor, and yet very little to the Advantage of the Creditor.”); 8 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A 
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 245 (2d ed. 1937) (“That neither the Legislature, nor the common 
law, nor equity, had succeeded in constructing a satisfactory body of law, is clear from the fact 
that the defects pointed out at the beginning of the nineteenth century, are, to a large extent, the 
same as those pointed out by Brinklow in the sixteenth century.”). 
 18. For an early expression of the understanding of the larger societal impact of 
bankruptcy, see AN HUMBLE PROPOSAL TO CAUSE BANCRUPTS MAKE BETTER AND MORE 
SPEEDIER PAYMENTS OF THEIR DEBTS TO THEIR CREDITORS, THAN, BY LONG EXPERIENCE 
HATH BEEN FOUND, THE STATUTES AGAINST BANCRUPTS DO EFFECT (London 1679) 
[hereinafter HUMBLE PROPOSAL]. “[I]f Circumstances be so set, as renders private Property a 
Public Grievance, in such cases it seems reasonable, that the Public do exercise their Authority 
to convert this private Grievance into their Common-weal.” Id. at 7. 
 19. This phenomenon was not lost on eighteenth- and nineteenth-century advocates for 
bankruptcy reform. See, e.g., SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE 
BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note 7, at 53 (testimony of Sir Samuel Romilly) (arguing that 
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greater equilibrium between debtors and creditors has long been that 
if debtors see an advantage in disclosing their assets to their creditors, 
they will be less inclined to try to cheat, and if debtors cheat less, 
creditors will be repaid more.20 
It took the English law over a century to begin to understand this 
truism.21 The parliaments that passed the earliest statutes believed 
that bankruptcy existed to serve creditors alone and thought that all 
they had to do to obtain debtor cooperation was threaten 
punishment. Only as it became apparent that the success of 
bankruptcy as a debt-collection mechanism hinged on maintaining a 
greater balance between the needs and duties of both creditors and 
debtors did the law begin to seek out ways to provide positive 
incentives for debtor participation. The process of trying to solve the 
problem of obtaining debtor cooperation—a process that involved 
moving from a purely punitive to a modern, increasingly remedial 
bankruptcy system—is the focus of this Article. 
This development is analyzed through the rise and fall of 
England’s century-long but ultimately failed experiment with 
 
permitting recuperation of future earnings “takes from [the bankrupt] . . . all motives for 
industry, by subjecting the future fruits of his labours to the demands of his former creditors”); 
DEFOE, ESSAY, supra note 17, at 192 (arguing that English bankruptcy law “encourages no new 
Industry, for it makes [the debtor] perfectly uncapable [sic] of any thing but starving”). 
 20. See, e.g., SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, 
FURTHER REPORT OF MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, 1818, H.C. 277, at 5 (testimony of Thomas 
Nowlan) (“[T]he most effectual mode of preventing fraud is to lessen the temptation or 
necessity for committing it.” (emphasis omitted)). This is not to say that debtors will not cheat. 
That is why there is still a Bankruptcy Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C. § 152 (2006), that deals with the 
exact same crimes that the English penalized in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. See 
generally STEPHANIE WICKOUSKI, BANKRUPTCY CRIMES (3d ed. 2007) (discussing 
contemporary American criminal bankruptcy law). 
 21. For early evidence of an understanding see, for example, a broadside written at the 
time discharge was introduced, CONSIDERATIONS UPON THE BILL, TO PREVENT FRAUDS 
FREQUENTLY COMMITTED BY BANKRUPTS, HUMBLY SUBMITTED TO THE HIGH COURT OF 
PARLIAMENT; TOGETHER WITH REASONS FOR SOME CLAUSE OR PROVISION THEREIN TO BE 
MADE, FOR THE INCOURAGEMENT OF DEBTORS TO DISCOVER AND DELIVER UP THEIR 
ESTATES, FOR THE EQUAL BENEFIT OF THEIR CREDITORS (circa 1706) (British Library, Cup. 
645.b.11/37*) (“It is consistent with the Policy and Reason of Human Laws, almost in all Parts 
of Christendom, that some Power be constituted to make an Equilibrium of Justice between 
Debtor and Creditor, suffering neither the one to Cheat, nor the other to Oppress, Bury, 
Famish, or Ruin another Subject.”); see also REASONS HUMBLY OFFERED FOR PASSING THE 
BILL FOR PREVENTING OF FRAUDS COMMITTED BY BANKRUPTS (circa 1719 or 1732) 
(Lincoln’s Inn Library, MP 100 no. 5) (stating that creditors “are . . . willing to give such 
Encouragement as by Experience they have found to be necessary, to encourage Bankrupts 
justly and fairly to conform thereto, in order to render such a Law more effectual for the 
Purposes intended”). 
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employing the threat—and occasionally the reality—of capital 
punishment for fraudulent bankruptcy. Part I outlines the struggles of 
early English bankruptcy law in obtaining debtor cooperation during 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when the statutes paid no 
attention to the interests of debtors. Part II treats the pivotal events 
of 1705 to 1707, during which an infamous financial scandal catalyzed 
Parliament to reform the bankruptcy law and to try yet again to 
improve debtor cooperation, first by looking backward to the old 
solution of penalties, and second, by looking forward to the recent 
idea of discharge. Part III discusses why the threat of death not only 
failed to control what was likely to have been widespread bankruptcy 
fraud but potentially also permitted fraud to flourish in the discharge 
procedure. 
Despite the current and historical importance of bankruptcy, its 
pre-modern past has barely been investigated. No scholarship has 
investigated the history of the punitive side of bankruptcy, even 
though the impulse to punish bankrupts is still very much alive and 
well, as witnessed by the debates over the extent to which the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 
punished debtors for their indebtedness by making bankruptcy more 
difficult to obtain.22 And while several articles have discussed the 
origin of discharge, they have used only readily available printed 
sources.23 This Article goes beyond the usual sources to research the 
capital punishment and discharge elements of eighteenth-century 
bankruptcy through archival manuscripts, parliamentary committee 
testimony, and contemporary broadsides, newspapers, and pamphlets. 
This material tells a story that is at once foreign in the severity of the 
punishment of debtors and yet surprisingly familiar in the underlying 
attitudes toward them. 
 
 22. See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. S1856 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005) (statement of Sen. Grassley) 
(proposing amendments to 11 U.S.C. §707(b)) (“This bill would make it harder for individuals 
who can repay their debt to file for bankruptcy under chapter 7.”); id. at S1813–14, S1856–57 
(statements of Sens. Frist & Grassley) (explaining that the purpose of the bill is to prevent 
abuse yet still help the honest but unfortunate debtor); Edith H. Jones & Todd J. Zywicki, It’s 
Time for Means-Testing, 1999 BYU L. REV. 177, 209 (“If discharge of debts is easy in 
bankruptcy, debtors will incur more debt. Conversely, if obtaining bankruptcy relief is difficult, 
debtors will be more reluctant to incur debts.”); James J. White, Abuse Prevention 2005, 71 MO. 
L. REV. 863, 874 (2006) (arguing that the bankruptcy reform act was merely a cover for trying to 
make bankruptcy less desirable). 
 23. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 11 and infra note 26. 
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I.  THE SEARCH FOR BALANCE IN EARLY BANKRUPTCY (1543–1705) 
Bankruptcy began in England as a collection device in which all 
power rested with the creditors. For a century or more, the law’s sole 
concern was that creditors should be repaid, while the interests of the 
debtor were ignored.24 Unfortunately for creditors, collection has 
always required at least some debtor participation. Especially in an 
age in which the coercive reach of public authorities was limited, as 
was the case in early modern England, the creditors could not get 
their money if the debtor did not cooperate in turning over or 
disclosing his assets.25 Early bankruptcy, however, destroyed the 
debtor both financially and personally, giving him little incentive to 
assist in the process. The development of English bankruptcy, from its 
creation in 1543 to the important juncture of 1706 and beyond, 
therefore became a search for ways to force or to encourage debtors 
to contribute to their own ruin. Initially, the best solutions to the 
problem were found outside the confines of the bankruptcy statutes, 
which, officially, remained staunchly pro-creditor. This Part 
investigates the factors behind the harshness of the early law and the 
forces that attempted to mitigate it by giving some leverage to 
bankrupts. 
Preliminarily, a word must be said about the dating of 
bankruptcy statutes because the dating system has been a common 
source of confusion in the literature.26 During the period under 
 
 24. Max Radin, The Nature of Bankruptcy, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 3–5 (1940); see also, e.g., 
Worseley v. Slader, (1758) 1 Burr. 467, 476–77, 97 Eng. Rep. 407, 412 (K.B.) (stating that the 
two purposes of bankruptcy are “the management of the bankrupt’s estate” and “equal 
distribution among his creditors” (emphasis omitted)); The Case of Bankrupts (Smith v. Mills), 
(1584) 2 Co. Rep. 25a, 25b, 76 Eng. Rep. 441, 465–68 (K.B.) (holding that the purpose of the 
bankruptcy statute was to “relieve the Creditors of the Bankrupt equally, and that there should 
be an equal and rateable Proportion observed in the Distribution of the Bankrupt’s Goods 
amongst the Creditors, having Regard to the Quantity of their several Debts; so that one should 
not prevent the other, but all should be in aequali jure”); CONSIDERATIONS UPON 
COMMISSIONS OF BANKRUPTS 4 (London, R. Gosling 1727) (“The common End of all the Laws 
relating to Bankrupts, is to discover and collect the Estate of the Debtor, in the best and 
speediest Manner, in order to make an equal Distribution of it among all the Creditors . . . .”). 
 25. See W.J. Jones, The Foundations of English Bankruptcy: Statutes and Commissions in 
the Early Modern Period, 69 TRANS. AM. PHIL. SOC. 1, 6–7 (1979) (explaining the lack of state 
administrative and enforcement mechanisms in early modern England). 
 26. E.g., Duffy, supra note 13, at 286–87, 293 (dating the Pitkin affair to 1704 and 5 Anne to 
1706); Andrew J. Duncan, From Dismemberment to Discharge: The Origins of Modern 
American Bankruptcy Law, 100 COM. L.J. 191, 198 (1995) (stating that Parliament “passed” 4 & 
5 Anne in 1705); Michael Quilter, Daniel Defoe: Bankrupt and Bankruptcy Reformer, 25 J. 
LEGAL HIST. 53, 56, 64 (2004) (dating the passage of 4 & 5 Anne to 1705 and the passage of 5 
Anne to 1706); Charles Jordan Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 65 
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consideration here, an English statute was officially dated according 
to the year of the first day of the parliamentary session in which the 
act was passed.27 Thus, as happened with the statute introducing 
capital punishment for fraudulent bankrupts, 4 & 5 Anne, c. 17, the 
parliamentary session began in October 1705, but the act only passed 
the two houses of Parliament and received royal assent in March 
1706. In the statute books, the statute would be dated 1705, but for 
the purposes of the historical chronology of events it is necessary to 
realize that it was passed in 1706. For this reason, one sometimes sees 
the various early bankruptcy acts dated in different years. 
A further wrinkle makes dating even more complicated. Until 
1752, the English used a modified form of medieval dating in which 
the first day of the new year was March 25.28 Because the Act of 4 & 5 
Anne was passed on March 19, its year of enactment was 1705 under 
the old style dating system.29 To clarify matters, this Article adopts 
several conventions. First, all dates are given in modern style. Second, 
to keep the chronological developments clear, the Article generally 
refers to the date of passage of an act rather than the official date in 
the statute books. Third, when the official dates of the acts are listed, 
they include the statute book date followed by the date of passage, if 
different, in square brackets with the indication “n.s.” for “new style” 
for pre-1752 acts which received royal assent before March 25. 
A. The Original Purpose of Bankruptcy 
Insolvency was particularly fraught with negative meaning in the 
early modern economy. The merchant or trader who relied on credit 
lived constantly on the edge. The still relatively primitive state of 
 
AM. BANKR. L.J. 325, 333, 337, 339 (dating the passage of 4 & 5 Anne to 1705, the Pitkin affair 
to 1704, and the passage of 5 Anne to 1706). 
 27. CHRISTOPHER ROBERT CHENEY, A HANDBOOK OF DATES: FOR STUDENTS OF 
BRITISH HISTORY 108 (Michael Jones ed., new ed. 2000) (1945). 
 28. Thus, for example, the year 1705 ran from March 25 (1705) to March 24 (1706 in 
current, or new style, dating). 
 29. The March-based dating system has led to occasional misunderstandings in recent 
scholarship. For instance, one author has interpreted the provision that the Act of 4 & 5 Anne 
would come into force on June 24, 1706, to mean that fifteen months passed between the 
conclusion of the retroactive application period (March 10, 1705 old style) and the Act’s coming 
into force, when, in fact, only three months passed, because the retroactive period in modern 
dating ended on March 10, 1706. McCoid, supra note 11, at 166 n.12. To be precise, in modern 
dating it would have passed on March 22, 1706, because the switch in 1752 from the March 25 to 
the January 1 new year was accompanied by the change from the Julian to the Gregorian 
calendar, in which the calendar jumped forward by eleven days (so by statute, when the change 
took effect, September 2, 1752, was followed by September 14, 1752). 
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communication, travel, and production meant that he could not be 
sure when he would receive the next shipment or the next payment 
on which his ability to pay his own creditors depended. His goal was 
to “synchronize the payments being made to him as a creditor with 
those he had to make as a debtor,” and this he could never do with 
complete assurance.30 As all merchants and traders who depended on 
credit existed in this state of financial instability, the insolvency of one 
person who owed significant debts could lead to the failure of many 
others.31 
The fragile glue holding together the web of credit on which the 
economy depended was confidence, and in the tightly knit pre-
modern world of buyers and sellers sharing book debt or circulating 
notes of hand or bills of exchange this confidence was highly personal, 
resting on reputation and trust and often little else.32 The bankrupt 
disrupted this system. He was seen not only as stealing money which 
his creditors might need to keep themselves out of insolvency but 
more importantly as stealing their confidence. Early comments to 
Parliament illustrate these twin concerns. In 1559, certain 
“[c]onsiderations delivered to the Parliament” included the complaint 
that, whereas “a poor thief doth steal a sheep or pick a purse, they 
[that is, bankrupts] come away with hundreds and thousands at least, 
and undo a great many honest men.”33 And in a speech to Parliament 
in about 1590, Richard Dane said, “These bankrupts are worse than 
thieves [who] rob by the highway for necessity; but these are double 
thieves because they were put in trust with many men’s goods, which 
 
 30. Julian Hoppit, The Use and Abuse of Credit in Eighteenth-Century England, in 
BUSINESS LIFE AND PUBLIC POLICY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF D.C. COLEMAN 64, 65–67 (Neil 
McKendrick & R.B. Outhwaite eds., 1986); see also V. MARKHAM LESTER, VICTORIAN 
INSOLVENCY: BANKRUPTCY, IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT, AND COMPANY WINDING-UP IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 2 (1995) (“The legal procedures governing indebtedness 
were important because they were the key to sustaining confidence in the credit system that 
underlay the British economy.”). 
 31. Hoppit, supra note 30, at 67. 
 32. Id. at 65 (“Central to the relationship between the debtor and the creditor was mutual 
confidence[] [b]ecause the loan was backed by nothing but personal security . . . .”); Joanna 
Innes, The King’s Bench Prison in the Later Eighteenth Century: Law, Authority and Order in a 
London Debtors’ Prison, in AN UNGOVERNABLE PEOPLE? THE ENGLISH AND THEIR LAW IN 
THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES 250, 251 (John Brewer & John Styles eds., 
1980) (explaining that the economy “rested upon an extensively ramified network of credit and 
debt”). For an excellent description of book debt, see AMALIA KESSLER, A REVOLUTION IN 
COMMERCE: THE PARISIAN MERCHANT COURT AND THE RISE OF COMMERCIAL SOCIETY IN 
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY FRANCE 58–61 (2007). 
 33. 1 CALENDAR OF THE MANUSCRIPTS OF THE MOST HON. THE MARQUIS OF 
SALISBURY, K.G. 164 (S.R. Scargill-Bird ed., London, Eyre & Spottiswoode 1883). 
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by breaking they undo many.”34 In a credit economy clinging, often 
quite precariously, to solvency, the bankrupt was a threatening 
character.35 
This fear of bankruptcy provides the backdrop against which the 
earliest English legislation played out. Early modern commentators 
and modern scholars generally agree that the first English bankruptcy 
act, 34 & 35 Henry VIII, c. 4 (1542 [1543]), was intended to help 
creditors recover their money from those debtors who were 
attempting to defraud them, either through the fraudulent or reckless 
expenditure of the borrowed money or by the willful refusal to repay 
their debts.36 The act’s preamble spoke of: 
divers and sundry persons, craftily obtaining into their hands great 
substance of other men’s goods, [who] do suddenly flee to parts 
 
 34. Richard Dane, Address to Parliament on the Mischiefs Arising from Bankrupts 
Concealing Their Effects; with the Means of Addressing the Grievance (circa 1590) (British 
Library, Landsdowne MS 99 f. 185r.) (“These Banckrowts are worse than theves [that] robbe by 
the highe waye for necessitie: but these are duble theves becawse they were put in trust with 
many mens goods: which by breking they undoe many.”); cf. HONORÉ DE BALZAC, EUGÉNIE 
GRANDET 77 (Sylvia Raphael trans., Oxford World’s Classics 2003) (1833) (“A highway robber 
is preferable to a bankrupt. A highwayman attacks you, but you can defend yourself and he 
risks his life. But the other . . . .”). I thank Professor Jay Westbrook for this reference. 
 35. See, e.g., A Recital of the Several Circumstances that May Cause a Debtor to Become a 
Bankrupt (dated in the catalogue as circa 1571, but likely closer to 1604 based on content) 
(British Library, Landsdowne MS 13 f. 55r) (“The abuses and deceipts of bankrupts is growne 
intollerable, the remedies p[ro]vided against them be weake, that unlesse the inconveniency 
thereof be remedied by this p[ar]liament, all trades of buyinge and sellinge . . . importinge the 
benefits of this Common wealthe will in short tyme utterlie decaye . . . .”); THOMAS DEKKER, 
THE SEVEN DEADLY SINNES OF LONDON 20 (H.F.B. Brett-Smith ed., Houghton Mifflin Co. 
1922) (1606) (“The theefe that dyes at Tyburne for a robbery, is not halfe so dangerous a weede 
in a Common-wealth, as the Politick Bankrupt. I would there were a Derick to hang up him 
too.”). 
 36. SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAW, FURTHER 
REPORT OF MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 20, at 2 (testimony of Thomas Nowlan) (“[T]he 
bankrupt law was first introduced into England at a period, when, comparatively speaking, trade 
was in its infancy, and credit very limited; and that the law was solely enacted to protect 
creditors against the frauds of debtors; and the bankrupt was then, with justice, perhaps, 
considered in the light of a criminal or offender; and infamy was attached to his name.”); 8 
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 17, at 233, 236, 243 (noting that statutes of bankrupts initially 
targeted a small class of debtors); A TREATISE OF FRAUDS, COVINS, AND COLLUSIONS 26 
(London, John Nutt 1710) (stating that statutes of bankrupts aimed to prevent the deception of 
creditors); Israel Treiman, Acts of Bankruptcy: A Medieval Concept in Modern Bankruptcy 
Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 189, 190 (1938) (calling the 1543 act “a law that began with a brief 
statute directed at the pursuit and punishment of a narrow class of fraudulent debtors”); see also 
Robert Weisberg, Commercial Morality, the Merchant Character, and the History of the 
Voidable Preference, 39 STAN. L. REV. 3, 13–16, 22–23 (1986) (arguing that the treatment of 
debtors under the early bankruptcy laws was in part an extension of the vision in early modern 
England of the merchant as villain). 
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unknown, or keep their houses, not minding to pay or restore to any 
their creditors, their duties, but at their own wills and pleasures 
consume debts and the substance obtained by credit of other men, 
for their own pleasure and delicate living, against all reason, equity, 
and good conscience . . . .37 
These men were called bankrupts, a term the English had borrowed 
from the French law, in which the term referred solely to fraudulent, 
and therefore criminal, insolvents.38 Only the insolvent’s pre-
bankruptcy behavior mattered in this statute. The debtor who spent 
his creditors’ money for reasons other than honest trade and who 
refused to pay when required would be treated as a bankrupt. Honest 
insolvents, whose losses were brought on by forces outside their 
control and who, without deception, presented their disability to their 
creditors, did not come within the intendment of the act.39 The 
language of the Henrician law made clear the equation of bankrupt 
and criminal, for the statute used the word “bankrupt” only once, in 
the title, “An Act Against Such Persons As Do Make Bankrupt.”40 
The remainder of the statute referred to the bankrupt only as the 
“offender.”41 
The four defining elements of early English bankruptcy that this 
statute introduced sought to maximize recovery against the crafty 
fraudsters who posed such a serious threat to economic stability. First, 
the debtor had no choice about becoming bankrupt. His creditors put 
him into bankruptcy, and their petition, originally to members of the 
 
 37. 34 & 35 Hen. VIII, c. 4, § 1 (1542 [1543]). 
 38. 4 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *277 (“We have fetched as 
well the name as the wickednesse of bankrupts from foreign nations . . . .”); I. Treiman, 
Escaping the Creditor in the Middle Ages, 43 L.Q. REV. 230, 231–32 (1927) (“[T]he fraud of the 
debtor lay in the mere fact that he was insolvent, rather than in his efforts to cheat his 
creditors.”). The common spelling variants seen in sixteenth-century English legal and 
legislative texts, such as banckeroote, banckerowte, and banckrote, betray the influence of the 
French banqueroute. Pierre Claude Reynard, The Language of Failure: Bankruptcy in 
Eighteenth-Century France, 30 J. EUR. ECON. HIST. 355, 356–57 (2001). 
 39. NOMIUS ANTINOMOS, OBSERVATIONS ON THE STATE OF BANKRUPTS, UNDER THE 
PRESENT LAWS IN A LETTER TO A MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT 2–3 (London, M. Cooper 1760) 
(“It is true, the law certainly looks on the Bankrupt as a culprit under its chastisement. The 
preamble of the very first statute made against them, of Henry the Eighth, supposes them to be 
persons who have run away beyond seas, or elsewhere, from the payment of their just 
debts . . . but the necessity of the statute was not at first thought applicable to a man, who stood 
in his counting-house at the head of his books; and on any deficiency, was ready to shew his true 
estate to his creditors, to give up all to them, or compound for a reasonable part.”). 
 40. This circumlocution is seemingly borrowed from the French usage faire banqueroute. 
 41. See 34 & 35 Hen. VIII, c. 4, §§ 1–2. 
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Privy Council and, from 1571 onward, to the chancellor, came to be 
granted as a matter of course upon their ex parte evidence alone.42 
Second, the creditors could only petition after the debtor committed a 
so-called “act of bankruptcy.” These statutorily defined acts 
ostensibly demonstrated the debtor’s intent to hinder, delay, or 
defraud his creditors.43 They thus provided the actus reus and the 
mens rea of the crime of bankruptcy.44 Third, and arguably the 
defining characteristic of most bankruptcy systems, the creditors 
would join together in a single bankruptcy proceeding, which would 
gather all the assets and then divide them ratably according to the 
amount of the creditors’ respective debts.45 Finally, all of the debtor’s 
assets came into the bankruptcy estate. With the exception, made in 
some later statutes, of necessary clothing, the bankrupt would be 
stripped of everything.46 This contrasted with the normal common law 
rule that placed strict limits on the attachment of real property and 
liquid assets such as bills, bonds, or choses in action for the payment 
of debt.47 Thus, a man’s home, so strongly protected under the 
 
 42. Id. § 1; 13 Eliz. I, c. 7, § 2 (1571 [1572]); see also RICHARD BOOTE, SOLICITOR’S GUIDE 
AND TRADESMAN’S INSTRUCTOR 9 (London, B. Tovey 4th ed. 1774); Alderman Backwell’s 
Case, (1683) 1 Vern. 152, 153, 23 Eng. Rep. 381, 381 (Ch.) (noting that a bankruptcy commission 
must be granted as matter of course upon the filing of a petition). Bankruptcy did not become 
voluntary in America until 1841. See Tabb, supra note 11, at 16–18; see also DAVID A. SKEEL, 
JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 28–33 (2001) 
(discussing the debates over voluntariness). In England, bankruptcy remained involuntary for 
merchants until 1841, see 7 & 8 Vict., c. 96, and for non-merchants until 1861, see 24 & 25 Vict., 
c. 134. Voluntariness was abolished in 1869, 32 & 33 Vict., c. 71, but was restored in 1883, 46 & 
47 Vict., c. 52. 
 43. 34 & 35 Hen. VIII, c. 4, § 1; Treiman, supra note 38, at 233–34 (discussing the English 
bankruptcy act of keeping house). By the last major pre-modern revision of the law in 1732, the 
number of acts of bankruptcy had increased to about sixteen, and they all described ways of 
intentionally avoiding creditors or evading their demands. For a list of acts, see EDWARD 
GREEN, THE SPIRIT OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS 37–38 (London, J. Williams 1767); 2 
BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at *478–79; WYNDHAM BEAWES, LEX MERCATORIA REDIVIVA 
OR, THE MERCHANT’S DIRECTORY 489–90 (London, John Moore 1752). American law retained 
the bankruptcy act requirement until 1978. Tabb, supra note 11, at 8. 
 44. ROBERT GEORGE CECIL FANE, BANKRUPTCY REFORM IN A SERIES OF LETTERS 
ADDRESSED TO SIR ROBERT PEEL, BART: LETTERS IV, V, VI, VII 37–39 (London, S. Sweet 
1838) (quoting well-known barristers about the treatment of the bankruptcy act as a crime 
under the law). 
 45. See Louis Edward Levinthal, The Early History of Bankruptcy Law, 66 U. PA. L. REV. 
223, 225 (1917) (“A special process of collective execution is devised, a process directed against 
all of the property of the debtor, restored to for the common benefit and at the common 
expense of all the creditors.”). 
 46. See 5 Geo. II, c. 30, § 1 (1732) (noting an exception for wearing apparel). 
 47. See Innes, supra note 32, at 254; Jones, supra note 25, at 13 (“The ability of creditors to 
seize the assets of a debtor was seriously limited.”). 
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common law, was no longer his inviolate castle.48 Bankruptcy gave 
creditors a powerful new collection tool, one which they could use on 
their own volition, without the agreement of the debtor. 
To make matters worse, because none of the early bankruptcy 
statutes contemplated discharging the bankrupt of the unpaid 
portions of his debts, the process functioned during the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries merely as a sort of enforced pause during which 
the bankrupt’s assets could be gathered in and distributed in an 
orderly fashion.49 In addition, the creditors retained their legal rights 
to recoup any unpaid debts.50 As long as the bankruptcy commission 
remained in force, future earnings went into the collective and new 
dividends would be distributed. Thereafter, the creditors could pursue 
all other legal avenues, including keeping the bankrupt in debtors’ 
prison, until the debts were completely paid. 
The next bankruptcy statute, the Act of 13 Elizabeth I, c. 7 
(1571),51 added two important features to the system.52 First, it 
explicitly limited the compass of the statute to merchants.53 Only 
those who bought and sold for a living were subject to bankruptcy. 
This would be significant later because it meant that merchants and 
traders could be convicted as felons for doing things that non-
merchants could do with impunity.54 Second, the Act created the 
position of commissioners of bankrupt, who were to be appointed by 
the chancellor to oversee each bankruptcy.55 The commissioners were 
 
 48. See JAMES BLAND BURGES, CONSIDERATIONS ON THE LAW OF INSOLVENCY, WITH A 
PROPOSAL FOR A REFORM 204, 213–15 (1783) (pointing out the extent to which the early 
bankruptcy procedure removed the protections of the common law); Treiman, supra note 38, at 
233 (discussing the “special regard to a man’s house” under English law). 
 49. See Jones, supra note 25, at 16. 
 50. 34 & 35 Hen. VIII, c. 4, § 6 (1542 [1543]); 13 Eliz. I, c. 7, § 10 (1571 [1572]). 
 51. The Act is sometimes dated 1570, which is inexplicable because no parliaments were 
held during the year 1570 under either style of dating. The parliamentary session in which the 
Act passed began in April 1571. 
 52. The Act added many new elements to bankruptcy procedure, but the ones discussed 
focus on the foundational elements that characterize bankruptcy. See 1 EDWARD CHRISTIAN, 
THE ORIGIN, PROGRESS, AND PRESENT PRACTICE OF THE BANKRUPT LAW, BOTH IN 
ENGLAND AND IN IRELAND 11 n.2 (London, W. Clarke & Sons 1812) (discussing innovations in 
the Act). 
 53. 13 Eliz. I, c. 7, § 1. It is not clear whether the Henrician Act was intended to apply 
generally or only to merchants. See Jones, supra note 25, at 17. The merchant question was a 
source of a great deal of litigation and fine distinctions. For an overview, see BEAWES, supra 
note 43, at 488–89. 
 54. See infra notes 375–76. 
 55. 13 Eliz. I, c. 7, § 2. 
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not government officials but rather prominent local citizens, often 
lawyers or merchants, who served in their private capacity and were 
paid out of the proceeds of the bankrupt’s estate.56 By the eighteenth 
century, an official list of commissions existed for London, with each 
commission composed of five members.57 The commissions were 
assigned from the list in order by a clerk when a petition of 
bankruptcy was submitted.58 Given that the assignees, who collected 
and distributed the bankrupts’ estate, were also creditors, bankruptcy 
was essentially a private matter largely controlled by those who would 
benefit from it with little oversight from the courts and susceptible to 
both corruption and incompetence.59 
The Henrician statute of 1543 had one serious liability: it 
probably did not work.60 First, it provided little procedure. It 
empowered creditors to work together to gather and distribute the 
bankrupt’s assets but gave little explanation of how this should 
happen.61 Second, it relied on the honesty of the bankrupt—who was 
presumed to be a criminal—to give up his estate when all of the 
incentives under the law pushed him to do the opposite. Bankruptcy 
permitted the creditors to strip the bankrupt of all his assets, imprison 
him, and continue to attach future earnings until he had repaid his 
debts in full. Furthermore, because the imprisoned bankrupt was not 
the state’s responsibility, his imprisonment for debt being a private 
matter between him and his creditors,62 he was not fed, clothed, or 
housed at public expense while in prison, but rather had to find a way 
to purchase these amenities at the jailers’ extortionate rates.63 
Therefore, a bankrupt who hoped to be able to survive his 
imprisonment either had to rely on friends and family for funds or 
 
 56. 1 GERARD MALYNES, CONSUETUDO, VEL, LEX MERCATORIA OR, THE ANCIENT LAW 
MERCHANT 158 (London, T. Bassett 3d ed. 1686) (stating that commissioners “must be 
Counsellors at the Law joyned with some citizens or Merchants”). 
 57. E.g., THOMAS DAVIES, LAWS RELATING TO BANKRUPTS, BROUGHT HOME TO THE 
PRESENT TIME 143–46 (London, H. Lintot 1744) (providing ten lists consisting of 
commissioners); A SUCCINCT DIGEST OF THE LAWS RELATING TO BANKRUPTS 3 (Dublin, 
Brett Smith 1791) (providing thirteen lists consisting of sixty-six total commissioners). 
 58. BOOTE, supra note 42, at 9. 
 59. See infra notes 378–85. 
 60. Jones, supra note 25, at 17–18. 
 61. Id. at 16. 
 62. Innes, supra note 32, at 253 (“[T]he courts played no more than a passive and 
procedural role . . . .”). 
 63. Manby v. Scott (1663) 1 Mod. 124, 132, 86 Eng. Rep. 781, 786 (Ex.) (“If a man be taken 
in execution and lie in prison for debt, neither the plaintiff, at whose suit he is arrested, nor the 
sheriff who took him, is bound to find him meat, drink, or clothes . . . .”). 
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conceal some of his assets from his creditors.64 And if the bankrupt 
found a way to pay off his debts, his former bankruptcy could prevent 
him from obtaining credit in the future.65 Yet, even though the 
bankrupt faced the prospect of ruin, the law expected him to 
cooperate with his creditors. 
The Elizabethan statute of 1571 tinkered with the procedure of 
debt collection to make it functional, provided that the debtor played 
his role obediently.66 When the debtor did not do so, the law offered 
no effective means to make him turn over his assets. The Henrician 
and Elizabethan statutes said nothing about post-bankruptcy crime 
except that the failure to surrender to the commissioners after a 
commission of bankrupt was taken out resulted in the punishment of 
outlawry.67 Only in the seventeenth century did laws begin to address 
the problem of debtor noncooperation by including penalties 
intended to frighten or coerce the debtor into participating in the 
bankruptcy process. 
B. Coercing Cooperation 
The Henrician statute died a quiet death. It was apparently never 
repealed, but after the passage of 13 Elizabeth I in 1571, it faded away 
and was rarely adduced.68 Yet for all the procedural and 
administrative flaws in the Henrician statute, creditors of those 
honest but unfortunate insolvents who had suffered loss from fire, for 
instance, or a shipwreck, or the failure of their own debtors seem to 
have quickly seen the value of the bankruptcy mechanism.69 Under 
the common law, the creditors of these honest insolvents could 
pursue costly and cumbrous suits for debt, or they could compose 
with the debtor. The first option involved long procedural delays and 
the prospect of ever-diminishing returns as each successive creditor 
sued for payment.70 The second option required creditors to accept 
 
 64. DEFOE, ESSAY, supra note 17, at 193, 197–98, 201–02. 
 65. Id. at 194. 
 66. 13 Eliz. I, c. 7 (1571 [1572]); see also 1 Jac. I, c. 15 (1604); 21 Jac. I, c. 19 (1624). 
 67. 34 & 35 Hen. VIII, c. 4, § 5 (1542 [1543]); 13 Eliz. I, c. 7, § 9. 
 68. 1 CHRISTIAN, supra note 52, at 7–8 n.4; Jones, supra note 25, at 17–18. 
 69. These were the paradigmatic examples of misfortunes that could render a man 
insolvent without culpability. See HUMBLE PROPOSAL, supra note 18, at 4; REASONS HUMBLY 
OFFERED FOR PASSING THE BILL FOR THE BETTER RECOVERY OF BANKRUPTS ESTATES, AND 
FOR THE MORE EQUAL DISTRIBUTION THEREOF (circa 1693). 
 70. HENRY BRINKELOW, THE COMPLAYNT OF RODERYCK MORS ch. XVII (Sauoy [i.e., 
Strasbourg], Per Fransicum de Turona [i.e., Wolfgang Köpfel] [1542]) (“[W]han any 
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only a portion of their debts or a longer period for repayment.71 
Unless all creditors agreed to the composition, its benefits were lost 
because the outlying creditor could imprison the debtor or demand 
payment in full at the expense of everyone else.72 In addition, 
compositions made the debtor the arbiter of what he could afford to 
pay and left him in control of his property during the pendency of the 
negotiations. By contrast, bankruptcy gave the creditors access to all 
of the debtor’s assets, it was a useful joinder device, and it provided a 
powerful stick with which to beat the recalcitrant insolvent—or the 
hold-out creditor—into agreeing to a composition.73 
Evidence indicates that creditors early on began to make use of 
the bankruptcy law against honest but unfortunate debtors, even 
though, by its terms, the Henrician law, at least, was not intended to 
apply to them. For instance, in April 1571, just as Parliament was 
considering a major new bankruptcy statute, a bill was proposed 
entitled, “An Act to repress the oppression of common promoters.” It 
included a provision prohibiting bankrupts from bringing penal suits 
“on penalty of being put in the stocks, and the suit voided.”74 A 
marginal note criticizing the text pointed out that “[m]any honest 
men by hard construction may be accounted a bankrupt, and it is not 
reason his suit should be void . . . .”75 Similarly, a document discussing 
possible changes to the bankruptcy laws dating to around 1580 spoke 
of “the bankrupt who often is driven to break by accidents with 
honest men,”76 and a draft of an ultimately aborted act from 1601 
 
marchant . . . come to an after deale, and not able to pay his credyte at his due tyme . . . than ye 
have a parcyal lawe in making of tachmentys [attachments], first come, first servyd: so one or ij 
shall be all payd, and the rest shal have nothing.”); Innes, supra note 32, at 252–53. 
 71. I. Treiman, Majority Control in Compositions: Its Historical Origins and Development, 
24 VA. L. REV. 507, 511, 519 (1938). 
 72. Id. at 511–12, 521. 
 73. See, e.g., 8 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 17, at 234 (discussing the use of bankruptcy as a 
threat); Opinion on the Right of Strangers to Partake of Bankrupts Good Rateably with English 
Creditors (circa 1580) (National Archives (Kew, London), SP 12/146 f. 232) (“The force of this 
[bankruptcy] Lawe doth undoubtedlie restraine many p[er]sons of evill consience from 
Banckrootinge to the greate benefite of subiectes & of strangers, And also compelleth many 
Banckrootes to yelde much better satisfaction to theire Creditors then otherwise they wolde.”). 
 74. 20 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, DOMESTIC SERIES, OF THE REIGN OF ELIZABETH, 
ADDENDA 1566–1579, at 346 (M.A.E. Green ed., 1871). 
 75. An Act to Repress the Opression of Common Promoters (1571) (National Archives, SP 
15/20 f. 48) (“Many honest men by harde construction may be accompted a Banckerowte and it 
is not reason his suite shuld be void . . . .”). 
 76. Opinion on the Right of Strangers to Partake of Bankrupts Good Rateably with 
English Creditors, supra note 73 (“the Bankeroote who often is dryven to breake by acsidentes 
with honeste men”). 
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“against Co[z]ening Banckrupts and lewd apprentices and factors” 
excused from certain penalties any bankrupt who could show that his 
insolvency was due to “loss by [bad] debtors, fire, the adventure of 
the seas, or other casualty [that] hath happened unto him.”77 
The distinction between honest and fraudulent insolvents was 
not new. It had been known in antiquity,78 and many continental 
insolvency systems created separate procedures during the medieval 
and early modern eras that dealt with honest insolvents civilly and 
fraudulent bankrupts criminally.79 A two-track insolvency law had 
merit in a society that looked upon bankrupts as criminals because, as 
the quotes above suggest, unfortunate insolvents raised somewhat 
different issues from fraudulent ones. It was, for instance, more 
difficult to justify a bankruptcy law whose primary intent was to 
punish the debtor for his willful failure to repay his loans because the 
debtor had arguably done nothing worthy of punishment.80 This made 
the problem of coercing the bankrupt’s cooperation even thornier. 
The honest insolvent, put into bankruptcy against his will and asked 
 
 77. Bill Against Cozening Bankrupts and Lewd Apprentices and Factors (1601) (National 
Archives, SP 12/283 f. 45) (“losse by Ill debtors, fyer, the adventure of the seas, or other casualty 
[that] hath happened unto him”); see also THOMAS GOODINGE, THE LAW AGAINST 
BANKRUPTS: OR, A TREATISE WHEREIN THE STATUTES AGAINST BANKRUPTS ARE 
EXPLAINED 35 (London, S. Heyrick 1695) (“[T]he main intent of the Statutes is to relieve 
Creditors against Frauds and Deceits . . . . Fraud and Cheat lies, or should lie at the bottom of 
all; and I understand not the distinction of a Bankrupt by Fraud, and a Bankrupt by Accident, 
which I find in some of our Books, as the Laws have been expounded.”). 
 78. Levinthal, supra note 45, at 237. 
 79. For a contemporary overview of the French and Dutch systems, see BEAWES, supra 
note 43, at 554–70, and for a discussion of the French and Spanish systems, see the Addenda in 
THOMAS COOPER, THE BANKRUPT LAW OF AMERICA, COMPARED WITH THE BANKRUPT LAW 
OF ENGLAND, at iii–xxvi (Philadelphia, John Thompson 1801). 
 80. GOODINGE, supra note 77, at penultimate page of preface (“A Bankrupt, by Fraud, I 
always hated . . . . But I regret the proceedings against Bankrupts by Accident . . . and am sorry 
they are involved in the same Penalties.”); HUMBLE PROPOSAL, supra note 18, at 5 (opining 
that honest bankrupts “merit compassion”). There are later perspectives on the same issue. See 
SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note 7, at 104 
(testimony of John Ingram Lockhart) (“[N]o better can be the result of a commission issued 
against the most upright merchant, whose extensive dealings, and vast, yet prudent ventures, 
might all have failed, through uncontrollable events; and who would thus be bowed down before 
the same species of tribunal, condemned to surrender in public the last piece of coin, or the last 
token of affection; placed on the same footing, and perhaps at the same table, with some guilty 
wretch, whose frauds, falsely denominated contracts, are about to receive complete amnesty, 
from the hands of the same judges, at the instance of some creditors as criminal as himself.”); 
151 CONG. REC. S2466 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Mikulski) (“This bill 
punishes people, assumes that all those filing for bankruptcy have purposefully created their 
debt problems, imposes a strict standard that does not take into account the circumstances 
surrounding the bankruptcy . . . . That’s not fair . . . .”). 
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to hand over his all, might have been rather indignant about the 
shabby treatment he was receiving from creditors who, not long 
before, had probably been friends or business associates. When 
confronted with the prospect of a bankruptcy that they (in theory) 
had no say in commencing,81 even honest insolvents may have sought 
to conceal assets or abscond.82 
The reaction to the dilemma of creating a law that achieved the 
cooperation of both fraudulent and honest bankrupts was threefold. 
First, seventeenth-century bankruptcy statutes focused less on the 
threshold question of what sort of pre-bankruptcy behavior brought 
an insolvent under the bankruptcy acts and more on forcing all 
bankrupts, through the threat of corporal punishment and 
imprisonment, to turn over their assets to the benefit of their 
creditors. Second, in reaction to a law that continued to ignore their 
interests, debtors colluded with friendly creditors to control when 
they entered bankruptcy. Third, eventually accepting some of the 
defects in the bankruptcy laws, Parliament considered multiple bills 
during the last quarter of the seventeenth century aimed at helping 
honest debtors compound their debts with reluctant creditors and 
avoid bankruptcy entirely. 
The sixteenth-century acts of Henry and Elizabeth provided no 
tools for the commissioners to coerce bankrupts to turn over their 
assets.83 As this lack of coercive power proved problematic, early in 
the seventeenth century Parliament passed two new bankruptcy acts 
that punished the bankrupt’s failure to work with the commissioners, 
because “the best remedy” for an increase in bankruptcy “will be fear 
of corporal punishment.”84 The 1604 Act of 1 James I, c. 15 
threatened with imprisonment bankrupts who refused to answer the 
 
 81. On collusive bankruptcies, see infra notes 90–94. 
 82. Barksdale Reading of 21 Jac. I, ch. 19 (1628) (Lincoln’s Inn Library, MS 57 ff. 2v-3r) 
(reading on the statute of 21 James I, arguing that the bankruptcy statutes responded to frauds 
that bankrupts had committed); SOME OBSERVATIONS WITH RELATION TO THE LAWS 
RESPECTING BANKRUPTS: HUMBLY OFFERED TO THE CONSIDERATION OF THIS PRESENT 
PARLIAMENT (circa 1700) (“[A]t present being exposed to the extreme Severity of the most 
rigid part of their Creditors . . . , the Bankrupts endeavour to Conceal their whole Estates, and 
thereby generally defraud their Creditors of the greatest part of their Debts.”). 
 83. See A Recital of the Several Circumstances that May Cause a Debtor to Become a 
Bankrupt, supra note 35 (“The abuses and deceipts of bankrupts is growne intollerable, the 
remedies p[ro]vided against them be weake.”). 
 84. A Briefe of the Bill Exhibited Against Bankrupts (March 13, 1624) (National Archives, 
SP 14/160 no. 74) (“[T]he best remedy will be feare of corporall punishment.”). 
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commissioners’ questions.85 Answering falsely with intent to deceive 
resulting in damage to one’s creditors in the amount of ten pounds or 
more opened the door to a criminal indictment. If found guilty, the 
bankrupt was sentenced to stand in the pillory for two hours and have 
one of his ears nailed to the pillory and then cut off.86 Twenty years 
later, 21 James I, c. 19 (1624),87 extended pillorying and ear-cutting to 
punish not just perjury but also the concealment of assets, refusal to 
disclose information about the estate to the commissioners, and the 
making of an intentionally fraudulent conveyance of twenty pounds 
or more.88 In addition, the bankrupt who could not “make it appear 
unto the said commissioners, that he or she hath sustained some 
casual loss, whereby he or she is disabled to pay what he or she then 
owed”89 would also be pilloried and lose an ear. “Casual loss” meant 
loss beyond the debtor’s control, thus demonstrating that by this time 
lawmakers expected honest insolvents to be brought under the 
bankruptcy acts. 
Acting against the increasing coerciveness of the law, debtors 
took it upon themselves to protect their interests. In principle, 
bankruptcy was involuntary. In practice, however, abundant evidence 
shows that collusion between the debtor and a favored creditor had 
become common by at least the late seventeenth century.90 
 
 85. 1 Jac. I, c. 15, § 8 (1604). 
 86. Id. § 9. Pillorying and cutting off the ear was a common seventeenth-century 
punishment for crimes ranging from “sedition, writing seditious and libellous works, forgery and 
coin-clipping to fortune-telling, drunkenness, gambling, adultery, and giving short weight.” 
DONALD VEALL, THE POPULAR MOVEMENT FOR LAW REFORM 1640–1660, at 7 (1970). 
 87. This statute is sometimes dated to 1623, presumably because the parliamentary session 
began in February 1624 n.s., which would have been 1623 o.s. E.g., 1 CHRISTIAN, supra note 52, 
at 37. In fact, no Parliament was held at all in 1623 (dating in modern style). 
 88. 21 Jac. I, c. 19, § 7 (1624). This was not the first time a statute forbade fraudulent 
conveyances by debtors. The fraudulent conveyances act of 13 Elizabeth I, c. 5, passed in the 
same 1571 session as the Elizabethan bankruptcy act, although the fraudulent conveyance law 
applied more broadly than did the bankruptcy statute—which applied only to merchants. 
CHARLES ROSS, ELIZABETHAN LITERATURE AND THE LAW OF FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE 
31, 38 (2003). The Elizabethan statute was not the first fraudulent conveyance act, but it was 
broader than earlier acts and consequently displaced them. Id. at 31–32; see also GARRARD 
GLENN, THE LAW OF FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES 7–8 (1931) (noting that a pre-Elizabethan 
fraudulent conveyances law existed but was superseded as the controlling statute by 13 
Elizabeth I, c. 5). In 1566, Parliament took up a bill against fraudulent gifts and bankrupts. The 
bill died in the House of Commons. 1 H.C. JOUR. 80 (Dec. 19, 1566). In 1571, the two issues 
were divided between two bills. See G.R. ELTON, THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND 1559–1581, 
at 74 (1986) (noting that the two issues were separated at some point before 1576). 
 89. 21 Jac. I, c. 19, § 7. 
 90. See, e.g., DEFOE, ESSAY, supra note 17, at 196 (“[W]e see frequently now, that 
Bankrupts desire Statutes, and procure them to be taken out against themselves.”); Jones, supra 
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Technically, this collusion was illegal. Influenced by its origins in the 
statute of 1543, the act of bankruptcy was theoretically a crime,91 and, 
as Lord Mansfield said, “where is the Crime of denying oneself to 
another, by previous consent and agreement?”92 In reality it became 
so commonplace for a bankrupt to find a sympathetic creditor, 
commit a deliberate act of bankruptcy in his presence, and ask the 
creditor to file the petition that such collusion generally went 
unremarked.93 A document from around 1718 described the situation 
to the chancellor: “It is the usual practice when Traders through 
Misfortune are forced, or through Knavery design to Break to cheat 
their Creditors, to procure some friend of their own to take out a 
Com[m]ission of Bankrupt against them, for fear a just Creditor 
should do it.”94 
 
note 25, at 30 n.111 (“There was always concern that the bankrupt might get his friends to 
petition for a commission.”); LORD NOTTINGHAM’S ‘MANUAL OF CHANCERY PRACTICE’ 163 
(D.E.C. Yale ed., 1965) (“Sometimes the bankrupt sets up a friend or two as creditors to 
petition against him, and they understanding one another huddle up the execution of a 
commission between them, and defeat the rest of the creditors.”); 15 H.C. JOUR. (1706) 292 
(statement of Mr. Walker) (“[I]t’s reasonably believed, four in five Commissions are taken out 
by the procurement of the Bankrupts themselves.”). 
 91. E.g., Ex parte Bennet, (1743) 2 Atk. 427, 428, 26 Eng. Rep. 716, 717 (Ch.) (Hardwicke, 
L.C.) (stating that a bankrupt “is guilty of a crime and a tort in becoming a bankrupt; and 
though the genius and turn of bankrupt acts is altered of late, yet it is by the old acts of 
parliament considered as a wrong”); FANE, supra 44, at 37–39 (noting that bankruptcy is 
criminalized but concluding that this is an error). 
 92. Hooper v. Smith, (1763) 1 W. Bl. 441, 442, 96 Eng. Rep. 252, 253 (K.B.). To “deny 
oneself” to a creditor meant to have a servant or apprentice falsely tell a creditor who had come 
seeking payment of a debt that the debtor was not available to avoid payment. See SELECT 
COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note 7, at 23 
(testimony of Basil Montagu) (“I wish to add, with respect to the law [against] concerted 
commissions of bankruptcy, that it appears to me to have originated in the supposition, that the 
bankrupt laws require the act of bankruptcy to be done with intent to defeat a creditor, and 
therefore that an act done to benefit the creditor, cannot be considered an act of bankruptcy; 
the bankrupt statute requires, that an act of bankruptcy shall be done with intent to defraud or 
delay a creditor; therefore we say, that an act which is done by a trader intending to benefit the 
creditor, cannot be done to defeat or delay him.”). 
 93. This is, for instance, what happened in the Perrott case in 1760. See, e.g., sources cited 
infra notes 235–36; see also Opinion of Counsel (British Library, Landsdowne MS 558 f. 63r) 
(giving the opinion of counsel from 1723 when the lawyer consulted did not even bother to 
comment on the fact that the bankrupt had “[d]esired and pressed one Rawson to whom he was 
largely indebted to sue out a Com[m]ission of Bankrupt against him” (abbreviations expanded 
without indication)). 
 94. Papers Relating to the Commissions of Bankrupts (probably circa 1718) (British 
Library, Stowe MS 416 f. 36v.) (abbreviations expanded without indication); see also 2 KNAPP & 
BALDWIN, supra note 2, at 316 (calling arrangements to have a creditor come and demand 
money “the common and most ready foundation of commissions of bankruptcy”). 
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But if bankruptcy were so unfair to the debtor, why would he 
choose to put himself through it, especially before the advent of 
discharge? One reason complained of in the evidence was the use of 
false creditors to prove fake debts.95 For example, assume a debtor 
owed a total of £200 to five creditors, and he had £100 in assets. If he 
convinced five more of his friends to pose as creditors to whom he 
owed another £200 in total, then each genuine creditor would be 
repaid a quarter of his original loan. The bankrupt would recoup £50 
from the friendly fake creditors and, perhaps, buy some time to pay 
back any real creditors who came seeking the remainder of their 
money. 
Finally, although Parliament passed no major new bankruptcy 
legislation between 1624 and 1706,96 it did not cease to concern itself 
with the problem of uncooperative bankrupts. Between 1678 and 
1698, it took up at least thirteen separate bills, many of which were 
designed to provide the unfortunate insolvent with an attractive 
alternative to the bankruptcy laws.97 This legislation employed a 
 
 95. 1 JAMES OLDHAM, THE MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS AND THE GROWTH OF ENGLISH 
LAW IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 413–14 (1992) (providing examples of fraudulent debtor 
cases heard by Lord Mansfield); BRIT. J., Feb. 4, 1727 (describing this scheme); REASONS 
HUMBLY OFFER’D FOR ALTERING AND AMENDING THE LAWS CONCERNING BANKRUPTS, 
AND FOR PREVENTING THE GREAT LOSSES THAT ARE DAILY SUSTAINED BY THEIR 
CREDITORS, SINCE THE EXPIRATION OF THE LATE ACTS, OF THE FOURTH AND FIFTH YEARS 
OF THE REIGN OF HER LATE MAJESTY QUEEN ANNE (circa 1718) (Lincoln’s Inn Library, MP 
100/7). 
 96. The Act of 13 & 14 Charles II, c. 24 (1661 [1662]), was a minor act concerned with 
removing noblemen and investors in certain speculative companies from the purview of the 
bankruptcy statutes. 
 97. 9 H.C. JOUR. 483, 488 (May 27 and June 4, 1678) (considering a bill to improve the 
discovery of the estates of bankrupts); 9 H.C. JOUR. 609 (May 2, 1679) (ordering that leave be 
granted to consider a bill to prevent a minority of creditors from defeating compositions 
acceptable to the majority); 9 H.C. JOUR. 661 (Nov. 24, 1680) (“Ordered, That Leave be given to 
bring in a Bill to supply the Laws against Bankruptcy.”); 9 H.C. JOUR. 730 (June 6, 1685) 
(“Ordered, That Leave be given to bring a Bill to supply the Defects of the Laws made against 
Bankrupts.”); 10 H.C. JOUR. 142 (May 22, 1689) (“Pray[ing for a] Bill for the Composition 
touching Bankrupts Estates.”); 10 H.C. JOUR. 275 (Oct. 26, 1689) (“Ordered, That Leave be 
given to bring in a Bill touching a Disposition of Bankrupts Estates.”); 10 H.C. JOUR. 364 (Apr. 
2, 1690) (ordering another “Bill touching the Disposition of Bankrupts Estates”); 10 H.C. JOUR. 
572 (Dec. 4, 1691) (“Ordered, That Leave be given to bring a Bill for the better Discovery and 
more equal Distribution of Bankrupts Estates.”); 10 H.C. JOUR. 702 (Nov. 17, 1692) (“Ordered, 
That Leave be given to bring a Bill for the better Ordering and Distributing of Bankrupts 
Estates, and Relief of their Creditors.”); 11 H.C. JOUR. 3 (Nov. 14, 1693) (“Ordered, That Leave 
be given to bring in a Bill for the better Discovery of Bankrupts Estates.”); 11 H.C. JOUR. 191 
(Dec. 21, 1694) (“A motion being made, That Leave be given to bring in a Bill for better 
Discovery of Bankrupts Estates.”); 16 H.L. JOUR. 142 (Apr. 1, 1697) (passing the Creditors’ 
Relief (Compositions) Act), codified as 8 & 9 Wm. III, c. 18 (1697); 16 H.C. JOUR. 288, 343 
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different tactic from the bankruptcy statutes by reversing the rhetoric 
on insolvency. Rather than assuming that all bankrupts were frauds 
and cheats, these bills began from the premise that most insolvents 
were honest and anxious to pay what they could to their creditors. 
The bankrupt became a pitiable unfortunate trying to do his best by 
his creditors, and the vengeful creditor, whose unwillingness to accept 
a composition prevented everyone from being paid, became the 
villain.98 The prologue to the proposed 1694 Bankrupts’ Estates Bill is 
similar to others: 
whereas bankrupts who are not able to pay their full debts, are 
oftentimes desirous to compound for the same, or to satisfy their 
creditors to the utmost of their power, but by the perverseness of 
some few creditors, . . . such good intentions have been obstructed, 
to the manifest prejudice of other creditors who have had the 
greatest share and interest in such bankrupts’ estates, and the said 
bankrupts thereupon, despairing of any good accommodation with 
their creditors, have withdrawn themselves out of their reach, or 
consumed in prison the greatest part of their estates, which 
otherwise by a reasonable composition, would have been disposed 
of amongst their creditors.99 
In these bills, concealing assets or oneself was no longer treated 
as a crime but rather as an understandable response to overbearing 
and obstinate creditors. The bills proposed that once a certain 
percentage of the creditors, usually two-thirds, agreed to a 
composition, the remainder would be forced to join, even if a 
bankruptcy proceeding had already commenced against the debtor.100 
Although the bills came with an important caveat voiding any 
agreements in which it was proved that the debtor had not made a full 
 
(May 17, 1698; July 5, 1698) (Creditors’ Relief (Composition) Repeal Act), codified as 9 & 10 
Wm. III, c. 29 (1698). 
 98. This rhetoric began early. See, for example, a document dated circa 1580 complaining 
about the “Eville dealinge” of some creditors who 
wolde overthrowe suche agrements, and utterlie spoille a nombre of poore men even 
to their owne and other the creditors greate losses, for as the execution of the statute 
taketh from the banckeroote all that he hath to the utter overthrowe of him and his 
familie and the creditors comonlie not half paid, So good compositions bringeth in 
time full payement to the Creditors, and preservation of the poore men. 
Opinion on the Right of Strangers to Partake of Bankrupts Goods Rateably with English 
Creditors, supra note 73 (interlinear additions not marked). For similar rhetoric, see REASONS 
HUMBLY OFFERED FOR PASSING THE BILL FOR THE BETTER RECOVERY OF BANKRUPTS 
ESTATES, AND FOR THE MORE EQUAL DISTRIBUTION THEREOF, supra note 69, at 149. 
 99. 1 MANUSCRIPTS OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS, 1693–1695, supra note 17, at 360–61. 
 100. E.g., id. at 361. 
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and honest disclosure of his books and estate,101 they also 
demonstrated some understanding that the debtor was far more likely 
to hand over his assets if he knew that he would get something in 
return. 
Only one of these bills passed—in 1697. It was retroactive, 
applying to failures before November 1696, and its repeal a year later 
over the objection of many merchants suggests that it had been 
intended as a sort of one-time amnesty in response to poor economic 
conditions brought about by the war with France.102 Less than a 
decade later, Parliament would take up reform again, this time within 
the bankruptcy law itself. Yet despite having begun to realize the 
necessity of a debtor-friendly carrot like discharge, the lawmakers did 
not give up their old club of threatening punishment. Indeed, they 
paired discharge with the harshest possible penalty. Discharge would 
succeed, eventually; capital punishment would be a failure, perhaps 
right from the first. 
II.  THE PIVOT POINT (1705–1707) 
The one-sidedness of early English bankruptcy, exacerbated by 
the threat of punishment for refusing to cooperate, created the need 
for a mechanism like discharge that would offer the debtor a carrot to 
balance against the existing sticks.103 Nonetheless, although some 
reformers had already advocated some kind of discharge, when a 
 
 101. E.g., id. at 364. 
 102. 2 MANUSCRIPTS OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS, 1695–1697, at 504–06 (1903); 3 
MANUSCRIPTS OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS, 1697–1699, at 240–41 (1905). The preamble to the 
repeal act blames fraud, accusing debtors of packing the vote with fake creditors. The broadside 
plea not to repeal the Act confirms that this was a consideration. It pointed out that “several 
Abuses and Perjuries have been committed; but that can be no reason, why (for the faults of 
some few) others, for whom chiefly this Act was made, should have no Benefit by it.” REASONS 
HUMBLY OFFERED TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE HOUSE OF LORDS, WHY THE ACT, 
INTITULED, AN ACT FOR THE RELIEF OF CREDITORS, BY MAKING COMPOSITION WITH THEIR 
DEBTORS, IN CASE TWO THIRDS IN NUMBER AND VALUE DO AGREE, SHOULD NOT BE 
REPEALED (1698). 
 103. See REMARKS ON THE LATE ACT OF PARLIAMENT TO PREVENT FRAUDS 
FREQUENTLY COMMITTED BY BANKRUPTS, WITH PROPOSALS FOR THE AMENDMENT 
THEREOF 8 (London, J. Morphew 1707) (“That before the passing the late Act, some further 
Provision was necessary both with respect to Bankrupts and Insolvent Persons for the procuring 
their Liberty; and also with respect to Creditors for the securing a larger, more equal, and more 
speedy Distribution of their Debtors Estates.”); REV. ST. ENG. NATION, Feb. 26, 1706, at 98 
(Daniel Defoe arguing that, at the time the 1706 Act was under consideration in the House of 
Commons, a bill with just penalty and no positive incentives for the bankrupt to cooperate 
would be “Preposterous in its Nature, Unjust in Practice, and not Practicable in Common 
Reasoning”). 
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major financial scandal persuaded Parliament to think seriously about 
bankruptcy reform in 1705 and 1706, the legislators’ immediate 
reaction was to turn to capital punishment. The moderating 
mechanism of discharge was an afterthought proposed almost a year 
later and passed despite a quite mixed reaction from the merchant 
community. 
A. Early Proposals for a Capital Punishment Provision 
For over a century prior to 1706, legislators had toyed with the 
idea of making the bankrupt’s failure to cooperate in his economic 
evisceration a capital crime. As early as 1559, the list of 
“Considerations delivered to the Parliament” recommended that 
bankruptcy be made a felony with the possibility of pardon the first 
time if all the creditors petitioned for it.104 A document that may have 
been a proposal for the 1604 bankruptcy act recommended that “[i]f 
the bankrupt forswear the damage of his creditors to a certain105 
value, he is to be indicted and suffer as in [fel]ony106 without 
admittance of his book,107 and his goods saved for his creditors.”108 The 
clause “without admittance of his book” referred to the refusal of 
benefit of clergy, also called “pleading the book,” and a defendant 
only pled benefit of clergy, a type of first offender reprieve, if he or 
she faced capital punishment.109 
No evidence has thus far answered the question whether a 
provision making bankruptcy a capital offense found its way into any 
drafts of the 1604 Act, but such a clause did make it into the draft of 
the next statute. The act that became 21 James I, c. 19 of 1624 was 
originally taken up in the House of Commons in 1621.110 The 1621 and 
1624 bills must, in their preliminary drafts, have been nearly identical, 
 
 104. 1 CALENDAR OF THE MANUSCRIPTS, supra note 33, at 162, 164. 
 105. The text is partially effaced, but the remaining letters and the context suggest that the 
word was “certaine.” 
 106. The original document has deteriorated, and the key word after “suffer as in” has been 
partly obliterated by a hole. Based on context, it is very likely “felony.” 
 107. From “without” to “book” interlinear. 
 108. A Recital of the Several Circumstances that May Cause a Debtor to Become a 
Bankrupt, supra note 35 (“If the Bankrupt forsweare ye damage of his Creditors to a certaine 
value, he is to be indicted and suffer as in [fel]ony without admittance of his book and his 
goodes saved for his Creditors.”). 
 109. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *366–67 (detailing the benefit of clergy); 1 JAMES 
FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 458–63 (London, 
Macmillan & Co. 1883) (same). 
 110. 1 H.C. JOUR. 537 (Mar. 5, 1621). 
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for verbatim printed summaries of the two exist.111 Both summaries 
indicate that the laws would punish with pillorying fraudulent 
conveyance, refusal to disclose assets, and failure to demonstrate to 
the commission that the loss suffered was caused by misfortune. The 
bills then went on to punish as a felon without benefit of clergy any 
bankrupt who absconded and did not surrender himself to the 
commissioners. In other words, the offender would be hanged. The 
briefs offered the justification that “[t]his wilfull deceit is worse than 
burglary, or robbing by the high-way, which may be prevented, this 
cannot.”112 
In debates in the House of Commons on May 24, 1621, Sir 
Edward Coke, at that time the famous former judge, appears to have 
reacted to this provision with the following observation: “Adrian 
would have bankrupts whipped to death. They deserved it. But I like 
not laws written in blood. It is sufficient that it is so penal in some 
cases.”113 Other members shared Coke’s opposition. The heavily 
edited manuscript draft of the House of Lords’ version of the 1624 bill 
shows that the Lords struggled with the capital punishment clause 
more than with any other provision of the bill.114 They attempted to 
salvage the clause by adjusting the wording, crossing out lines, and 
making short substantive additions.115 In the end, however, the Lords 
abandoned the idea and dropped the entire clause, which 
consequently did not appear in the final law. 
The argument that fraudulent bankrupts should be treated as 
felons did not die out. In a petition to the House of Lords around 
1696, the merchants of London suggested that it “may be very useful 
in a Law to be made for time to come, whereby it may be made 
Felony for Debtors to [e]mbezel their Effects, or to abscond 
 
 111. The 1621 brief is reprinted at 7 WALLACE NOTESTEIN, FRANCES HELEN RELF & 
HARTLEY SIMPSON, COMMONS DEBATES, 1621, at 104–08 (1935); the 1624 brief is at A Brief of 
the Bill Exhibited Against Bankrupts (National Archives, SP 14/160 no. 74). 
 112. 7 NOTESTEIN ET AL., supra note 111, at 107–08; A Brief of the Bill Exhibited Against 
Bankrupts, supra note 111. 
 113. 5 NOTESTEIN ET AL., supra note 111, at 176 (“But I like not Lawes written in bloode. 
Tis sufficient that it is so penall in some cases.”). 
 114. An Act for the Further Description of a Bankrupt, and Relief of Creditors Against 
Such as Shall Become Bankrupts, and for Inflicting Corporal Punishment upon the Bankrupts in 
Some Special Cases (May 4, 1624) (Parliamentary Archives, HL/PO/JO/10/1/25). 
 115. Id. at f. 5. 
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themselves . . . .”116 In the chapter of his 1697 book, Essays Upon 
Several Projects, proposing bankruptcy reforms otherwise highly 
favorable to debtors, author and political commentator Daniel Defoe 
recommended that any merchant or trader demonstrating fraudulent 
intent either by absconding upon becoming insolvent or by failing to 
cooperate with the bankruptcy process should “be guilty of Felony, 
and upon Conviction of the same, shall suffer as a Felon, without 
Benefit of Clergy.”117 
That the death penalty after so much time finally became part of 
the bankruptcy law in 1706—at exactly the moment when Parliament 
made an abrupt policy about-face and decided to offer the bankrupt 
the carrot of discharge—can be explained as a response to a very 
public scandal involving the massive financial scam that two London 
merchants, Thomas Pitkin and Thomas Brerewood, nearly pulled off 
in 1705. The anger and frustration of lawmakers and creditors over 
their inability to scare Pitkin and Brerewood into making a full and 
honest disclosure and restitution of the money they had stolen boiled 
over into a series of parliamentary statutes, one of which was the 1706 
Act of 4 & 5 Anne. 
B. The Pitkin Affair (1705) 
On Saturday, February 10, 1705, Thomas Pitkin met with his 
business partner, Thomas Brerewood, in the Swan Tavern in Cornhill, 
in the heart of the mercantile district of London.118 The men met to 
pull the trigger on a fraud that had been at least nine months in the 
making.119 After the meeting, Pitkin would leave London, absconding 
first to Scotland and later to Holland, and setting in motion an 
economic panic, an international manhunt, and a reform of English 
bankruptcy law.120 
 
 116. REASONS HUMBLY OFFER’D TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE LORDS SPIRITUAL 
AND TEMPORAL IN PARLIAMENT ASSEMBLED, AGAINST SOME CLAUSES DESIR’D TO BE 
INSERTED IN THE BILL, INTITULED, AN ACT FOR RELIEF OF CREDITORS (circa 1696). 
 117. DEFOE, ESSAY, supra note 17, at 222–23. 
 118. OBSERVATIONS ON THE BANKRUPTS BILL: OCCASION’D BY THE MANY FALSE 
MISREPRESENTATIONS AND UNJUST REFLECTIONS OF MR. DANIEL DE FOE IN HIS SEVERAL 
DISCOURSES ON THAT HEAD HUMBLY OFFERED TO THE CONSIDERATION OF ALL FAIR 
TRADERS 26 (London, B. Bragg 1706) [hereinafter OBSERVATIONS ON THE BANKRUPTS BILL]. 
 119. 14 H.C. JOUR. 542 (Feb. 20, 1705) (containing a petition of Pitkin’s creditors claiming 
that the scam had been going on for nine months). 
 120. OBSERVATIONS ON THE BANKRUPTS BILL, supra note 118, at 5, 26–27. 
KADENS IN FINAL  4/1/2010  1:07:40 PM 
1256 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:1229 
Pitkin, a linen draper, or wholesale cloth merchant, had his shop 
at the sign of the Black Spread Eagle in Kings Street, Cheapside, 
London.121 He was successful enough to have contracted a marriage 
with the daughter of a wealthy merchant.122 Brerewood served as the 
procurement agent for army regiments controlled by several of the 
most powerful noblemen of the day.123 A man of means, he came from 
a leading family of Chester, and his grandfather, Robert Brerewood, 
had been a justice of the King’s Bench.124 Although Pitkin was the 
face of the scandal, contemporaries believed that Brerewood had 
masterminded the scheme in which he involved Pitkin as an effective, 
but perhaps not particularly enthusiastic, dupe.125 
The fraud itself, to the extent it can be deduced, appears to have 
been relatively simple.126 Pitkin, using at least in part money provided 
for the purpose by Brerewood, paid off some of his existing creditors 
early, giving the impression that he was flush with cash in the wake of 
his profitable marriage.127 Having acquired the reputation for wealth, 
 
 121. Letter obligatory from Thomas Pitkin to John Winter (Oct. 27, 1704) (Rylands Library 
(Manchester, England), RYCH/3791/3); see also Letter Obligatory from Thomas Pitkin to Elias 
Barnes (Jan. 20, 1705) (Rylands Library, RYCH/3791/8 and RYCH/3791/9) (letters obligatory 
both dated Jan. 20, 1705 n.s. and indicating that Pitkin was still at Kings Street). 
 122. Petition of Thomas Brerewood to the House of Lords (Mar. 28, 1707) (Parliamentary 
Archives, HL/PO/JO/10/6/117/2372); see also 15 H.C. JOUR. 309 (Feb. 25, 1707) (noting that 
Pitkin’s wife possessed a great fortune). 
 123. See 5 NARCISSUS LUTTRELL, A BRIEF HISTORICAL RELATION OF STATE AFFAIRS 
FROM SEPTEMBER 1678 TO APRIL 1714, at 526 (Oxford, Oxford University Press 1857) (noting 
that Brerewood was an agent of “the four regents”). 
 124. See Petition of Frances Brerewood, Wife of Thomas Brerewood, Praying to Be Heard 
by Counsel Against Brerewood’s and Pitkin’s Bill (Mar. 31, 1707) (Parliamentary Archives, 
HL/PO/JO/10/6/117/2372) (referring to the marriage portion given to Brerewood’s wife by 
Brerewood’s father, Henry Brerewood, of ten houses in Chester “which were late ye Estate of 
Sir Robert Brerewood Knight” (abbreviations expanded without indication)); Anita 
McConnell, Brerewood, Sir Robert (1588–1654), in 7 OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL 
BIOGRAPHY 476 (H.C.G. Matthew & Brian Harrison eds., 2004). 
 125. 15 H.C. JOUR. 310 (Feb. 25, 1707); see also THE CASE OF THE CREDITORS OF THOMAS 
PITKIN; DISCOVERING THE FRAUDULENT CONTRIVANCE AND PRACTICES OF THOMAS 
BREREWOOD, THE SAID PITKIN’S PRINCIPAL ACCOMPLICE (circa March 1707) (Guildhall 
Library (London, England), Bside 13.22) (“Pitkin, by the repeated Sollicitations of Brerewood, 
was at last prevailed upon to Engage in this Affair.”). But see REV. ST. ENG. NATION Feb. 23, 
1706, at 94 (“differ[ing] from the General Opinion in this Case” and arguing that “the whole 
Plot, Contrivance, Management, and Method of that Capital Fraud, was Mr. P[it]kin’s, wholly 
his own . . . and the other Gentleman, meerly hook’d in, to bear some of the Scandal”). 
 126. It is also a direct ancestor of one of the most common bankruptcy scams, called a 
“bustout,” committed in the United States today. See WICKOUSKI, supra note 20, at 10. 
 127. 15 H.C. JOUR. 309 (Feb. 25, 1707); Petition of Thomas Brerewood Praying to Be Heard 
by Counsel at the Bar Against a Bill to Subject the Estate of Thomas Brerewood to the 
Creditors of Thomas Pitkin, Notwithstanding Any Agreement or Composition Made with the 
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Pitkin proceeded, on Brerewood’s instructions, to amass a huge 
quantity of merchandise on credit. Estimates of his debts ranged from 
£50,000 to as high as £100,000.128 To give some sense of how large a 
sum that was, consider that a wealthy merchant of the time would 
have had an annual income of between about £400 and £600 on a 
capitalization of between £8,000 and £12,000.129 
As he acquired the goods, Pitkin secretly passed them on to 
Brerewood.130 In addition, prior to absconding, he transferred his 
entire estate to Brerewood so that when his creditors realized that he 
had fled and tried to use bankruptcy to recuperate their money, they 
would find nothing left to go after.131 The plan apparently envisioned 
that Brerewood, who actually held all the goods, would step forward 
and graciously offer to buy the debts of Pitkin’s creditors for about 
forty cents on the dollar (or eight shillings, six pence in the pound).132 
The conspirators assumed that the creditors would be anxious to get 
something and would agree to the deal. Presumably, after quietly 
selling off the merchandise Pitkin had accumulated and repaying 
himself, Brerewood would split the remainder with Pitkin, who would 
be able to return to England free of liability or risk of bankruptcy. 
The plan did not work out quite as intended. Pitkin’s creditors 
learned of his absence immediately and became suspicious.133 When 
Pitkin did not return promptly, the creditors took out a commission of 
bankrupt,134 and, given the extent of the fraud and the number of 
creditors (later estimated to be over 140),135 on February 20, 1705, 
 
Creditors of the Said Thomas Pitkin (Mar. 28, 1707) (Parliamentary Archives, 
HL/PO/JO/10/6/117/2372). 
 128. 14 H.C. JOUR. 542 (Feb. 20, 1705) (petition of Pitkin’s creditors, claiming debts of 
above £70,000); 15 H.C. JOUR. 309 (Feb. 25, 1707) (testimony before the House of Commons 
claiming just under £60,000 in debts); 5 LUTTRELL, supra note 123, at 545 (estimating that on 
May 1, 1705, Pitkin owed debts of £100,000); THE CASE OF THE CREDITORS OF THOMAS 
PITKIN, supra note 125 (claiming that the total debts amounted to £51,000). 
 129. STANLEY CHAPMAN, MERCHANT ENTERPRISE IN BRITAIN: FROM THE INDUSTRIAL 
REVOLUTION TO WORLD WAR I 22–24 & tbl.1.1 (1992) (citing estimates from 1688 and 1759). 
 130. 15 H.C. JOUR. 309 (Feb. 25, 1707); THE CASE OF THE CREDITORS OF THOMAS PITKIN, 
supra note 125. 
 131. 15 H.C. JOUR. 308–09 (Feb. 25, 1707). 
 132. Id.; THE CASE OF THE CREDITORS OF THOMAS PITKIN, supra note 125. There were 
twenty shillings in a pound and twelve pence in a shilling. 
 133. 15 H.C. JOUR. 310 (Feb. 25, 1707); OBSERVATIONS ON THE BANKRUPTS BILL, supra 
note 118, at 27. 
 134. LONDON GAZETTE, Feb. 12, 1705. 
 135. THE CASE OF MR. GEORGE WILCOCKS, ATTORNEY AT LAW (circa Mar. 1707) 
(Guildhall Library, Bside 12.118). 
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they also petitioned the House of Commons for a public act 
condemning Pitkin.136 In their petition they explained that they had 
been unable to locate any of Pitkin’s assets and that if none were 
located, many creditors would be ruined. They wanted Parliament to 
address the problem that “the Laws, now in force, have not provided 
sufficient Remedies for the Discovery of Frauds of this Kind.”137 The 
law needed to be able to force the bankrupt to disclose and deliver his 
assets to his creditors. The Commons responded by creating a 
committee “to consider some Means to prevent the Prejudice, that 
happens to Trade by the fraudulent breaking of Traders, and for 
punishing the same.”138 
The resulting statute, entitled “An Act for the Relief of the 
Creditors of Thomas Pitkin, a Bankrupt, and for the Apprehending of 
him, and the Discovery of the Effects of the said Thomas Pitkin and 
his Accomplices,” became law on March 14, 1705.139 Among other 
provisions, it threatened Pitkin with life imprisonment and standing in 
the pillory three times a year if he did not return to London and 
cooperate with his creditors.140 In the end, Pitkin had to be captured in 
Holland and extradited back to London, where he told his creditors 
all, laying the blame squarely on Brerewood.141 Other than spending 
some time in prison while assisting his creditors in fingering his 
partner, Pitkin never seems to have made any restitution, and at some 
point he was able to move to a small village in East Anglia.142 
Brerewood did not give up so easily. Although the creditors 
identified him as an accomplice and the House of Lords ordered him 
taken into custody in early March 1705,143 he still managed to salvage 
part of the original scam by hiring an attorney, George Wilcocks, to 
 
 136. 14 H.C. JOUR. 542 (Feb. 20, 1705); THE CASE OF THE CREDITORS OF THOMAS PITKIN, 
supra note 125. 
 137. 14 H.C. JOUR. 542 (Feb. 20, 1705). 
 138. Id. 
 139. 3 & 4 Anne, c. 12 (1704 [1705 n.s.]). 
 140. ANNO REGNI ANNAE REGINAE ANGLIAE, SCOTIAE, FRANCIAE, & HIBERNIAE, 
TERTIO & QUARTO 212 (London, Charles Bill [1705 n.s.]). 
 141. 15 H.C. JOUR. 334 (Mar. 11, 1707) (petition of Thomas Brerewood); 15 H.C. JOUR. 
310–11 (Feb. 25, 1707) (containing various accounts of Pitkin’s capture in Holland). 
 142. See REV. ST. ENG. NATION, Mar. 14, 1706, at 128 (complaining that Pitkin “walks the 
Streets, and shows his Face”); THE CASE OF THE CREDITORS OF THOMAS PITKIN, supra note 
125 (mentioning that Pitkin had been in custody); Will of Hassel Pitkin (Dec. 15, 1724) 
(National Archives, PROB 11/626) (the 1724 will of Pitkin’s son Hassel Pitkin, mentioning that 
his father lived in the village of Belchamp Otten). 
 143. 5 LUTTRELL, supra note 123, at 525–26. 
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negotiate a composition with Pitkin’s creditors.144 Wilcocks assured 
the creditors “that 8 [shilling] 6 [pence] in the Pound was the utmost 
that Brerewood’s Estate would reach to pay,” and thereby convinced 
them all to sign a composition in September 1705.145 But the creditors 
eventually got wind of the fact that Brerewood held much more of the 
stolen assets than he had let on, and they obtained a parliamentary 
act against him in April 1707, making, despite the previous 
composition, his entire estate liable to Pitkin’s debts on pain of life 
imprisonment and pillorying three times a year.146 
That was not the end of the story. Brerewood fled to Livorno, 
Italy, where his creditors found him in December 1707 and at great 
expense hauled him back to London to stand trial.147 He was 
convicted in the London criminal court in March 1709 of “Defrauding 
Mr. Pitkins Creditors, and Abscond[ing] contrary to an Act of 
Parli[a]ment made on his Account” and sentenced as the statute 
against him required.148 Yet by November he had been freed on a 
royal pardon after having compounded with Pitkin’s creditors to pay 
an extra one shilling six pence in the pound over the original 
agreement.149 
 
 144. THE CASE OF MR. GEORGE WILCOCKS, ATTORNEY AT LAW, supra note 135. 
 145. THE CASE OF THE CREDITORS OF THOMAS PITKIN, supra note 125; LONDON 
GAZETTE, Sept. 17, 1705, at 2 (providing notice of the accord between Brerewood and his 
creditors). 
 146. An Act to Subject the Estate of Thomas Brerewood to the Creditors of Thomas Pitkin, 
Notwithstanding Any Agreement or Composition Made with the Creditors of the Said Thomas 
Pitkin, 5 Anne, c. 23 (1706 [1707]). 
 147. 6 LUTTRELL, supra note 123, at 241; British Library, Add. MS 38464 f. 21r (accounting 
for some of the expenses for the manhunt and return of Brerewood to England); The Case of 
the Creditors of John Coggs Deceased, and John Dann Against the Creditors of Thomas Pitkin 
(n.d.) (British Library, Add. MS 38465 f. 84v) (“[A]t the executing the sd. Agreemt. by the sd 
Coggs & Dann with the Assignees of Pitkins Credrs. there were produced severall Accots. of the 
charges of obteyning and prosecuting the sd. Act of Parliamt. against Brerewood, and bringing him 
over from beyond Sea, amounting to above 1800£.”). 
 148. THE PROCEEDINGS ON THE QUEEN’S COMMISSION OF THE PEACE, AND OYER AND 
TERMINER, AND GOAL-DELIVERY OF NEWGATE, HELD FOR THE CITY OF LONDON AND 
COUNTY OF MIDDLESEX, AT JUSTICE-HALL IN THE OLD-BAYLY, Mar. 2, 1709, at 4 [hereinafter 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE OLD BAILEY]. 
 149. LONDON GAZETTE, Nov. 3, 1709, at 2 (announcing a composition with Pitkin 
creditors); Petitions for the Pardon of Thomas Brerewood (1709) (British Library, Add. MS 
61617 ff. 158a–59a) (requesting pardon by Queen in exchange for additional payment by 
Brerewood); Case of the Creditors of Thomas Pitkin (circa 1710) (Hampshire Record Office, 
44M69/G2/177 ff. 1–2) (indicating that Pitkin creditors obtained pardon for Brerewood). This 
was still not the end of the story, for Brerewood contracted with his bankers, Coggs and Dann, 
to pay the debt. Pitkin’s creditors then went against the bankers, who ended up ruined. The 
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The Pitkin affair was ostensibly the exact sort of fraud that the 
bankruptcy acts were intended to punish, but when Pitkin absconded 
in February 1705, the governing law was the 1624 bankruptcy statute, 
which would have stripped him of his assets and sentenced him to two 
hours in the pillory and the loss of an ear.150 Pitkin had secreted his 
assets, so he had no fear of them being taken from him provided he 
kept his mouth shut, and a few hours in the stocks seemed to his 
creditors a rather puny punishment for such a grand crime. Instead, 
Pitkin’s scam had people calling for blood. Even such staunch 
advocates of a kinder, gentler bankruptcy law as Daniel Defoe and 
his sometime ally and newspaper-writing counterpart, John Tutchin, 
editor of the Observator newspaper, advocated for forceful 
punishment.151 Something, they said, needed to be done to deter 
debtors from committing these sorts of frauds and to punish them 
severely if they did.152 These sentiments did not go unnoticed in the 
Houses of Parliament.153 
 
Case of the Creditors of John Coggs Deceased, and John Dann Against the Creditors of 
Thomas Pitkin, supra note 147. 
 150. For a discussion of the common law of fraud and larceny, see infra notes 169–76. 
 151. DANIEL DEFOE, REMARKS ON THE BILL TO PREVENT FRAUDS COMMITTED BY 
BANKRUPTS 13 (London 1706) [hereinafter DEFOE, REMARKS] (writing that if the debtor who 
absconds is “ever, Pitkin like, . . . recovered and brought back by Force, he goes directly to the 
Gallows, as he deserves”); see also OBSERVATIONS ON THE BANKRUPTS BILL, supra note 118, 
at 17 (saying of Defoe, “[i]t was observed, that your Self and the rest of those Gentlemen who 
appeared on the same side with you, cry’d up Felony, the Penalty of the Bill, as a mighty 
Security to the Creditors”). 
 152. See, e.g., OBSERVATOR (London), Feb. 24, 1705, at 1 (“But what shall we do with such 
Cheats as this Pitkin? I think Hanging is his Due. Obs[ervator] ’Tis not his Due, because the 
Law does not Punish a Crime of that Nature with Death. . . . But I think it highly necessary to 
Crop these Vices in the Bud. If this Pitkin be not Punish’d, such Bankrupts will soon come in 
Fashion.”). 
 153. See, e.g., 15 H.C. JOUR. 291 (Feb. 12, 1706) (describing the testimony of Walker, a linen 
draper, that “this Act was made upon the account of that notorious Fraud of one Pitkyn”); 
OBSERVATIONS ON THE BANKRUPTS BILL, supra note 118, at 5–6 (claiming that the Pitkin 
affair was the impetus behind the bankruptcy bill); DEFOE, REMARKS, supra note 151, at 3 
(noting the appeal to Parliament made by Pitkin’s creditors); ALEXANDER JUSTICE, A 
GENERAL TREATISE OF MONIES AND EXCHANGES 80 (London 1707) (characterizing the Pitkin 
Act as “being a good Precedent for a more general Law for regulating those Affairs, and 
preventing frauds, which began to be very common; the Excellent Parliament now in Being, 
pass’d the following Act, the good Effects of which will be daily felt in England more and 
more”). 
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C. The Act of 4 & 5 Anne (1706) 
On March 19, 1706, the Act of 4 & 5 Anne, c. 17, received royal 
approval.154 For the first time it granted bankrupts who cooperated 
with the commission of bankruptcy the possibility of receiving a 
discharge of their debts and a small stipend from their estate with 
which to begin again. For this monumental shift of focus, 4 & 5 Anne 
holds a place of importance in the history of Anglo-American 
bankruptcy. But the discharge provision came into the bill only in its 
last stages. Initially, the purpose of the bill was to punish fraudsters 
like Pitkin as the felons they were thought to be: with death by 
hanging. 
The House of Commons passed the bill condemning Pitkin on 
March 1, 1705 and sent it to the House of Lords the same day. The 
next day, following the second reading of the bill in the Lords, it was 
submitted to committee.155 The March 3, 1705, entry in the published 
Journals of the House of Lords states only that the committee 
recommended that the Pitkin bill pass without amendments.156 The 
manuscript journal, kept by the clerks of the House, gives a fuller 
account. According to the manuscript, the committee had reported 
out the bill with a clause related to frauds committed by bankrupts in 
general. The Lords objected to the clause, which was removed.157 The 
idea of a new, general bankruptcy act, however, was not discarded, 
and the Lords ordered the common law judges to draft a bankruptcy 
bill directed at “prevent[ing] [f]rauds frequently committed by 
[b]ankrupts.”158 The judges returned a bill in time for it to be read two 
days later, on March 5.159 This bill passed the House of Lords with 
minor amendments, and was before the House of Commons when the 
Queen prorogued Parliament, thereby expunging all pending bills.160 
The rejected clause and the subsequent judges’ draft formed the 
original nucleus of the Act of 4 & 5 Anne, c. 17 that eventually 
became law a year later, in March 1706. The initial March 1705 draft 
 
 154. 18 H.L. JOUR. 162 (Mar. 19, 1706). 
 155. 17 H.L. JOUR. 685 (Mar. 2, 1705 n.s.). 
 156. 17 H.L. JOUR. 687 (Mar. 3, 1705 n.s.). 
 157. 6 THE MANUSCRIPTS OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS, 1704–1706, at 298 (1966). 
 158. 17 H.L. JOUR. 687 (Mar. 3, 1705 n.s.). 
 159. Id. at 689. 
 160. The bill passed the House of Lords on March 7, 1705. 17 H.L. JOUR. 691. It was read in 
the House of Commons on March 7 and 8, but it never had the required third reading before 
Parliament was prorogued on March 14, ending the session. 14 H.C. JOUR. 564–65 (Mar. 7, 
1705). 
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was short—only two-and-a-half manuscript pages—and it did not 
contain provisions concerning either discharge or the death penalty.161 
Instead the judges had written a simple bill narrowly tailored to 
punishing the likes of Pitkin.162 The preamble, which the final version 
would retain, sought to prevent the crimes committed by persons who 
“have and do daily become bankrupt, not so much by reason of losses 
and unavoidable misfortunes as to the intent to defraud and hinder 
their creditors of their just debts and duties to them due and 
owing.”163 To accomplish this, the bill required the bankrupt to 
provide the same cooperation and disclosure as in the seventeenth-
century statutes, but instead of two hours in the pillory and the loss of 
an ear, the penalty would be life imprisonment and standing in the 
pillory.164 
The Lords made two changes to the draft before sending it on to 
the House of Commons.165 First, they amended the penalty clause so 
that the uncooperative bankrupt, rather than spending his life in 
prison, would suffer as a felon without benefit of clergy. Second, the 
Lords added a sunset provision, setting the act to expire after three 
years. Both of these new provisions would appear in the final bill.166 
Modern scholars and even Chancellor Hardwicke in an opinion 
delivered in 1744 have assumed that the eventual 1706 bill was time-
limited because the new discharge concept that was found in the final 
version was meant to be a temporary experiment—or in Hardwicke’s 
thinking, a temporary expedient.167 The manuscript record suggests 
 
 161. Initial Draft of 4 & 5 Anne (Mar. 5, 1705) (Parliamentary Archives, 
HL/PO/JO/10/6/85/2131). 
 162. OBSERVATIONS ON THE BANKRUPTS BILL, supra note 118, at 6 (asserting that the 
bankruptcy bill was brought in at the same time as the Pitkin bill “to prevent and curb such like 
Practices for the future”). 
 163. Initial Draft of 4 & 5 Anne, supra note 161, at f. 1 (“[H]ave & doe dayly become 
Bankrupt, not soo much by reason of Losses and unavoidable misfortunes as to the intent to 
defraud & hinder their creditors of their just debts & dutys to them due & owing . . . .”). 
 164. Id. at f. 3. 
 165. Id.; Manuscript Journal of the House of Lords, 24 Oct. 1704–14 Mar. 1705 (Mar. 6, 
1705) (Parliamentary Archives, HL/PO/JO/5/1/40). 
 166. See 4 & 5 Anne, c. 17, §§ 1, 16 (1705 [1706 n.s.]). 
 167. See, e.g., Ex parte Burton, (1744) 1 Atk. 255, 255–56, 16 Eng. Rep. 163, 164–65 (Ch.) 
(stating that the discharge provision in the statute of Anne “was temporary at first, and never 
intended to be a perpetual law, but was made in consideration of two long wars which had been 
very detrimental to traders, and rend[e]red them incapable of paying their creditors”); Cohen, 
supra note 11, at 156 (describing one historian’s belief that discharge “was devised in response 
to mercantile difficulties existing immediately prior to the passage of the 1705 act”); Louis 
Edward Levinthal, The Early History of English Bankruptcy, 67 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 19 n.67 (1919) 
(suggesting that the “dangers” of the 1706 Act’s “leniency” led to stricter provisions in the 1732 
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otherwise, for the sunset provision came into the statute nearly a year 
before discharge. Instead, the legislative history indicates that in the 
original bill, it was the death penalty provision that was meant to be 
temporary. 
After almost 150 years of thinking about making fraudulent 
bankruptcy a felony and with the Pitkin affair simmering in the 
background, why would the Lords have been hesitant about 
permanently recategorizing bankruptcy crime as a felony without 
benefit of clergy? In the view of one bankruptcy historian, the 
introduction of the penalty of death for fraudulent bankruptcy was an 
insignificant change that, “[w]hile obviously quite 
dramatic, . . . should not be overstated . . . [because] bankruptcy was 
no different from most property crimes of that era, which also 
provided for the possible imposition of the death penalty.”168 In fact, 
bankruptcy was quite different from other similar crimes of the era. 
As a property crime, bankruptcy resembled larceny, except that 
larceny required that the stolen property be obtained illegally.169 Thus, 
larceny could not cover the situation in which a person received 
goods through a contractual agreement and then made off with them. 
Such an act would have to have been addressed civilly.170 More 
importantly, although the early eighteenth century witnessed a 
sustained increase in the number of felonies removed from benefit of 
clergy, many larcenies remained clergyable, meaning that those 
convicted were not hanged.171 Indeed, during the sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries, when some members of Parliament were 
 
bankruptcy act); McCoid, supra note 11, at 166 n.12, 182 (“The introduction of the discharge is 
described as initially an experiment because the limitation from the outset on the duration and 
coverage of the 1706 act strongly suggests that it was meant to be tentative in character.”). 
 168. Tabb, supra note 11, at 11. 
 169. 6 SIR JOHN BAKER, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 1483–1558, at 
564 (2003) (defining larceny as “a taking and carrying away of a chattel of value from the 
possession of someone with better title, without that person’s consent, intending permanently to 
deprive him of the possession”). Indeed the question of servants or bailees making off with 
property received in the course of their duties had exercised sixteenth-century judges, requiring 
an act of Parliament in 1529 to declare that it was a “felony for a servant to abscond with or 
‘imbezil’ goods worth 40s. delivered to him by his master to keep to his master’s use.” Id. at 
567–68. 
 170. See 2 EDWARD HYDE EAST, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 816 (London, 
A. Strahan 1803) (“Where indeed the possession is honestly obtained upon a contract or trust in 
the first instance, the subsequent dishonest conversion of it . . . is no other than a breach of trust, 
for which the party injured has a civil remedy.”). 
 171. See J.M. BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND 1660–1800, at 144 (1986) 
(describing property crimes newly excluded from clergy during the late sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries). 
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already advocating hanging bankrupts, nearly all larcenies were 
clergyable.172 
To extend the comparison beyond property crimes, fraudulent 
bankruptcy was analogous to common law fraud, also called cheat, 
and forgery. Neither of these were capital crimes in 1706, though 
some types of forgery became capital during the course of the 
eighteenth century.173 Fraud, for instance, which the common law 
limited to a narrow list of acts including using false weights and 
measures, selling goods with counterfeit marks, and playing with false 
dice,174 had been extended a year before the passage of the first 
bankruptcy act to include the use of false tokens or counterfeit letters 
to obtain personal property. But the punishment prescribed was to be 
by pillorying, “or otherwise, by any corporal pain, (except pain of 
death).”175 None of the other crimes against public trade, including 
smuggling, were capital offenses in 1706, and most were categorized 
as misdemeanors.176 
Thus, in imposing capital punishment in the 1705 draft and the 
eventual 1706 law, Parliament treated bankruptcy as a special case, 
and the fraudulent bankrupt as a particularly incorrigible character. 
In so doing, the legislators continued to employ an old approach to 
fight an old battle, using coercion and threats to try to solve the 
perennial problem of forcing the debtor to give up his assets when the 
rewards of doing so were not readily apparent. But at the same time, 
the sunset provision suggests that they were far from convinced that 
death was the right penalty.177 This is further evidenced by an 
alteration in the draft proffered when the Lords took up the bill again 
during the following session in November 1705. The proposed text 
was nearly identical to the March draft except for a blank after the 
words “being thereof lawfully Convicted by Indictment or 
 
 172. Id. at 143. 
 173. 3 STEPHEN, supra note 109, at 181–82; 2 EAST, supra note 170, at 853, 1003; BEATTIE, 
supra note 171, at 146 (explaining that forgery was removed from benefit of clergy in 1729). 
Blackstone equated forgery with fraudulent bankruptcy, calling both crimen falsi—a crime of 
falsehood. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *157. 
 174. 3 JOSEPH CHITTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 995 (London, A.J. 
Valpy 1816). 
 175. Id. at 996 (discussing 33 Hen. VIII, c. 1). 
 176. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *154–60. 
 177. Cf. BURGES, supra note 48, at 289 (claiming that “[w]henever the framers of a law 
found themselves at a loss to prevent what they wished effectually to prohibit, they enacted the 
penalty of death”). James Oldham kindly pointed this text out to me. 
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Information Shall Suffer.”178 It seems that the Lords intended to leave 
open to further discussion the imposition of capital punishment. They 
did not have that debate, however, because they chose to abandon 
their own bill in favor of one proposed by the Commons.179 
By the time the Act of 4 & 5 Anne passed the two Houses of 
Parliament and received royal assent in March 1706, it had morphed 
into a major reform of bankruptcy law.180 In addition to introducing 
capital punishment and discharge, it made important procedural 
changes, such as requiring the commissioners to hold three creditors’ 
meetings to help organize the process of proving debts and examining 
witnesses.181 The bill that finally became “An Act to Prevent Frauds 
Frequently Committed by Bankrupts” was first read in the House of 
Commons in late October 1705.182 Although different from the Lords 
bill of March, it retained most of that draft’s language, including the 
felony provision. The Commons bill was read a second time on 
November 8 and then sent to committee,183 where it languished into 
the new year. At that point, according to Daniel Defoe,184 “several 
Persons on both sides began to consider how to make it a compleat 
Act, and both to relieve the miserable but honest Debtor already 
fallen into Disaster, and secure Trade against the numerous Mischiefs 
of Bankrupts for the Future.”185 As a result, on February 4 the 
committee was instructed to “receive a Clause, for the better 
discovery and preventing Frauds committed by Prisoners and 
Bankrupts, and for the Relief of such Prisoners for Debt as Shall 
resign their Effects to their Creditors.”186 If Defoe is to be believed,187 
 
 178. Bankrupts Prevention of Frauds Bill (1705) (Parliamentary Archives, 
HL/PO/JO/10/6/85/2150 f. 3). 
 179. 18 H.L. JOUR. 13 (Nov. 7, 1705) (first reading of bill). No further readings of the bill are 
recorded. 
 180. CHRISTIAN, supra note 52, at 59 n.1 (discussing how this statute ushered in “a new æra 
in the system of the bankrupt law”). 
 181. 4 & 5 Anne, c. 17, §§ 1, 18 (1705 [1706 n.s.]) (capital punishment); id. § 7 (discharge); id. 
§ 13 (three meetings). 
 182. 15 H.C. JOUR. 5 (Oct. 31, 1705). 
 183. 15 H.C. JOUR. 15 (Nov. 8, 1705). 
 184. Defoe had been actively involved in the debates about the bankruptcy bill. He was 
himself a bankrupt, and it was a topic that had long concerned him greatly. See Quilter, supra 
note 26, at 54–55, 62–63, 68. 
 185. DEFOE, REMARKS, supra note 151, at 3–4. 
 186. 15 H.C. JOUR. 125–26 (Feb. 4, 1706). 
 187. It is not clear that Defoe always told the truth in the service of his political projects. 
See, e.g., OBSERVATIONS ON THE BANKRUPTS BILL, supra note 118, at 25–33 (accusing Defoe 
of “varnishing over” the truth in his advocacy of the bankruptcy bill). 
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the committee’s initial response to their mandate had two parts: 
discharge and requiring all creditors to come into the collective. 
The idea of discharge did not originate in 1706. In 1662, 
Parliament had considered a bill relieving debtors worth less than £10 
of their debts upon their relinquishing two-thirds of their assets.188 The 
string of composition acts repeatedly proposed in the last quarter of 
the same century had also assumed a proceeding analogous to 
discharge, though within the context of contract rather than 
bankruptcy.189 Defoe had called for discharge in his 1697 book, Essays 
Upon Projects,190 and he and his newspaper, A Review of the State of 
the English Nation, in which he wrote passionately in favor of 
bankruptcy reform during February and March 1706, were at the 
peak of their influence at the time of the 1706 debate.191 
Writing shortly after the passage of the 1706 Act, Defoe claimed 
that the discharge provision had been an attempt to resolve an 
absurdity in an early version of the bill. In early English bankruptcy, 
creditors retained the right to remain outside the collective and 
pursue their regular common law remedies. If, however, the debtor 
were forced to surrender everything, then the creditors participating 
in the bankruptcy would receive an unfair advantage because nothing 
would be left for the outlying creditor. Conversely, the debtor 
remained exposed to prosecution for debts by creditors who did not 
come in. “From this Circumstance it seem’d so rational, either to 
force all the Creditors to come in, or to discharge the Debtor from 
them that stood out, that when such an Offer was made to the House, 
it was too reasonable to be opposed . . . .”192 Based on Defoe’s 
constant commentary in his Review, it appears that the idea of forcing 
 
 188. Draft of an Act for Relief of Creditors and Release of Poor Prisoners (Jan 27, 1662 n.s.) 
(Parliamentary Archives, HL/PO/JO/10/1/310A) 
 189. McCoid, supra note 11, at 182–85; REASONS HUMBLY OFFER’D TO THE RIGHT 
HONOURABLE THE LORDS SPIRITUAL AND TEMPORAL IN PARLIAMENT ASSEMBLED, 
AGAINST SOME CLAUSES DESIRED TO BE INSERTED IN THE BILL, INTITULED, AN ACT FOR 
RELIEF OF CREDITORS, supra note 116 (presenting the opposition of the merchants of London 
to a clause in a composition bill allowing for discharge and an allowance). 
 190. DEFOE, ESSAY, supra note 17, at 214; see also OBSERVATOR, Feb. 24, 1706 n.s., at 1 
(calling for discharge). 
 191. Quilter, supra note 26, at 58, 62–63. Defoe offered statements of his own role in the 
process. See REV. ST. ENG. NATION, Mar. 19, 1706, at 133; REV. ST. ENG. NATION, Mar. 23, 
1706, at 142; DEFOE, REMARKS, supra note 151, at 18 (declaring, “I confess, I press’d hard in 
Parliament for an Amendment” concerning the certificate requirement). 
 192. DEFOE, REMARKS, supra note 151, at 4. 
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creditors into the bankruptcy initially attracted more attention and 
generated more antagonism than did the idea of discharge.193 
Perhaps as a consequence, the creditor requirement did not 
make it into the final bill and may not even have survived the House 
of Commons. By contrast, when the Commons committee reported 
out a bill on February 27, 1706, it included a discharge provision that 
probably also granted the bankrupt a small allowance of up to 5 
percent of his net estate to enable him to begin again.194 It seems that 
all the clause required the bankrupt to do to obtain his discharge was 
to swear an affidavit that he had turned over all his assets fully and 
honestly.195 The bill narrowly made it out of Commons on March 6 
and was immediately given to the Lords.196 
On March 7, the Lords sent the bill to the committee of the 
whole house,197 and the opposition to discharge intensified. The bill’s 
supporters believed that it would pass in early March.198 To help 
ensure passage, they recruited merchants to appear before the Lords 
to voice their support.199 That plan backfired when the merchants 
heard the details of the bill.200 They had been in favor of a bill to 
“prevent frauds [] frequently committed by bankrupts,” which was 
the title inherited from the Lord’s initial 1705 draft, but they did not 
like the idea, as one said, that “I may be paid my debts rather by 
affidavit than [by] money.”201 In response, the Lords added an 
amendment requiring that no certificate of discharge be granted 
unless the commissioners of the bankruptcy certified to the chancellor 
 
 193. REV. ST. ENG. NATION, Feb. 26, 1706, at 98 (stating that the main objection being 
argued in the House of Commons was the creditor rule). Perhaps this had been Defoe’s 
intention all along. By focusing attention on the creditor rule, he and his allies may have hoped 
that discharge would fly under the radar. 
 194. This ended up as 4 & 5 Anne, c. 17, § 7 (1705 [1706 n.s.]). 
 195. 6 MANUSCRIPTS OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS, 1704–1706, supra note 157, at 427–28. 
 196. 15 H.C. JOUR. 188 (Mar. 6, 1706) (reporting a vote of 54 to 53 on a rider making the bill 
retroactive, which was the last part of the bill voted on). 
 197. 18 H.L. JOUR. 140–41 (Mar. 7, 1706). 
 198. OBSERVATIONS ON THE BANKRUPTS BILL, supra note 118, at 8; see also A LETTER 
FROM A NORTH-BRITAIN, TO HIS FRIEND IN LONDON 1 (1708). 
 199. See supra note 198. 
 200. REV. ST. ENG. NATION, Mar. 21, 1706, at 138; OBSERVATIONS ON THE BANKRUPTS 
BILL, supra note 118, at 8–9; see also DEFOE, REMARKS, supra note 151, at 8 (“[T]he 
[merchants’] Arguments were so weak, and the People appear’d so hot, and so visibly 
partial . . . .”). 
 201. 6 MANUSCRIPTS OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS, 1704–1706, supra note 157, at 427–28 (“I 
fear this Bill may have ill consequences. I like the Bill as to the title of it, but it will encourage 
sloth and those that venture on others’ estates.” (quoting testimony of another merchant)). 
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or Lord Keeper in writing that the bankrupt had made a full and 
honest disclosure of his assets.202 The bill was sent back to the 
Commons with this amendment and was passed into law on March 19, 
1706.203 
Within a month of the passage of the Act, the number of 
docketed commissions of bankruptcy skyrocketed. In 1705, an 
estimated 159 commissions were opened; in 1706, that number grew 
to 567. Bankruptcy commissions did not reach 1706 numbers again 
until the 1770s.204 Breaking 1706 down by quarter shows the impact of 
the Act even more dramatically: quarter one, prior to the passage of 
the Act saw thirty-one commissions issued; quarter two, during the 
period when the Act was available retroactively, saw ninety-one; 
quarter three saw 166; and quarter four, 279.205 
Unfortunately, easy discharge would not last. In January 1707, 
less than a year after the passage of the Act, the House of Commons 
received a petition from the merchants and traders of London 
complaining that, notwithstanding the Act, “there are still carried on 
divers notorious Frauds (and it may be feared) wilful Perjuries, and 
secret Evasions of the said Law, to the manifest Prejudice of Trade, 
and the endangering of the Nation’s Credit both at home and 
abroad.”206 A committee was immediately created to investigate 
abuses of the new bankruptcy law.207 In early February, the Commons 
received a petition from the company of mercers, grocers, 
apothecaries, and haberdashers of the city of Worcester complaining 
that the bankruptcy bill “hath been made use of by fraudulent 
Persons, to the Damage of their Creditors,” and asking that the bill be 
 
 202. Manuscript Journal of the House of Lords, 14 June 1705–21 Nov. 1706 (Mar. 11, 1706) 
(Parliamentary Archives, HL/PO/JO/5/1/41) (amendments made to the act); 18 H.L. JOUR. 153 
(Mar. 13, 1706) (additional amendments made and agreed to); 15 H.C. JOUR. 198–99 (Mar. 19, 
1706) (reading amendments from the Lords, including amendment concerning discharge 
certificate); REV. ST. ENG. NATION, Mar. 16, 1706, at 130 (Defoe discussing this 
“Amendment”); REASONS HUMBLY OFFERED FOR PASSING THE BILL, NOW DEPENDING IN 
PARLIAMENT RELATING TO BANKRUPTS (1706) (Guildhall Library, Bside 17.87) (referring to 
the Lords’ amendment). 
 203. 18 H.L. JOUR. 162 (Mar. 19, 1706). 
 204. JULIAN HOPPIT, RISK AND FAILURE IN ENGLISH BUSINESS 1700–1800, at 182–83 
(1987); see also Papers Related to the Commissions of Bankruptcy (n.d.) (British Library, Stowe 
416 f. 30r). (listing the number of bankruptcy commissions sealed between June 24, 1706, and 
April 14, 1719, including 715 commissions for the year June 24, 1706 to June 24, 1707, and only 
200 commissions for the following year). 
 205. HOPPIT, supra note 204, at 187–88. 
 206. 15 H.C. JOUR. 240 (Jan. 17, 1707). 
 207. Id. 
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amended.208 The following week, the Commons heard testimony of 
London merchants concerning the “Abuses, and ill Practices, arising 
from the said Act.”209 Perhaps significantly, during the same period, 
the bankruptcy committee was also taking testimony about the Pitkin 
affair, finally learning how Pitkin had obtained his money and about 
Brerewood’s attempts to cheat the creditors with his disingenuous 
offer of a composition.210 
On February 27, 1707, exactly one year after the first bankruptcy 
act with discharge was introduced, the Commons received a bill to 
amend the 1706 Act.211 A key change was the requirement that four-
fifths of the creditors in number and value consent to the bankrupt 
receiving his certificate of discharge.212 The Commons passed the bill 
in late March, sending it to the Lords, who considered but refused 
several proposed amendments in favor of debtors,213 and returned the 
bill unaltered with their assent on April 4.214 Again the impact on the 
opening of bankruptcy commissions was immediate. In the first 
quarter of 1707, before the new law was in place, 149 commissions 
were opened, but in the second quarter only sixty-four, in the third 
quarter, thirty-six, and in the fourth quarter, forty-nine. The numbers 
remained well below their 1706 peak in the following years.215 The 
new rule helped create the phenomenon of the undischarged 
bankrupt: the bankrupt who had handed over his assets but who did 
not receive a discharge in return, and who therefore remained liable 
for all unpaid debts.216 
The stiffened requirements for discharge affected the place of 
capital punishment in the statutory scheme in two contradictory ways. 
The original thought in 1706—at least according to Daniel Defoe—
was that a carrot would work better than a stick.217 If the bankrupt 
knew he had some hope—not only of getting out of prison or out 
 
 208. 15 H.C. JOUR. 280 (Feb. 8, 1707). 
 209. 15 H.C. JOUR. 291 (Feb. 12, 1707). 
 210. 15 H.C. JOUR. 308–11 (Feb. 25, 1707). 
 211. 15 H.C. JOUR. 314 (Feb. 27, 1707). 
 212. 5 Anne, c. 22, § 2 (1707). 
 213. 7 THE MANUSCRIPTS OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS 1706–1708, at 78–82 (1966) (quoting a 
description in the manuscript minutes concerning the vote on the amendments and describing 
the amendments). 
 214. 18 H.L. JOUR. 313–14 (Apr. 4, 1707). 
 215. HOPPIT, supra note 204, at 188. 
 216. For a discussion of the undischarged bankrupt, see infra notes 332–38 and 
accompanying text. 
 217. DEFOE, REMARKS, supra note 151, at 3–5. 
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from under the shadow of the threat of imprisonment, but also of 
having that portion of the debts that he could not pay forgiven—then 
he would be more likely to deal honestly with his creditors under the 
bankruptcy commission. He would not need to conceal assets as the 
only way to survive the bankruptcy ordeal.218 But when Parliament 
reacted to alleged frauds by making discharge more difficult to 
obtain, many bankrupts continued to have an incentive to conceal 
assets to protect themselves against the possibility that they would not 
be released from prison and freed of their debts. Consequently, acts 
of fraudulent bankruptcy continued alive and well, sometimes 
committed by otherwise honest men afraid of not getting a discharge. 
Yet only a handful of bankrupts were ever prosecuted, let alone 
hanged. Part III attempts to explain why. 
III.  PUNISHMENT FOR FRAUDULENT BANKRUPTCY (1706–1820) 
The two acts of Anne were both set to expire in 1709 but were 
extended until 1716, when they were permitted to lapse.219 A new 
bankruptcy act, passed in 1719, reintroduced capital punishment and 
discharge, but, after being continued twice, that act, too, was allowed 
to expire in 1729.220 Finally, in 1732, Parliament passed a major 
bankruptcy reform bill incorporating prior laws and adding some new 
elements. This bill also included discharge and the felony provision, 
and thereafter capital punishment for fraudulent bankruptcy 
remained a part of English law until 1820.221 Thus, for 108 years 
between 1706 and 1820, England supposedly executed fraudulent 
bankrupts, but only four men were in fact hanged: Richard Towne, a 
tallow-chandler, in 1712; Alexander Thompson, an embroider, in 
1756; John Perrott, a cloth merchant, in 1761; and John Senior, a 
 
 218. See REASONS HUMBLY OFFERED FOR PASSING THE BILL, NOW DEPENDING IN 
PARLIAMENT RELATING TO BANKRUPTS, supra note 202 (“This Bill will prevent Bankrupts 
concealing their Effects, both by the Severe Penalties it Enacts, and the Incouragements given 
thereby . . . .”). 
 219. 7 Anne, c. 25 § 4 (1708 [1709]). 
 220. 5 Geo. I, c. 24, §§ 1, 3 (1718 [1719]), continued by 11 Geo. I, c. 29 (1724 [1725]), further 
continued by 13 Geo. I, c. 27 (1727). 
 221. 5 Geo. II, c. 30, § 1 (1732). This statute also had a sunset provision but was continued 
multiple times until it was made permanent by 37 Geo. III, c. 120 (1797). See SELECT 
COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note 7, at 51 
(testimony of Sir Samuel Romilly). 
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clothier, in 1813.222 A handful of other men were convicted but were 
pardoned or had their sentences reduced or overturned.223 
This could be interpreted as a remarkable record of deterrence, 
but the evidence of continued bankruptcy crime suggests otherwise. 
The reality seems to have been that imposing capital punishment for 
fraudulent bankruptcy was a spectacular failure—not simply because 
it did not prevent the frauds at which it was aimed but also because it 
was so rarely enforced, permitting other frauds to flourish.224 This 
failure will be studied from both a micro and a macro perspective, 
examining, on the one hand, the motivations of individuals and, on 
the other, the systemic problems that arose in the century after the 
introduction of discharge and capital punishment. Section A takes the 
first approach, presenting a microhistory of the bankruptcy of John 
Perrott, the paradigmatic fraudulent bankrupt. Perrott borrowed 
money dishonestly and categorically refused to pay it back once the 
bankruptcy proceedings began. For his obstinacy, he was hanged. Yet 
when he dropped dead at the end of a rope, his creditors still could 
not locate their missing money. The penalty, therefore, did not 
further either of the traditional goals of bankruptcy: repaying 
creditors or deterring debtor fraud.225 
Section B discusses the broader reasons why capital punishment 
failed. Even in the face of such a harsh penalty, and even with the 
 
 222. Because no official records were kept, it is not certain that this list is complete. There 
are, however, two reasons to believe that no one else was hanged for fraudulent bankruptcy. 
First, no newspaper stories or Old Bailey accounts have surfaced. Second, the appendix to an 
1819 parliamentary committee report on the criminal laws records only the four known 
executions. SELECT COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL LAWS, &C., REPORT, 1819, H.C. 585, at 132, 
147, 152–53. 
 223. See the Appendix for the complete list. 
 224. James Bland Burges, the author of a treatise on bankruptcy reform in the late 
eighteenth century, asserted that the death penalty provision was not used because it was legally 
inoperative. In the printed version of the statute, the fraudulent bankrupt was to be “convicted 
by Judgement or Information.” As Burges pointed out, however, the common law mandates 
that criminal defendants be proceeded against by indictment. BURGES, supra note 48, at 289–90; 
see also GREEN, supra note 43, at 225–28 (this appears to be the earliest edition in which this 
point is made). Although Burges was right on the law, he was wrong on the statute. As Edward 
Christian related in a later treatise, the words “judgment or information” were a printer’s error. 
The parliamentary roll containing the official text of the statute had “indictment or 
information.” CHRISTIAN, supra note 52, at 123 n.1 (citing King v. Bullock, (1807) 1 Taunt. 71, 
168 Eng. Rep. 595 (E.C.)). 
 225. See, e.g., SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, 
supra note 7, at 80 (testimony of Archibald Cullen) (“The bankrupt law was introduced with a 
view to prevent and punish the frauds of debtors, and to distribute their property equally 
amongst all their creditors . . . .”). 
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possibility of discharge, bankruptcy crimes continued to be 
committed. Contemporaries believed fraud flourished because these 
crimes went mostly unpunished. As a result of the lack of 
prosecutions, the rest of the bankruptcy system ended up in 
disequilibrium, though one that differed from what existed prior to 
1706. Instead of bankruptcy being a creditors’ remedy, it became—
too often for the likes of contemporaries—a fraudulent debtors’ 
playground. 
A. The Bankruptcy of John Perrott (1760–1761) 
John Perrott’s bankruptcy and execution in 1761 captured the 
attention of the times and continued to be remembered decades later 
as the quintessential bankruptcy fraud.226 The case was so famous that 
a nineteenth-century editor of Blackstone’s Commentaries called 
Perrott the last bankrupt hanged.227 In fact, he was not. That honor 
went to John Senior, a clothier from the village of Alverthope, 
outside Wakefield in Yorkshire, who in 1813 became the fourth and 
last man hanged for fraudulent bankruptcy in England. Senior did 
what many bankrupts probably did: he concealed some of his goods, 
in this instance a relatively small amount of cloth worth half his total 
debt.228 He was likely hanged because he compounded his 
concealment with fraud. Although it does not appear that his 
creditors had learned of the hidden assets during the initial period of 
investigation, before receiving his certificate, Senior began trading in 
his brother’s name. “This excited suspicion, and led to enquiries, 
which terminated in the assignees’ instituting the present 
prosecution.”229 He was found guilty on the evidence of the many 
people who had helped him hide the cloth and move it from place to 
place in the dead of night.230 The judge “intimated” that Senior should 
expect no mercy, and he was accordingly hanged a few weeks later.231 
The case stirred some passing interest in local newspapers, but by the 
 
 226. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 227. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at *482 n.a. 
 228. See Fraudulent Bankrupt, HULL PACKET, Apr. 6, 1813, at 4 (reporting on Senior’s case 
and also discussing his creditors and his total debts of £1,181); 2 CHITTY, supra note 174, at 516–
17 (using Senior’s indictment as a model and listing concealed property worth £560 out of total 
debts of £1,181). 
 229. Fraudulent Bankrupt, supra note 228, at 4. 
 230. HULL PACKET, Mar. 30, 1813, at 4. 
 231. Fraudulent Bankrupt, supra note 228, at 4; Execution, LEEDS MERCURY, Apr. 10, 1813, 
at 3. 
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time the bankruptcy lawyer and activist, Basil Montagu, testified 
before a parliamentary committee studying bankruptcy reform five 
years later, Senior’s story was nearly forgotten. In enumerating to the 
committee the men executed for bankruptcy crime, Montagu could 
only note, “I rather think, but am not certain, that a person has been 
executed within the last eight or nine years, at York.”232 
By contrast, John Perrott’s bankruptcy had all the necessary 
titillating elements to excite public curiosity: money, sex, and intrigue. 
Capitalizing on the interest, several pamphlets were published laying 
out the story in great detail, and a number of archival documents and 
judicial opinions flesh out the numerous legal proceedings in which 
Perrott engaged. These permit a close-up view of the bankruptcy 
process and show how the capital felony provision was ultimately 
unable to prevent or to provide redress for fraud. 
On January 17, 1760, John Perrott, a cloth merchant, called his 
creditors together at the Half Moon Tavern in Cheapside, London to 
inform them that he could not pay his debts.233 Through 1758, Perrott 
had done business on a cash basis. In 1759, he suddenly began to buy 
on credit and in significantly larger quantities than before. But he had 
built a good reputation for honesty during the nearly thirteen years 
he had been trading for his own account, and his creditors let his debt 
mount.234 Even at the January 17 meeting, the creditors were 
favorably impressed with his forthrightness; nevertheless, they 
decided to sue out a commission of bankruptcy and arranged for one 
of their number to call at Perrott’s warehouse so that he could “be 
denied.”235 Denying yourself to a creditor meant instructing an agent 
to deny a creditor who came seeking money access to you in order to 
avoid payment. Accordingly, the following morning William Hewitt, a 
warehouseman and one of Perrott’s principle creditors, went to 
Perrott’s warehouse and was duly denied by the apprentice.236 
 
 232. SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note 
7, at 21. 
 233. 1 AN AUTHENTIC NARRATIVE OF THE PROCEEDINGS UNDER A COMMISSION OF 
BANKRUPTCY AGAINST JOHN PERROTT 1 (London, R. Griffiths 1761) [hereinafter AUTHENTIC 
NARRATIVE]. 
 234. 2 KNAPP & BALDWIN, supra note 2, at 316. 
 235. PROCEEDINGS OF THE OLD BAILEY, Oct. 21, 1761, at 403 (concerning the act of 
bankruptcy); see also 1 AUTHENTIC NARRATIVE, supra note 233, at 1, 3. 
 236. PROCEEDINGS OF THE OLD BAILEY, supra note 235, at 394 (testimony about the act of 
bankruptcy); Bankruptcy Commission Docket Book (Jan. 19, 1760) (National Archives, B4/16 f. 
22) (describing Hewitt as a warehouseman). 
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Perrott may have hoped he could avoid a commission of 
bankruptcy, for he had a major fraud in the works, and the scrutiny of 
a bankruptcy proceeding was going to reveal it.237 Instead, he may 
have believed that by calling the creditors together and appearing 
honest, they would be willing to compound the debt, or he may have 
been trying to pull off the sort of scheme, often lamented in the 
bankruptcy literature, in which a debtor put out word that he was 
insolvent and about to commit an act of bankruptcy, and the creditors 
rushed in to cut deals. The debtor, who was in fact solvent, then 
walked away with the money he had been absolved from repaying.238 
Hewitt promptly petitioned for a commission, which issued the 
day after Perrott committed the act of bankruptcy.239 The 
commissioners met immediately, and at that meeting they found 
Perrott a bankrupt, and he “surrendered himself as such.”240 Between 
Perrott’s reluctant testimony and the evidence of his accounts and 
associates, the commissioners soon realized that a large sum of money 
was unaccounted for. Several pieces of evidence made them 
suspicious early on. First, though Perrott’s early account books were 
organized and thorough, during 1758 they began to become confused, 
and by 1759 they were in “total disorder.”241 Second, his annual debt 
suddenly and unaccountably increased from less than £300 in the 
years before 1758 to upwards of £27,000 in 1759.242 Third, at the same 
time that he was buying more on credit, he had also begun to sell 
anonymously through a broker, Henry Thompson. Perrott sent goods 
to Thompson, who then invited merchants to make offers without 
telling them whom he represented.243 These prospective buyers, 
among them the leading merchants in town,244 offered to buy at 15 to 
20 percent below prime cost, and Perrott always ordered Thompson 
 
 237. 1 AUTHENTIC NARRATIVE, supra note 233, at 4 (“An examination, exhibiting such 
strong proofs of the deponent’s misconduct, was not likely to extenuate the justly preconceived 
suspicions of his creditors.”). 
 238. See, e.g., 5 Geo. I, c. 24, § 1 (1718 [1719]) (describing a similar practice); THE 
BANKRUPT. A MODERN CHARACTER (circa 1785) (laying out the same scheme). 
 239. Bankruptcy Commission Docket Book, supra note 236 (recording the issuance of the 
commission by Sir Robert Henley, the Lord Keeper, naming five commissioners, of whom three 
were esquires and two gentlemen). 
 240. 1 AUTHENTIC NARRATIVE, supra note 233, at 1. 
 241. Id. at 4 n.(*). 
 242. 4 BLOODY REGISTER, supra note 5, at 270. 
 243. 1 AUTHENTIC NARRATIVE, supra note 233, at 6. 
 244. Id. at 33 (naming several merchants, including Sir Samuel Fludyer, alderman and future 
Lord Mayor of London). 
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to accept the buyers’ price. Neither Perrott nor Thompson could 
produce records of these transactions.245 
In addition, by deposing several witnesses about Perrott’s 
business activities, the commissioners learned of two potential acts of 
concealment. In his testimony, Thompson revealed that the day after 
the commission was sued out, Perrott had his apprentice deliver a 
package to Thompson for safe keeping. The package was sealed with 
three seals, and Perrott told Thompson that it contained personal 
papers unrelated to the bankruptcy. Two days before Thompson 
testified, Perrott retrieved the package.246 Perrott later informed the 
commissioners that the package contained “‘nothing but letters from 
the fair sex;’ which he had since destroyed.”247 The fullest account of 
the case gave the following alert: “[I]t is necessary to advertise the 
reader, to keep in his memory the paper parcel sealed with three 
seals . . . as it was principally owing to the same paper parcel, that this 
complicated scene of iniquity was at last unravelled.”248 
The commissioners also received a tip leading them to a certain 
Patrick Donelly, a wigmaker who told them on March 13 that about 
two weeks after the commission issued, Perrott sent him two large 
boxes, claiming that the boxes contained his clothing and asking 
Donelly to hold onto them while he looked for lodging. Several days 
later, Perrott instructed Donelly to deliver the boxes to rooms in a 
house in the fashionable Queen Square.249 The house was occupied by 
a Mrs. Mary Anne Ferne. Ferne claimed during an interview that she 
had known Perrott for about a year but had received no money, 
banknotes, or other effects from him, and the matter was dropped.250 
On April 19, the commissioners presented Perrott with a written 
interrogatory regarding the whereabouts of £13,500 that could not be 
accounted for.251 Relativizing money historically is difficult, but the 
course of this case indicates that the missing £13,500 represented a 
 
 245. Id. at 5–6. 
 246. Id. at 6–7. 
 247. Id. at 12. 
 248. Id. at 7. 
 249. Id. at 10–11. 
 250. Id. at 11. 
 251. Id. at 17 (“As you do admit that you have spent the last week . . . with Mr. Maynard, 
one of your assignees[,] to settle and adjust your accounts and to draw up a true state thereof, to 
enable you to close such your examination; and do likewise admit . . . there is a deficiency of the 
sum of 13,513l . . . . Give a true and particular account; What is become of the same, and how, 
and in what manner you have applied and disposed thereof?”). 
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very large sum. Indeed, it was nearly twice the annual income of the 
highest paid barristers of the time.252 
Perrott responded to the interrogatory by saying that he had lost 
about £2,000 on goods sold in the previous year and otherwise, “for 
nine or ten years, I have, and am sorry to say it, been extremely 
extravagant, and spent large sums of money.”253 The commissioners 
scoffed at this claim. Perrott had only been running up his credit for a 
year, and an amount like £13,500 was, they felt, too large to spend in 
so short a time, especially because Perrott claimed that he had never 
gambled and because his books showed him to be a man of frugal 
habits.254 Exercising their statutory power, the commissioners had 
Perrott committed to Newgate Prison until he saw fit to provide a 
complete and reasonable account of the missing money.255 
After six weeks in Newgate, he sent notice to the commissioners 
that he would answer their question.256 At a meeting on June 5, 1760, 
Perrott presented the commissioners with an account. Each entry was 
in round numbers, totaling £15,030. The entries included such items 
as rent, food, clothing, travel expenses, wages, commissions paid to 
his agent, and sales losses. The largest entries were: £2,700 for 
“House-keeping . . . with rent, taxes, and servants wages”; £920 for 
“Tavern expenses, coffee-house expenses, and places of diversion”; 
£3,000 for sales losses; and £5,500 for “Expenses attending the 
connection I had with the fair sex.”257 Perrott submitted no evidence 
to support this accounting, and the commissioners, unsatisfied with 
his response, sent him back to Newgate. Perrott petitioned the Lord 
Keeper to be released, but “his Lordship, on hearing the said 
deposition read, thought it so infamous in all its circumstances, that 
he did not think it necessary to order any attendance upon it.”258 
The commissioners had well before this time concluded that 
Perrott was engaged in some sort of fraud, but they lacked hard 
evidence. Even testimony of a former maidservant of Mary Ann 
 
 252. DANIEL DUMAN, THE JUDICIAL BENCH IN ENGLAND 1727–1875: THE RESHAPING OF 
A PROFESSIONAL ELITE 106–08 (1982). Attorney General Charles Yorke, one of the best paid 
barristers of this time, earned £7,322 in 1763. In 1770, the two most successful barristers earned 
just over £8,000. Id. at 107–08. 
 253. 1 AUTHENTIC NARRATIVE, supra note 233, at 17. 
 254. Id. at 5, 17; 4 BLOODY REGISTER, supra note 5, at 269–70. 
 255. 1 AUTHENTIC NARRATIVE, supra note 233, at 17. 
 256. Id. at 17–18. 
 257. Id. at 18–19. 
 258. Id. at 19–20. 
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Ferne, who came forward seeking the advertised reward of 20 percent 
of the bankrupt’s estate to anyone uncovering the missing assets,259 
only provided the information that, before meeting Perrott, Ferne 
had been poor but that now she was flush with money.260 The servant 
also mentioned that Ferne had hidden a paper package sealed with 
three seals, which the servant believed contained banknotes, and she 
claimed that Perrott had instructed her that if anyone came to search 
the house, she should show them his rooms and not Ferne’s.261 
Nevertheless, the servant’s testimony was considered insufficient to 
obtain warrants or bring suit, so no further discovery was made, and 
on July 26, 1760, the assignees paid a dividend to the creditors of five 
shillings in the pound.262 
Making another attempt to obtain his liberty, Perrott turned to 
the courts. He brought writs of habeas corpus in King’s Bench three 
times arguing that he should be released because he had answered the 
commissioners’ questions. The first petition resulted in no published 
report, and Lord Mansfield remanded Perrott to Newgate.263 The next 
petition, however, produced an important opinion that established 
the right of commissioners to keep bankrupts imprisoned even after 
they had answered the commission’s questions.264 
In Rex v. Perrott, heard on February 10, 1761,265 Perrott argued 
that (1) he had already given a full answer to the commissioners’ 
questions, and (2) the commissioners’ jurisdiction to question him, 
 
 259. Id. at 20; see also, e.g., LONDON GAZETTE, Apr. 19, 1760, at 3 (offering a reward 
because “there is great Reason to believe that the greatest Part of [Perrott’s] Effects are now 
concealed”). Offering a reward of a percentage of the bankrupt’s estate was one of the statutory 
powers of the assignees. 5 Geo. II, c. 30, § 20 (1732). 
 260. 1 AUTHENTIC NARRATIVE, supra note 233, at 21 (deposition of Sarah Reed on June 20, 
1760). 
 261. Id. at 22. 
 262. Id. at 27; Bankrupts, PUB. ADVERTISER, June 16, 1760, at 3 (announcing the dividend); 
see also PUB. LEDGER, Feb. 19, 1760, at 131 (listing in detail Perrott’s commercial merchandise 
sold at auction). 
 263. 1 AUTHENTIC NARRATIVE, supra note 233, at 27 (case heard in September 1760). 
 264. Id. at 28–29. In December 1760, Perrott petitioned the Lord Keeper for his liberty. 
“This matter was debated before the chancellor, when it was determined that the prisoner could 
obtain redress only in the court of King’s Bench; as the matter in question was strictly of legal 
determination.” 4 JACKSON, supra note 4, at 208. Consequently, Perrott ended up back before 
Mansfield. See Response of Lord Keeper to Perrott’s petition (Dec. 20, 1760) (National 
Archives, B1/38 f. 235); see also Response of Lord Chancellor to Petition (Jan. 22, 1761) 
(National Archives, B1/39 f. 3). 
 265. For this date, see the marginal note at Rex v. Perrott, (1761) 2 Burr. 1215, 1215, 97 Eng. 
Rep. 796, 796 (K.B.). 
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and therefore to commit him to prison, lasted only for the statutory 
forty-two days that the bankrupt had to surrender himself and be 
examined. Mansfield summarily dismissed point one, saying that 
Perrott’s answer to the commissioners was “very insufficient and 
unsatisfactory.”266 On the second issue, he pointed out not only that 
the bankruptcy statutes gave the commissioners the general power to 
examine and imprison the bankrupt beyond the statutory period until 
he made a full answer but also that this was the clear intent of the 
legislature.267 “The Objection has been strongly argued,” Mansfield 
said, “[b]ut there is no Case to support it. It is a new invention, and 
would entirely defeat the end and intention of the bankrupt-acts.”268 
Finding himself once again in Newgate, Perrott agreed to submit 
to yet another examination by the commissioners.269 This time he 
explained that about six years previously he had become acquainted 
with a certain Sarah Powel. Although for the first five years of their 
relationship he spent £400 or £500 on her,270 during 1759 he had 
lavished money upon her to the amount of £5,000.271 He provided an 
accounting of this money, each entry listing the month in which he 
sent Powel the money and the place to which he sent it: £100 at 
Christmas in 1758, £500 in January 1759, £400 in February 1759, etc.272 
The commissioners were still not convinced. First, Perrott could 
not provide any details about the money he spent on Powel during 
the first four years of their acquaintance, nor could he remember 
where she had lived during those years, even though he claimed to 
have visited her often and to have written to her. Second, Perrott said 
that all of the money he sent to Powel came from his agent, Henry 
Thompson, rather than from (traceable) bank notes. Unfortunately, 
Thompson had since died.273 Conveniently, so had Powel, who had 
 
 266. Rex v. Perrott, (1761) 2 Burr. 1122, 1123, 97 Eng. Rep. 745, 746 (K.B.). 
 267. Id. at 1124, 97 Eng. Rep. at 746 (opinions of Mansfield, C.J., Foster, J., and Wilmot, J.). 
 268. Id., 97 Eng. Rep. at 746. It was, in fact, not a new invention, according to testimony 
before a House of Commons committee on bankruptcy reform in 1818. Prior to Perrott’s Case, 
it had been an open question whether the commissioners’ ability to imprison the bankrupt 
exceeded the forty-two-day grace period. It had also been an open question whether they had 
the power to determine the truthfulness of the bankrupt’s answers to their questions, or whether 
any plausible answer was sufficient. See SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE 
BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note 7, at 52 (testimony of Sir Samuel Romilly). 
 269. 1 AUTHENTIC NARRATIVE, supra note 233, at 29. 
 270. Id. at 34. 
 271. Id. at 29–31. 
 272. Id. at 30–31. 
 273. Id. at 31–33. 
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died penniless of consumption about ten months earlier, meaning that 
Perrott had known of her death when he gave his previous accounting 
on June 5, 1760, falsifying his claim that he had covered up the truth 
to avoid disgracing her.274 In fact, Perrott could provide no proof at all 
of sending enough money to Powel to keep her in luxury. On the 
contrary, the commissioners dug up evidence that Powel had 
complained to others of Perrott’s parsimony. To make matters worse, 
the commissioners discovered that Powel, also known as Rachel Sims, 
was a prostitute, or, as a contemporary account put it, she was “in 
keeping, as the fashionable term is, by different persons, but was 
deserted at the time of Perrott’s meeting her [and] had contracted an 
habit of drinking, an habit not uncommon to ladies of her profession 
and disposition . . . .”275 
Back Perrott went to Newgate, and once again he brought a 
habeas corpus petition before King’s Bench, which heard the case on 
June 8, 1761.276 Perrott again argued for his release on the ground that 
he had fully answered the commissioners’ inquiry. This time, four 
barristers spoke on his behalf: 
Mr. Gould, Mr. Serj. Davy, Mr. Coxe, and Mr. Stowe argued that he 
ought now to be discharged, as having given a full and complete 
Answer to the Questions propounded to him: And it is not material, 
in the present Respect, whether it be true or false; or whether his 
Conduct was prudent or imprudent.277 
Two other barristers disagreed, insisting that Perrott’s story was 
incredible and therefore, by definition, an unsatisfactory response. 
The court concurred and remanded Perrott to Newgate without 
opinion.278 
Perrott next filed suit in Common Pleas for false imprisonment 
against the commissioners, but that proceeding was halted when the 
commissioners made a “fatal discovery.”279 Sometime in June 1761, 
William Hewitt, the assignee, was walking in the garden of Lincoln’s 
Inn when he saw a dejected-looking woman leaning against the wall. 
He approached this stranger and asked her what was the matter (or at 
 
 274. Id. at 33. 
 275. Id. at 35. 
 276. For this date, see the note at Rex v. Perrott, (1761) 2 Burr. 1125, 1125, 97 Eng. Rep. 745, 
746 (K.B.). 
 277. Rex v. Perrott, (1761) 2 Burr. 1215, 1216, 97 Eng. Rep. 796, 796 (K.B.). 
 278. Id., 97 Eng. Rep. at 796. 
 279. 1 AUTHENTIC NARRATIVE, supra note 233, at 36. 
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least so the “remarkably provindential” [sic] story goes).280 She told 
him that she had been fired by a certain Mrs. Ferne. Hewitt, 
recognizing the name and thinking that it might turn up some 
information in the Perrott case, directed the woman, whose name was 
Mary Harris, to Thomas Cobb, the assignees’ attorney.281 Harris was 
taken before Justice John Fielding, the famous London police 
magistrate, where she deposed as follows.282 
According to Harris, four years earlier Ferne had been a servant. 
She and Harris had lodged together and had even been bedfellows, 
and at that time Ferne had very little money. On February 14, 1761, 
Ferne had called upon Harris for the first time in two years and the 
next day, she asked Harris to become her maid. Harris lived with 
Ferne and worked for her from March 5 to June 4, 1761. While there, 
she saw banknotes worth £4,000 in Ferne’s possession. Ferne 
explained the money by saying that “she had it from Fellows, whom 
she always made to pay for favours received.”283 Ferne also told 
Harris that when she had met Perrott she had no money at all and 
that “all her fortune was owing” to Perrott,284 and that “if she had 
known that . . . Perrott was going to fail, she would have got all she 
could from him . . . that his creditors should not have had any 
thing.”285 
Harris recounted accompanying Ferne on her visits to Perrott in 
Newgate. She saw Ferne cut banknotes in half and give one of the 
halves to Perrott. Once she heard Perrott and Ferne talking about 
buying the fancy house of Sir John Smith in Queen’s Square. Perrott 
gave her half of a banknote for £1,000 and Ferne unsuccessfully bid 
£999 for the house. Ferne and Perrott spoke frequently about the 
opulence in which they would live when he got out of prison. Most 
importantly, Harris revealed that Ferne expected her lodgings to be 
searched, so she kept the half banknotes in a copy of Rochester’s 
 
 280. 4 BLOODY REGISTER, supra note 5, at 271. The assignees had, in September 1760, 
increased the reward for information to 40 percent of the recuperated assets. Whether or not 
that affected the servant’s willingness to talk is not discussed in the Authentic Narrative, nor is 
the discovery of Mary Harris. See 2 AUTHENTIC NARRATIVE, supra note 233, at 7. 
 281. 4 BLOODY REGISTER, supra note 5, at 271. 
 282. 2 AUTHENTIC NARRATIVE, supra note 233, at 7–10. 
 283. Id. at 7–8. 
 284. Id. at 8–9. 
 285. Id. at 10 (emphasis omitted). 
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Poems, and when the searchers came, she intended to take up the 
book and pretend to read.286 
Based on this testimony, the commissioners issued a warrant for 
Ferne’s house and Perrott’s rooms at Newgate.287 At Ferne’s, the 
searchers found halves of five banknotes, dated February or March 
1761, amounting to £185. The other half of four of the notes turned 
up tied in a rag at the bottom of Perrott’s trunk in Newgate, along 
with half of a note for £1,000.288 Because banknotes were like modern 
checks with serial numbers, bearing the names of the payees, 
endorsers, and the bank cashier, they could be traced. The tracks of 
these five notes led the assignees to Martin Mathias, a solicitor.289 
Mathias deposed that Ferne had hired him the previous year, in 
May 1760, to work on Perrott’s case. A month later she brought him 
thirteen banknotes, in denominations between £100 and £500, totaling 
£2,200. All of the notes had been cut in half and glued back together 
with wax. When asked about this, Ferne explained that they had been 
sent to her from out of the country and cut in half and mailed 
separately for safety. She asked Mathias to exchange the notes for a 
single note of £2,200.290 Mathias sent the notes to the Bank of 
England, receiving in return three notes: two for £1,000 and one for 
£200. He gave these to Ferne. Mathias testified that he believed the 
money belonged to Ferne, whom he understood to be a lady of high 
birth and means.291 
Ferne’s explanation to the commissioners for having the 
banknotes gave a somewhat different impression. According to her, 
she acquired the money for granting favors to gentlemen. In 
particular, she had two elderly gentlemen friends, one who wore “a 
 
 286. Id. at 9–10. 
 287. According to 2 AUTHENTIC NARRATIVE, supra note 233 at 11, Justice Fielding of the 
London metropolitan court issued a search warrant on June 25, 1761, but according to the 
affidavit of William Hewitt, sworn on June 20, recounting the discovery of the notes, the search 
was made “by Virtue of a Warrant under the hands and seals of the Major part of the 
Commiss[ioners].” The Information of William Hewitt One of the Assignees of John Perrott a 
Bankrupt (June 20, 1761) (London Metropolitan Archives, CLA/047/LJ/13/1761/005); see also 
LONDON GAZETTE, June 23, 1761, at 4 (reporting that a warrant had issued on June 18, and 
indicating that the bank notes had already been found). Thus the date in the Authentic Narrative 
must be a mistake. 
 288. 2 AUTHENTIC NARRATIVE, supra note 233, at 11. 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. at 13–14. 
 291. Id. at 16. Pye Donkin, another attorney involved in Perrott’s case, also deposed that he 
believed Ferne to be a woman of fortune, from an aristocratic family. Id. at 32. 
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blue coat, and a star upon his breast, and a cockade in his hat” and 
the other, a man of seventy, who wore “a white coat, with a star on it, 
and a light blue garter.”292 She did not know the men’s names, but 
when she needed money, she would contact them at the coffee houses 
they frequented, and they would give her cash or notes. The half 
banknotes ended up in Perrott’s trunk for safe keeping because, “her 
Maid-servant being apt to drink, she, [Ferne], apprehended if she and 
her servant should both happen to be in liquor together, there would 
be some danger of setting the house on fire.”293 
The commissioners then set out to discredit every aspect of 
Ferne’s testimony. She claimed that she had loaned Perrott money 
before his bankruptcy, but the commissioners learned that she was a 
common prostitute from a poor family who, a few years earlier, had 
been reduced to allowing “the gentlemen soldiers then quartered [at 
Northampton] to participate indiscriminately of her favours.”294 They 
discounted the story of the elderly gentlemen, in part because there 
was no light blue garter in any order of British chivalry, “and it is well 
known that foreigners are not accustomed to be so extravagantly 
munificent.”295 Most importantly, the assignees succeeded in tracing 
back most of the thirteen original banknotes to merchants who had 
paid Perrott’s agent for cloth.296 
The game was up. In September 1761, the assignees preferred a 
bill of indictment against Perrot at the London criminal court, the Old 
Bailey, for concealing his effects.297 After a month-long delay 
requested by the creditors, Perrott was tried on October 21, 1761.298 
The trial lasted six hours as the prosecution painstakingly explored 
 
 292. Id. at 19. 
 293. Id. at 21–22 (emphasis omitted). 
 294. Id. at 25, 34. 
 295. Id. at 26–27. 
 296. Id. at 35–38, 40–41. 
 297. Index to Indictment Books (London Metropolitan Archives, CLA/047/LJ/10/002 f. 
106v) (listing Perrott’s indictment on September 14, 1761). The assignees had been planning for 
this since March, when they sought permission from the creditors to prefer an indictment. PUB. 
LEDGER, Mar. 18, 1761, at 263. 
 298. The trial was delayed from its original docketing on September 18 because the 
assignees’ solicitor, Thomas Cobb, was unable to get the evidence ready in part because of the 
difficulty in tracking down Perrott’s former apprentice, who had moved to Dublin. Affidavits of 
Thomas Cobb in King Against John Perrott (Sept. 18, 1761) (London Metropolitan Archives, 
London Session Papers CLA/047/LJ/13/1761/006). 
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the money trail.299 Perrott, in his defense, could only say that he had 
sent all the money he received from Thompson to his mistress, Sarah 
Powel, and that the half banknotes in his trunk were Ferne’s. She had 
asked him to keep them, and because she was supporting him while 
he was in Newgate: 
I thought I should be very ungrateful, if I did not; and the reason she 
gave me was, her house had been attempted to have been broke 
open twice; and for the favours she was pleased to compliment me 
with, she said she thought she had some little right so to do.300 
Perrott’s counsel apparently focused on alleged procedural 
errors.301 The Old Bailey proceedings do not record this part of the 
trial, but some of the claims can be pieced together from discussions 
in later treatises. One was that Hewitt, the petitioning creditor, 
improperly testified at Perrott’s trial about the discovery of the 
hidden notes, even though “the Creditor of a Bankrupt cannot be a 
Witness, for he swears to increase his own Dividend.”302 Another 
complaint was that the warrant committing Perrott to Newgate had 
certain flaws, including incorrectly reciting the title of the controlling 
statute, which should have vitiated it.303 The objections were ignored. 
The day before his execution, the two assignees came to visit 
Perrott in prison. They found him remorseful and willing to answer 
questions. Assuring him that they forgave him, they asked where the 
money was. “[A]fter a deep pause, Perrott said, I have this day 
received the Holy Sacrament, and will answer no more questions.”304 
The assignees went away empty-handed. One account attributes 
Perrott’s unwillingness to confess even after his conviction to a 
supposed plot to have a rescue party made up of seamen show up at 
 
 299. GEN. EVENING POST (London), Oct. 22, 1761, at 1; PROCEEDINGS OF THE OLD 
BAILEY, supra note 235, at 399–402. 
 300. PROCEEDINGS OF THE OLD BAILEY, supra note 235, at 404. 
 301. 2 AUTHENTIC NARRATIVE, supra note 233, at 42. 
 302. GREEN, supra note 43, at 219; ST. JAMES’S CHRON., Oct. 22, 1761, at 3 (recounting that 
the assignee was permitted to testify after he agreed to take no dividend from the bill in 
question). Green also pointed out the collusion between Perrott and Hewitt in the commission 
of the act of bankruptcy. GREEN, supra note 43, at 219. 
 303. GREEN, supra note 43, at 217–18 (“We make the Observation, because we think it 
extreamly remarkable, that a Warrant which had been settled and approved by some of the 
ablest of the Profession, should be liable to so palpable an Objection; and besides, we could not 
but admire, that as the Commitment had been so much canvassed and litigated in Westminster 
Hall, the Objection should have escaped . . . Notice . . . .”). 
 304. 4 BLOODY REGISTER, supra note 5, at 274. 
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the prison, “secur[e] the turnkey at the gate, forc[e] the keys from 
him, and then carry[] off the prisoner.”305 
Several days after Perrott’s execution on November 11, 1761, 
Ferne was taken into custody and turned over “the half of two Bank 
notes; the other moiety of which were sometime since found in the 
possession of Perrott in Newgate. These notes were artfully concealed 
behind the backboard of Perrott’s picture, which was in this Lady’s 
apartment.”306 In April 1762, Perrott’s creditors “unanimously agreed 
to prosecute the Celebrated Lady who was party in concealing the 
Bank-notes, with the utmost rigour.”307 
John Perrott was the type of bankrupt that Parliament had in 
mind in 1706 when it passed the first Act of Anne. He was the latter-
day Thomas Pitkin, who obtained his creditors’ money through fraud, 
and through fraud prevented them from recuperating it. What the 
legislators had not anticipated, however, was that anyone would 
prefer to go to the gallows rather than disclose where he had hidden 
the money. In Perrott’s case, the statute had failed miserably. The 
threat of death did not scare him into revealing his assets, and once he 
was dead, his creditors were no closer to being repaid.308 Despite the 
two sometimes being equated, bankruptcy was not like murder.309 The 
goal of bankruptcy had always been to get the creditors their money 
back. Vengeance and retribution were not part of the law, at least not 
explicitly, and they did not further its stated goals. A dead debtor did 
not pay his debts. Perhaps a frightened debtor did, and Perrott’s 
 
 305. Id. at 275–76. Several other rumors circulated in the newspapers after Perrott’s death. 
One story said that, a day before his death, Perrott had given a friend a “Tortoiseshell Snuff-
Box, with a Lady’s Picture in it set in Gold” as well as “some other Things of Value, which were 
contained in the said Box.” WHITEHALL EVENING POST (London), Nov. 26, 1761, at 3. Another 
story claimed that Perrott was buried under a fictitious name in his hometown of Newport-
Pagnel. WHITEHALL EVENING POST, Nov. 28, 1761, at 3. 
 306. LLOYD’S EVENING POST, Nov. 13, 1761, at 478. 
 307. LONDON CHRON., Apr. 24, 1762, at 394. 
 308. ST. JAMES’S CHRON., Dec. 1, 1761, at 4 (“The Punishment Mr. Perrot has lately 
undergone, will appear to be scarce adequate to his Crime when considered in all its 
Consequences. It may be alledged, that when a Man forfeits his Life for his Misdemeanors, 
nothing further ought to be expected or required of him. But this Forfeiture of Life makes no 
Amends to the Persons injured . . . .”). 
 309. See SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra 
note 7, at 50–51 (testimony of Sir Samuel Romilly) (explaining that, in the treaty of Amiens 
between England and France in 1801, the two governments agreed to give up offenders who fled 
justice, but the only offenders listed were “murderers, persons guilty of forgery, and fraudulent 
bankrupts”); DANIEL SAUTERIUS, THE PRACTISE OF THE BANCKRVPTS OF THESE TIMES 31–32 
(London, John Norton 1640) (equating bankrupts with murderers). 
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assignees had authorized the publication of an account of the case 
ostensibly “as a terror to future offenders.”310 The problem, as Section 
B describes, was that prosecutions were so infrequent and convictions 
so difficult to obtain that much of the threat had gone out of the 
statutory penalty. 
B. The Failure of Capital Punishment 
Despite initial optimism that the availability of discharge and the 
threat of capital punishment would improve debtor cooperation and 
end fraud, bankrupts discovered that they still needed to conceal 
assets. Yet, while fraud continued to flourish, indictments and 
convictions for fraudulent bankruptcy were few. The failure to 
prosecute encouraged bankrupts to do whatever necessary, honest or 
not, both to protect their property and to obtain their discharge. As a 
result, the bankruptcy system became a morass of fraud. In fact, in 
Ireland, which had adopted English bankruptcy law in 1772,311 the 
situation grew so serious that British parliamentarians discussed 
eliminating bankruptcy entirely in that part of the kingdom.312 
Nonetheless, despite urgent calls for reform, by 1820, the only 
significant change was the abolition of the death penalty, a provision 
whose lack of enforcement was arguably the source of many of the 
other problems. 
1. The Problem of Fraud.  In the aftermath of the Acts of Anne, 
commentators had greeted the discharge and death penalty provisions 
with enthusiasm. Daniel Defoe predicted that the 1706 Act would 
result in less fraud: 
Instead of flying from the Law for fear of Punishment, he now will 
fly to the Law for Protection; instead of absconding and hiding 
himself from his Creditors, now he will run to seek them out, offer 
them all he has as their Due, and demand his Liberty as his 
Right . . . .313 
 
 310. 1 AUTHENTIC NARRATIVE, supra note 233, at i. 
 311. 1 CHRISTIAN, supra note 52, at vi; 2 id. at 1 (discussing the introduction of English 
bankruptcy law into Ireland). 
 312. 38 PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES 987 (T.C. Hansard ed., London 1818). 
 313. DEFOE, REMARKS, supra note 151, at 16. 
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With discharge available, “[n]one then in their Wits” would 
commit fraud when the penalty for doing so was so steep.314 Perhaps 
the initial reaction to the new law was indeed as Defoe predicted, for 
around 1718, during a period when the most recent bankruptcy 
statute containing discharge and the death penalty had lapsed, 
commentators bemoaned the increase in fraud and portrayed the 
expired law as a great success. According to one broadside, most of 
the usual frauds “were Remedied, and in a great Measure prevented, 
whilst the late Acts were in force . . . the Consequences [being] so 
fatal, that during all that Time, there are but Two Instances of 
Persons Convicted as Fraudulent Bankrupts.”315 
One of those convicted was John Ristow, a weaver from London, 
who in December 1710 tried to ship £500 worth of household goods 
and shop merchandise out of the country rather than pay his debts.316 
His creditors caught him in the process of transferring his effects from 
 
 314. REASONS HUMBLY OFFERED FOR ALTERING SEVERAL CLAUSES IN THE BILL 
DEPENDING IN PARLIAMENT, RELATING TO BANKRUPTS (1707) (British Library, 
Cup.645.b.11.(7*)) (“It is Felony by the late Act for the Bankrupt to abscond with his Effects, 
and not appear and deliver the same: None then in their Wits (unless they design to run away) 
will fraudulently remove their Goods, when they are certain to be debarr’d their Liberty, and 
also lyable to be hang’d, if they do not afterwards discover and deliver them back to their 
Creditors.”); REMARKS ON THE LATE ACT OF PARLIAMENT TO PREVENT FRAUDS 
FREQUENTLY COMMITTED BY BANKRUPTS, WITH PROPOSALS FOR THE AMENDMENT 
THEREOF, supra note 103, at 5 (“The Prospect of Liberty afforded by the Act will prevent 
Persons from Transporting themselves and Estates.”); REV. ST. ENG. NATION, Feb. 28, 1706, at 
102 (Defoe noting that all that will be required is to hang two or three bankrupts and no one 
else will dare to cheat). 
 315. REASONS HUMBLY OFFER’D FOR ALTERING AND AMENDING THE LAWS 
CONCERNING BANKRUPTS, AND FOR PREVENTING THE GREAT LOSSES THAT ARE DAILY 
SUSTAINED BY THEIR CREDITORS, SINCE THE EXPIRATION OF THE LATE ACTS, OF THE 
FOURTH AND FIFTH YEARS OF THE REIGN OF HER LATE MAJESTY QUEEN ANNE, supra note 
95 (naming eight bankrupts who had absconded since the expiration of the acts); see also 
REASONS HUMBLY OFFER’D FOR MAKING MORE CERTAIN THE LIBERTY OF SUCH 
BANKRUPTS WHO SHALL FAIRLY AND JUSTLY SURRENDER THEMSELVES, AND EFFECTS, 
PURSUANT TO THE ACT NOW DEPENDING, OR ANY OTHER ACTS NOW IN BEING, TO PREVENT 
FRAUDS COMMITTED BY BANKRUPTS 1 (circa 1718) (“Since the Expiration of the late Law of 
Bankruptcy, on the 26th June, 1716, great Numbers have withdrawn Themselves and Effects, 
some out of the Kingdom, and others into obscure Places, and have Secreted very considerable 
Sums of Money, and large Quantities of Goods, which would undoubtedly be voluntarily 
Surrendred, if the Liberty of the Bankrupt be made secure.”). 
 316. PROCEEDINGS OF THE OLD BAILEY, May 16, 1711, at 3, lists him as Restow. The 
newspapers and the record of his bankruptcy commission, however, spell the name Ristow. 
Advertisements, LONDON GAZETTE, Dec. 14, 1710, at 2; DAILY COURANT (London), Sept. 12, 
1711, at 2; Bankruptcy Commission Docket Book (Dec. 13, 1710) (National Archives, B4/1 
f. 17). 
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a river barge to a sea-going vessel.317 Ristow was found guilty and 
sentenced to death but then pardoned.318 Less than two years later, 
the second bankrupt convicted of fraudulent bankruptcy was not so 
lucky. Richard Towne was a London tallow chandler, whose reaction 
to hearing about the bankruptcy commission taken out on him was to 
sneak out of town at three o’clock in the morning with a large 
quantity of tallow and his account books.319 He was caught when the 
boat on which he was attempting to flee to Holland was turned back 
by bad weather.320 At trial he looked every bit the fraudster. He tried 
to prove that his petitioning creditor owed him money by producing 
forged notes,321 and one of his character witnesses called him “as great 
a Rogue as any in England.”322 Towne was found guilty and hanged 
less than two weeks after his trial.323 
Although no further executions took place until the 1756 
conviction of Alexander Thompson, the fact that only three people 
 
 317. PROCEEDINGS OF THE OLD BAILEY, supra note 316, at 3. 
 318. Id. at 4; REASONS HUMBLY OFFER’D FOR ALTERING AND AMENDING THE LAWS 
CONCERNING BANKRUPTS, AND FOR PREVENTING THE GREAT LOSSES THAT ARE DAILY 
SUSTAINED BY THEIR CREDITORS, SINCE THE EXPIRATION OF THE LATE ACTS, OF THE 
FOURTH AND FIFTH YEARS OF THE REIGN OF HER LATE MAJESTY QUEEN ANNE, supra note 
95 (naming the two convicted bankrupts: “Town the Tallow-Chandler, that was Hang’d, and J. 
Risteau, who was Pardon’d”). The absence of other evidence corroborates Ristow’s pardon. Of 
his trial or execution the newspapers say nothing, which would be rather unusual for that time. 
The deaths of the other bankrupts hanged were always noted in the newspapers. The only 
notices about Ristow discovered in the newspapers are a notice of the commission against him 
in the LONDON GAZETTE, Dec. 14, 1710, at 2, and a notice of the auction of his goods in the 
DAILY COURANT, Sept. 12, 1711, at 2. 
 319. A Particular Account of the Tryal of Richard Towne, Tallow-Chandler, POST BOY 
(London), Dec. 16, 1712, at 1; LONDON GAZETTE, Apr. 10, 1712, at 2 (offering a reward for 
Towne’s capture). 
 320. A Particular Account of the Tryal of Richard Towne, Tallow-Chandler, supra note 319. 
 321. Id. (stating that Towne produced three notes, “which being afterwards view’d by the 
Judges and Jury, it appear’d plainly to them, that Mr. Thomas’s Hand was counterfeited; and, 
That the Body of the Notes was writ by the Prisoner”); see also Bankruptcy Commission Docket 
Book (Apr. 8, 1712) (National Archives, B4/1 f. 40) (docketing Towne’s commission and listing 
Wm. Thomas, Citizen and Joiner of London, petitioning creditor); A Particular Account of the 
Tryal of Richard Towne, Tallow-Chandler, supra note 319 (identifying William Thomas as the 
prosecutor). 
 322. A Particular Account of the Tryal of Richard Towne, Tallow-Chandler, supra note 319. 
He was apparently also an accomplished liar. Upon his capture, Towne was found to be carrying 
very little money. He claimed that the two bags containing a total of 800 guineas—a gold coin 
worth one pound and one shilling—that he had secreted under his coat when he fled had fallen 
overboard as he leaned over the ship’s railing to be seasick in the bad weather. Id. He later 
claimed that the 800 guineas were a fabrication. 3 A COMPLEAT COLLECTION OF REMARKABLE 
TRYALS OF THE MOST NOTORIOUS MALEFACTORS 75 (London, J. Brotherton 1721). 
 323. EVENING POST (London), Dec. 20, 1712, at 3. 
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were found guilty of fraudulent bankruptcy in the first fifty years after 
the passage of the 1706 Act does not alone constitute evidence that 
fraud actually declined. Newspaper advertisements describing 
concealment of effects and failure to surrender to commissioners 
appeared as early as 1707.324 A notice might read, “there is Reason to 
believe that Robert Willan . . . did, in the Night-time, between 20th 
and 21st Instant, remove and convey away all his Shop Goods and 
Books of Account; in order, as tis supposed, to prevent a Seizure 
thereof, under the Commission of Bankrupt then issued against 
him,”325 or speak of “there being great reason to think he has 
endeavoured to conceal his effects, and as there is now lying in 
different peoples [sic] hands in London and parts adjacent, and on 
board some ships in the river, bound for Spain, bales of woollen 
goods, household furniture, plate, &c.”326 These advertisements were 
not common, but they were published in a steady trickle throughout 
the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.327 
Yet most of the men mentioned in the advertisements apparently 
were never brought to trial, let alone convicted and hanged. The 
Proceedings of the Old Bailey describe only twenty-four bankruptcy 
trials between 1706 and 1820.328 The index to the Old Bailey 
indictment books from 1715 to 1792 records six additional cases.329 
These account for some of the London and Westminster cases, and 
newspaper stories, court documents, and comments in other sources 
add another several dozen names from London and around the 
country, but only seven of these men are known to have been 
 
 324. See Appendix. These advertisements were not published prior to the 1706 Act, even 
though concealing and failure to surrender were crimes under the earlier statutes. 
 325. DAILY POST (London), July 23, 1730, at 2. 
 326. GAZETTEER & NEW DAILY ADVERTISER (London), Aug. 2, 1765, at 3 (noting the 
bankruptcy of Frederick Shepherd). 
 327. See Appendix. 
 328. See Appendix. 
 329. Twelve of the fourteen cases recorded in the Proceedings of the Old Bailey between 
1715 and 1792 are also mentioned in the indices. The additional names not in the Proceedings 
are in the Index to the Old Bailey Indictment Books (London Metropolitan Archives, 
CLA/047/LJ/10/001): Benjamin Bailey (concealment, indicted July 18, 1753); George William 
Pope (concealment, indicted Dec. 4, 1752); and Robert Wright (concealment, indicted July 11, 
1750). The 001 volume of the indices is unpaginated. The names are in order of date of 
indictment listed by last name in alphabetical sections. The second volume of the Index to 
Indictment Books (London Metropolitan Archives, CLA/047/LJ/10/002), mentions: Edmund 
Francis Calze, at f. 24r (concealment, indicted July 5, 1779); Derrick Martin, at f. 94v 
(concealment, indicted Apr. 13, 1774); Thomas Rawbone, at f. 122v (perjury in his examination 
before the commissioners, indicted Apr. 19, 1784). 
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indicted.330 As no official records were kept, this list of bankruptcy 
criminals cannot be considered exhaustive, and the continuity of 
complaints about bankruptcy fraud suggests that it was not an 
isolated problem.331 
Fraud continued to occur, in part because the benefits promised 
by discharge were too often unobtainable.332 The requirement that 
four-fifths of the creditors in number and value sign the certificate of 
discharge meant that one or two significant and angry creditors could 
prevent the discharge and keep the bankrupt in debtors’ prison 
indefinitely.333 Anecdotal evidence suggests that they occasionally did 
 
 330. See Appendix for the full list. 
 331. See, e.g., INCONVENIENCES ARISING FROM THE PRESENT METHODS IN TAKING OUT 
AND EXECUTING COMMISSIONS OF BANKRUPT (circa 1707–1710) (Chetham’s Library 
(Manchester, England), H.P. 2950) (including several examples of fraud by debtors in 
concealing); Letter to the Editor, LONDON CHRON., May 3, 1759, at 426 (same); Letter to the 
Editor, PUB. ADVERTISER, Nov. 1, 1773, at 1–2 (complaining about the “very great and flagrant 
Abuses of the Bankrupt Laws”); 35 PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES, supra note 312, at 244 (“The 
evil of which he complained, was the multiplication of fraudulent bankruptcies to an extent 
which threatened the most frightful consequences to the commerce and morals of the 
country.”). But see CONSIDERATIONS UPON COMMISSIONS OF BANKRUPTS, supra note 24, at 5–
6 (claiming that concealment was less common than creditors imagined). 
 332. But see REMARKS ON THE LATE ACT OF PARLIAMENT TO PREVENT FRAUDS 
FREQUENTLY COMMITTED BY BANKRUPTS, WITH PROPOSALS FOR THE AMENDMENT 
THEREOF, supra note 103, at 5 (claiming that many certificates had been signed since the 
passage of the Act a year before and only a few challenged). Bankruptcy crime is probably a 
given, so not all crime can be explained by external factors. Current figures estimate that 
“approximately ten percent of all bankruptcy cases involve abuse or fraud.” WICKOUSKI, supra 
note 20, at 1. 
 333. SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note 
7, at 32–33 (testimony of Basil Montagu) (listing reasons creditors withhold their signatures); id. 
at 34 (“I am certain also, that deserving bankrupts have very great difficulty sometimes in 
obtaining the signature of the last one or two creditors, from the consciousness of the power 
which such creditors possess, so that the good intentions of the great body of the creditors are 
for a time delayed.”); id. at 52–54 (testimony of Sir Samuel Romilly) (“I have known several 
instances of the most harsh and inhuman refusals of certificates by creditors.”); THE 
DEPLORABLE CASE OF SUCH UNFORTUNATE DEBTORS AS HAVE BEEN DECLARED 
BANKRUPTS (post 1707) (Guildhall Library, Bside 11.39) (“Some of their Creditors, sharpen’d 
with their Losses; others provoked at not being preferr’d to the Prejudice of the rest, will always 
refuse to sign such Certificate.”); PHILANTHROPOS [ERASMUS PHILIPS], PROPOSALS FOR 
PROMOTING INDUSTRY AND ADVANCING PROPER CREDIT; ADVANTAGEOUS TO CREDITORS 
IN PARTICULAR AND THE NATION IN GENERAL: IN A LETTER TO A MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT 
29–30 (1732) (complaining about creditors who spitefully refuse to sign certificates). The 
unwillingness of creditors to sign the certificate was predicted in 1707 in a broadside. See 
REASONS HUMBLY OFFERED FOR ALTERING SEVERAL CLAUSES IN THE BILL DEPENDING IN 
PARLIAMENT, RELATING TO BANKRUPTS, supra note 314 (pointing out that under 
compositions the debtor retained control of his property and the creditors had to sign the 
agreement to get their money, but under bankruptcy “the whole of his Effects will be in his 
Creditors[’] hands, and no Loss accrues by their refusing to sign a Certificate for his 
KADENS IN FINAL  4/1/2010  1:07:40 PM 
1290 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:1229 
just that. In 1731, a group of bankrupts petitioned the House of 
Commons for relief. They had been imprisoned for “from One to 
Fourteen Years” after having, so they claimed, conformed to the 
bankruptcy laws and turned over all their assets.334 Nevertheless, some 
of their creditors, rather than sign the certificate, had left them to 
“linger out the Remainder of their Days in Misery and Want.”335 In 
1759, a House of Commons committee reported on the difficulty of 
obtaining the necessary number of signatures and described the plight 
of bankrupts who were either left in prison for years or unable to 
rebuild their lives out of constant fear of being arrested for their old 
debts.336 Calculations for the years 1757 to 1759 showed that 52 
percent of bankrupts did not receive their certificates of discharge.337 
By the period from 1786 to 1805, however, that number had fallen to 
between 40 and 45 percent.338 
Nonetheless, even though discharge became somewhat easier to 
obtain toward the end of the century, many bankrupts still had nearly 
the same incentives after 1706 to conceal assets to ensure their 
survival during bankruptcy.339 In particular when the bankruptcy was 
 
Discharge”). The rules about obtaining signatures for the certificate were slightly modified over 
time, without solving the underlying problem. For an overview of that development, see SELECT 
COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note 7, at 99 
(testimony of Basil Montagu). 
 334. And if they, in fact, had not conformed, they were in a double bind. If they kept silent 
and did not turn over their concealed assets, they could support themselves in prison but not 
please their creditors. But if they reported their crime, they were liable to be executed as felons. 
SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note 7, at 86 
(testimony of Archibald Cullen). 
 335. RICHARD GRAY, TO THE HONOURABLE THE COMMONS OF GREAT-BRITAIN IN 
PARLIAMENT ASSEMBLED. THE HUMBLE PETITION OF THE BANKRUPTS NOW CONFINED FOR 
DEBT IN HIS MAJESTY’S PRISONS OF THE KING’S BENCH AND THE FLEET (circa 1731) 
(Lincoln’s Inn Library, MP 100/4). 
 336. 28 H.C. JOUR. 603–04 (June 2, 1759). 
 337. SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note 
7, at 98 (testimony of Basil Montagu). 
 338. Id. at 97. 
 339. PHILANTHROPOS, supra note 333, at 32–33 (“’[T]is greatly to be feared some of that 
Denomination, being sensible of the Disposition of those they had to deal with, have made 
Concealments, to maintain themselves in Prison . . . or procur’d fictitious ones to make the 
Number and Value requir’d; chusing rather to run the Risque of being hang’d than that more 
terrible Death of starving in Prison . . . .”); SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE BANKRUPT LAWS, 
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, 1817, H.C. 486, at 16 (testimony of Thomas Nowlan) (stating that the 
law gives bankrupts the choice to conceal or to starve); SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO 
CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAW, FURTHER REPORT, supra note 20, at 1 (testimony of 
Thomas Nowlan) (“[B]y requiring the bankrupt to surrender his last shilling, it reduces him to 
the dreadful alternative of choosing between starvation and felony.”). 
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not collusive and the debtor therefore had perhaps little sense of the 
hostility he would encounter from his creditors, he stood a good 
chance of not receiving his certificate. Already in 1707, an anonymous 
commentator had pointed out the difficult situation this created for 
the bankrupt when deciding whether to deal honestly with his 
creditors: “with humble Submission, it seems very hard, if not too 
much Hardship, for to be obliged, on the Penalty of Death, to 
surrender Person and Effects, and yet have hardly room for Hope 
left, that ever they shall be discharg’d from that Confinement till 
Death give them Enlargement.”340 After 1706, bankrupts had an 
additional reason to conceal assets besides providing for their own 
immediate needs: according to later evidence, creditors came to 
expect bribes before they would sign the certificate.341 
Bankrupts did not conceal assets unaware of the possible legal 
consequences. Although in one Old Bailey case the defendant 
excused his flight and refusal to appear before the commissioners—a 
capital felony—on the basis that someone had informed him that he 
was liable to be hanged for some other bankruptcy fraud that he had 
unknowingly committed,342 it appears likely that most merchants and 
traders had a reasonable understanding of the elements of the crime 
of fraudulent bankruptcy. The Lord Mayor of London had ordered at 
least one of the proposed bankruptcy bills and the account of Richard 
Towne’s trial to be published, presumably to inform the city’s 
merchants.343 Newspapers printed summaries of other bills,344 and the 
popular Proceedings of the Old Bailey recounted many of the London 
trials.345 
Finally, an affidavit from 1768 demonstrates that the participants 
in a rather routine concealment understood the consequences of their 
actions. Barbara Wilson related the following conversation between 
 
 340. REASONS HUMBLY OFFER’D TO THE HONOURABLE HOUSE OF COMMONS, TO PASS 
AN EXPLANATORY ACT, TO FURTHER CONFIRM ALL SUCH CERTIFICATES OF BANKRUPTS, AS 
HAS BEEN ALLOWED AND CONFIRMED BY THE LORD CHANCELLOR OR TWO OF THE JUDGES 
(circa 1707) (Chetham’s Library, H.P. 2462). 
 341. SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note 
7, at 32, 100 (testimony of Basil Montagu). 
 342. PROCEEDINGS OF THE OLD BAILEY, Oct. 13, 1708, at 3 (John Slaorgan). 
 343. ABSTRACT OF THE BANKRUPTS ACT OF 5 GEO. I (1719) (London Metropolitan 
Archives, CLA/040/07/004); A PARTICULAR ACCOUNT OF THE TRYAL OF RICHARD TOWNE, 
TALLOW-CHANDLER, FOR FELONY (London, J. Morphew 1712) (title page). 
 344. See, e.g., Abstract of a Bill for Preventing Frauds Committed by Bankrupts, DAILY J. 
(London), June 9, 1731, at 1. 
 345. See Appendix. 
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her brother-in-law, Samuel Wilson, the bankrupt, and his brother and 
sister: 
And the said Samuel Wilson at that time say’d that he thought that 
his Brother William Wilson and this Examinant would have been 
called and Examined before the Commissioners upon Oath. Upon 
which the said William Wilson reply’d that he would not willingly 
appear at Guildhall to be Examined, for that if he did he should 
Hang him, meaning the said Samuel Wilson. After which Samuel 
Wilson and his Sister Mary Wilson, who was then also present, say’d 
that he would not do to go there, for if he did he must swallow a few 
Pills.346 
Samuel Wilson was a haberdasher, and the goods for which he risked 
his life were worth about £70.347 No trial ever occurred, however, 
because Wilson apparently solved his problem by ensuring that 
Barbara disappeared,348 thereby dashing the assignees’ hopes of 
bringing him to justice.349 
The bankrupts who committed the crimes of absenting 
themselves or of concealing their assets were not necessarily those 
who lost their creditors’ money through reckless or fraudulent pre-
bankruptcy behavior. The Act of 1706 and those that followed it 
defined fraudulent bankruptcy solely as the post-bankruptcy 
concealment of assets or failure to surrender. The reasons why the 
debtors became insolvent were not taken into account anywhere in 
the eighteenth-century statutes, which paid no attention to the old 
honest insolvent–fraudulent bankrupt distinction.350 Ostensibly, the 
 
 346. The Information of Mrs. Barbara Wilson (Apr. 1, 1768) (London Metropolitan 
Archives, OB/SP/1768/04/026) (abbreviations expanded, punctuation and capitalization 
somewhat modernized). 
 347. Id. 
 348. GAZETTEER & NEW DAILY ADVERTISER, May 7, 1768 (giving notice of Barbara’s 
disappearance with “greatest reason to believe that the said Barbara Wilson, hath been spirited 
away by the agents of the said Samuel Wilson”); see also Manuscript Draft of Newspaper Notice 
(May 1768) (London Metropolitan Archives, OB/SB/1768/05/15); Thomas King at the 
Provocation of Thomas Dibbs Against Samuel Wilson (May 4. 1768) (London Metropolitan 
Archives, OB/SB/1768/05/14) (affidavit of assignees); Petition of Samuel Wilson (May 1706) 
(London Metropolitan Archives, OB/SB/1768/05/16) (denying Samuel Wilson’s involvement 
with the disappearance of Barbara); Affidavit of Mary Wilson (May 20, 1768) (London 
Metropolitan Archives, OB/SB/1768/05/17) (denying Mary Wilson’s involvement with the 
disappearance of Barbara). 
 349. Thomas King at the Provocation of Thomas Dibbs Against Samuel Wilson, supra note 
348 (concerning the need to delay trial). 
 350. SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note 
7, at 104 (testimony of John Ingram Lockhart); id. at 66 (testimony of Robert Waithman) 
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clause in the 1624 Act of James I, which penalized with pillorying and 
cutting off an ear the inability to demonstrate that one had become 
insolvent through misfortune rather than recklessness or fraud, 
remained in force throughout the period under consideration here, 
but as one witness pointed out to the parliamentary committee in 
1818, it was “obsolete.”351 
One result of this omission, however, was that creditors often 
turned their decision whether or not to sign the certificate into a 
comment on the debtor’s pre-bankruptcy behavior.352 Implicitly, then, 
the law gave the creditor two forms of compensation: his money and 
“a private vindictive satisfaction, by permitting the creditor to refuse 
his consent to the certificate.”353 Yet the imprisonment that commonly 
resulted when discharge was denied came with no attendant 
indictment, trial, or finding of guilt by an impartial tribunal.354 The 
justification for this was that imprisonment for debt was coercive 
rather than penal,355 but that distinction would have been lost on 
bankrupts, even the honest but unfortunate ones, who had handed 
over their entire estate only to find themselves imprisoned for years.356 
 
(complaining about the lack of differentiation between ex ante honest and fraudulent behavior); 
id. at 52–53 (testimony of Sir Samuel Romilly) (stating that the statute did not require 
consideration of ex ante behavior); DEFOE, REMARKS, supra note 151, at 23 (“Nor do any 
former Concealments from Creditors entitle a Bankrupt to the Penalties of this Act, provided 
they are fairly acknowledg’d . . . .”). 
 351. SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note 
7, at 105 (testimony of John Ingram Lockhart); 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *156 
(discussing 21 James 1, c. 19 as still in force and describing punishment under the statute). In 
March 1817, a bill titled “To Make Better Provision for the Repression of Bankruptcy,” H.C. 
Bill [157] (Eng.), was proposed in Parliament but never passed. 
 352. SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note 
7, at 52–53 (testimony of Sir Samuel Romilly). 
 353. Id. at 96 (testimony of Basil Montagu). 
 354. Id. at 53 (testimony of Sir Samuel Romilly); REASONS HUMBLY OFFER’D FOR MAKING 
MORE CERTAIN THE LIBERTY OF SUCH BANKRUPTS WHO SHALL FAIRLY AND JUSTLY 
SURRENDER THEMSELVES, AND EFFECTS, PURSUANT TO THE ACT NOW DEPENDING, OR ANY 
OTHER ACTS NOW IN BEING, TO PREVENT FRAUDS COMMITTED BY BANKRUPTS, supra note 
315, at 1 (arguing that imprisonment was worse than a felony conviction because, in the former 
case, there was no trial); see also Prisoner Petition (Nov. 27, 1732) (National Archives, SP 36/28 
f. 304) (complaining that “I have Labourd under as being confined for almost nine Years and 
being committed by the Commissioners of Bankrupts upon suspition of concealment and having 
from time to time beged and pleaded if they had anything against me to try me if not that they 
would discharge me but cannot git grants for Either: I am halfe starved at times and have no 
Substance but what I can git by beging at the common Grate”). 
 355. Cohen, supra note 11, at 155. 
 356. SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note 
7, at 85–86 (testimony of Archibald Cullen) (“It is quite clear, and on all hands admitted, that 
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2. Why Capital Punishment Failed to Deter Fraud.  The failure to 
make use of the death penalty provision—as opposed to long-term 
imprisonment at the creditors’ whim—to punish fraudsters was not 
entirely unexpected. A gloss on the capital felony clause in the 
summaries of the proposed 1621 and 1624 bankruptcy bills explained 
in happy justification, “This is more in terror to them [that is, 
bankrupts], then likely to be prosecuted by the Creditors.”357 Those 
skeptical of the 1706 statute repeated the same refrain, only now 
critically. “[I]f this Bill Pass,” they warned, “it will never be 
executed.”358 The latter prognostication turned out to be virtually 
correct. Creditors prosecuted infrequently because of the severity of 
the punishment and the cost and difficulty involved. Even when 
creditors did bring lawsuits, juries may have been reluctant to convict 
not only because of the penalty but also because they understood the 
potential for fraud in the bankruptcy system itself. 
Testimony before several parliamentary committees studying 
bankruptcy reform in 1817 and 1818 suggested three main reasons 
why creditors prosecuted so few fraudulent bankrupts. First, and most 
prominently, many witnesses believed that capital punishment was 
simply too severe a penalty for the failure to repay debts.359 In 1819, 
 
the power in question has been given, not for the purpose of punishment, but for the single 
purpose of enforcing a discovery. In point of fact, however, its operation is always penal, and in 
most cases, penal only.”); see also id. at 87 (“Mr. Justice Blackstone, when he said that after the 
abolition of the peine forte et dure, there was no such thing as torture in the English law, had 
forgotten the power of commitment by commissioners of bankrupt. What is it but a species of 
torture . . . to wring a confession of supposed guilt, by the sufferings or the terrors of 
imprisonment?”); ERASMUS PHILIPS, THE CREDITOR’S ADVOCATE AND DEBTOR’S FRIEND 
10–12 (London, T. Corbett 2d ed. 1731) (describing the bankruptcy of Nathaniel Dickenson in 
1729 in which he had assets sufficient to pay his creditors, but the assignees failed to proceed 
with the distribution and instead left him in prison). 
 357. 7 NOTESTEIN ET AL., supra note 111, at 107–08; A Brief of the Bill Exhibited Against 
Bankrupts, supra note 111. 
 358. REASONS HUMBLY OFFERED FOR PASSING THE BILL, NOW DEPENDING IN 
PARLIAMENT RELATING TO BANKRUPTS, supra note 202 (“Objection 5. It is further Objected 
by some, That if this Bill Pass, it will never be executed; as it was in the Case of Transporting of 
Wooll which was Felony by a former Law. Answer. The Case is greatly different: The Exporter 
of Wooll, had a Right therein, and only the Interest of the Government concern’d, but here a 
Man’s property is Fraudulently wrested from him, which irritates Passion; so that such as are for 
letting Men Rot in Prison, and making Dice of their Bones, are likely enough to put an Act of 
this kind in Execution.”); see also DEFOE, REMARKS, supra note 151, at 17 (“I know ’tis 
objected, that the Felony part will never be put in Execution.”); OBSERVATIONS ON THE 
BANKRUPTS BILL, supra note 118, at 17–18 (explaining that the penalty would not deter those 
dishonest enough to have committed the fraud in the first place). 
 359. SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note 
7, at 17–19 (testimony of Basil Montagu); id. at 50–51 (testimony of Sir Samuel Romilly); id. at 
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Stephen Curtis, a leather factor in London, described to a 
parliamentary committee investigating the death penalty a case in 
which the bankrupt’s fraud was clearly proved.360 Curtis was the 
assignee, and the commissioners urged him to prosecute on the 
grounds that “it was a difficult thing to prove offences and crimes of 
this sort against a bankrupt so completely as to bring him to justice; 
and that the assignees ought not to let an occasion pass where they 
had an opportunity of making an example.”361 Curtis refused “for no 
other reason than that the man would certainly have suffered 
death.”362 The result of this unwillingness to prosecute was that some 
bankrupts committed their crimes with impunity, their creditors 
having no alternative but to permit them to keep their concealed 
assets.363 
Second, assignees were also reluctant to prosecute because 
bringing a bankrupt to trial was expensive.364 In a vestige of medieval 
law, bankruptcy crime was tried in a criminal court by private 
prosecution, and therefore the assignees of the bankrupt’s estate, 
themselves creditors of the bankrupt, had to bring the indictment, try 
the case, and foot the bill. Going to trial might have made some 
financial sense had the creditors believed a conviction would lead to 
the recovery of significantly more of the bankrupt’s assets, though 
even then they were ultimately taking money from their own pockets. 
But if the creditors lost, which they usually did, they got nothing;365 
and if the bankrupt went to his grave without breaking down and 
 
67 (testimony of Robert Waithman); SELECT COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL LAWS, supra note 222, 
at 64 (testimony of Smith); SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note 339, at 
16 (testimony of Thomas Nowlan); id. at 25 (testimony of Joseph Miller). 
 360. SELECT COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL LAWS, supra note 222, at 96–97 (testimony of 
Stephen Curtis). 
 361. Id. at 97. 
 362. Id. 
 363. SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note 
7, at 51 (testimony of Sir Samuel Romilly); id. at 46–47 (testimony of Germain Lavie, solicitor) 
(discussing the case of James Nowlan “who lay in Newgate from the year 1793 to 1808, and was 
then liberated in consideration of the punishment that he had sustained by his long 
imprisonment, and without any satisfaction whatever being derived to his creditors”). 
 364. SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note 
7, at 47 (testimony of Germain Lavie, solicitor) (“I think the expense and the trouble are the 
sole causes of non-prosecution, with the difficulty of conviction.” “And not motives of 
humanity?” “Certainly not.”); SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note 339, 
at 84 (testimony of J. Mayhew) (“[T]he expense of such proceedings is so enormous, that 
creditors are altogether prevented from adopting them.”). 
 365. See Appendix for conviction rates. 
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divulging his concealed money, as Perrott did, they also got nothing. 
Prosecuting a bankrupt was, therefore, largely a matter of private 
vengeance and perhaps a strategy to scare the fraudster into turning 
over his assets in return for the assignees withdrawing or conceding 
the case. This might account for the several instances at the Old 
Bailey in which the prosecution appeared and announced it had no 
evidence to put forth, resulting in the bankrupt’s acquittal.366 
The third reason assignees avoided bringing suit was the 
difficulty of obtaining a conviction. The prosecution had to prove not 
only the fraud but also the act of bankruptcy, the petitioning 
creditor’s debt, proper notice to the bankrupt, that the bankrupt was 
a merchant or trader, that the commissioners were properly 
appointed and sworn, and several other procedural matters.367 To 
accomplish this, they could not use the testimony of creditors—who 
were assumed to be biased because self-interested—or of the 
bankrupt, who was the defendant in a criminal trial and therefore not 
expected to incriminate himself.368 
Even if the prosecutors could prove all the necessary elements 
and demonstrate that all procedures had been correctly followed, 
seemingly certain victories might be dashed on the rocks of mistakes 
in the wording of notices or indictments. One such instance was the 
trial of William Tucker in 1807.369 Tucker was a serge manufacturer 
“much given to swearing,”370 and he was indebted for the “enormous 
 
 366. See Appendix for the relevant cases of Thomas Dawson (1729), Thomas Carter (1774), 
Thomas Evans (1790), and John Ibbetson (1806). 
 367. SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note 339, at 26 (testimony of 
Joseph Miller) (“[T]here being so many technical requisites to support a prosecution, renders 
conviction nearly impossible.”); id. at 84 (testimony of J. Mayhew) (“[S]uch is the difficulty of 
giving evidence of such proof to a jury, that solicitors, I believe, in general are altogether 
deterred from doing it.”); SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT 
LAWS, supra note 7, at 77 (testimony of William Cooke) (“[T]he necessity of proving the 
petitioning creditor’s debt and the bankruptcy increase the chance of the person prosecuted 
escaping.”). 
 368. GREEN, supra note 43, at 219 (stating that creditors could not serve as witnesses); 
FANE, supra note 44, at 39. 
 369. For another example, see the case of Edward Frith, tried at the Old Bailey in 1738, who 
was acquitted because of mistakes in the indictment. PROCEEDINGS OF THE OLD BAILEY, Oct. 
11, 1738, at 151; see also THOMAS LEACH, CASES IN CROWN LAW DETERMINED BY THE 
TWELVE JUDGES, BY THE COURT OF KING’S BENCH, AND BY COMMISSIONERS OF OYER AND 
TERMINER AND GENERAL GAOL DELIVERY, FROM THE FOURTH YEAR OF GEORGE THE 
SECOND TO THE TWENTY-NINTH YEAR OF GEORGE THE THIRD 11–13 (London, T. Wheldon 
1789). 
 370. TREWMAN’S EXETER FLYING POST, July 2, 1807, at 1. 
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sum” of £23,000.371 The prosecution was well on its way to proving 
that Tucker had failed to appear before the commissioners of 
bankruptcy, as required by the statute, when Tucker’s counsel 
pointed out that the summons to appear was dated “eight hundred 
and seven, the word thousand is left out.”372 On this basis, the court 
directed a verdict for the defendant.373 
The parliamentary commission testimony focused on these three 
reasons—dislike of the penalty, cost, and procedural hurdles—but 
contemporaries hinted at others. Juries, for instance, seem to have 
disfavored sending bankrupts to the gallows.374 If some juries did 
nullify, they might have done so in response to certain well-known 
structural problems in the bankruptcy law. One was the inconsistency 
of making a bankrupt subject to capital punishment for concealing his 
effects whereas a non-merchant, who could not be made a bankrupt, 
could secrete his assets with impunity, leaving the creditors merely to 
fume.375 James Bullock, on trial for fraudulent bankruptcy in 1807, 
made this exact point in his statement to the jury: 
I will say that law is severe, it is partial. You, gentlemen, are like 
myself, men that get your living by buying and selling. There is every 
man, even the greatest bulk of society, may buy as many goods of 
you and me, and other tradesmen, they may pledge them, keep 
them, embezzle them in any way they may think fit; there is no 
criminal attachment to them, they may go to prison, and live upon 
our property. It seems to me very hard, when we, who are subject to 
so many misfortunes, should be liable to loose [sic] our lives, when 
they may go at large.376 
 
 371. Tucker, the Bankrupt, TREWMAN’S EXETER FLYING POST, Dec. 10, 1807, at 3. 
 372. PROCEEDINGS OF THE OLD BAILEY, Dec. 2, 1807, at 49. 
 373. Id.; Singular Bankruptcy Case, HAMPSHIRE TELEGRAPH & SUSSEX CHRON., Dec. 14, 
1807, at 4. 
 374. SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note 339, at 16 (testimony of 
Thomas Nowlan); id. at 66 (testimony of Thomas Tilson). The Nowlan evidence related to 
Ireland. Jury nullification would, however, explain the case of Albertus Burnaby, who was 
acquitted for failure to prove the act of bankruptcy, although the trial proceedings seem to 
clearly prove the act. PROCEEDINGS OF THE OLD BAILEY, July 11, 1726, at 2–3. 
 375. SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note 
7, at 51 (testimony of Sir Samuel Romilly). 
 376. PROCEEDINGS OF THE OLD BAILEY, Sept. 16, 1807, at 399. 
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Bullock, however, was insufficiently sympathetic or convincing. The 
jury found him guilty, though his sentence was later commuted on 
review without opinion.377 
Another structural problem in the bankruptcy law that might 
have encouraged jury nullification was its susceptibility to fraud by 
creditors.378 A man was made a bankrupt by the ex parte declaration 
of a person claiming to be a creditor for a certain, statutorily required 
amount.379 The alleged bankrupt had no right to object to the granting 
of the commission. He could only petition the Lord Chancellor to 
have it superseded, and the dispute could take months or years to 
work its way through Chancery.380 In the meantime, his alleged 
creditors had taken possession of his assets, leaving him nothing with 
which he could fight his case, unless he committed a felony by 
concealing assets or had friends or family to support him.381 
The man who believed himself to have been wrongly made a 
bankrupt refused to submit to the examination of the commissioners 
at the risk of a prosecution for capital felony, as George Page 
discovered in 1819.382 His conviction was overturned on the ground 
that properly surrendering but then refusing to answer particular 
questions did not constitute a capital offense.383 The defendant who 
felt that his creditors had put him into bankruptcy with fraudulent 
 
 377. King v. Bullock, (1807) 1 Taunt. 71, 168 Eng. Rep. 595 (E.C.); 1 EDWARD CHRISTIAN, 
THE ORIGIN, PROGRESS, AND PRESENT PRACTICE OF THE BANKRUPT LAW BOTH IN 
ENGLAND AND IRELAND 295–96 (London, W. Clarke & Sons 2d ed. 1818); SELECT CASES 
FROM THE TWELVE JUDGES’ NOTEBOOKS 107–08 (D.R. Bentley ed. 1997) (the trial judge’s 
notebook commenting on the procedural argument). 
 378. See INCONVENIENCES ARISING FROM THE PRESENT METHODS IN TAKING OUT AND 
EXECUTING COMMISSIONS OF BANKRUPT, supra note 331, at 1–2 (providing examples of 
creditors’ fraud); 1 OLDHAM, supra note 95, at 414–15 (providing an example of a creditor-fraud 
case before Lord Mansfield). 
 379. GREEN, supra note 43, at 71–72. 
 380. SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note 
7, at 56–57 (testimony of Sir Samuel Romilly) (“I have known several instances of this kind: 
commissions taken out without any colour of justification, either in respect of the insolvent 
circumstances of the supposed debtor, or of there having been any act of bankruptcy committed; 
and I have known that such commissions have in the end been superseded, and the persons who 
took them out have been ordered to pay all the costs of the proceeding: but I never knew an 
instance of this kind in which the person against whom the commission had been taken out, was 
not, notwithstanding his ultimate success, completely and irretrievably ruined.”). 
 381. Id. 
 382. PROCEEDINGS OF THE OLD BAILEY, Feb. 17, 1819, at 145–50. 
 383. Rex v. Page, (1819) Russ. & Ry. 392, 397, 168 Eng. Rep. 861, 865 (C.C.R.). 
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designs, on his money perhaps or on his customers and trade,384 had to 
hope that the jurors agreed, as they did when they acquitted John 
Essington in 1729 to “general Satisfaction, it appearing a scandalous 
and malicious Prosecution, carried on by the Debtors to his Estate.”385 
A final reason for the failure of capital punishment—a reason 
which contemporaries did not explicitly mention—might have been 
the inconsistency with which it was enforced, on the occasions that 
indictments were even brought. As mentioned above, Richard Towne 
was hanged in 1712 for trying to ship his goods out of the country, 
whereas in 1710, John Ristow had been pardoned for the same act.386 
In 1708, John Sleorgin, a London weaver, was acquitted after 
convincing the jury that his setting out for Holland after being made a 
bankrupt and his running away from his creditors after they caught 
him was all an unfortunate mix-up. He claimed he did not know of 
the commission against him and that he was headed to Holland on an 
innocent cloth-buying trip.387 In 1756, Alexander Thompson 
absconded from London as soon as he had received the insurance 
money for a fire that destroyed his shop. He was arrested upon his 
return to the city and convicted for failure to appear before the 
bankruptcy commissioners, even though he claimed he had no notice 
of the bankruptcy.388 Reviewing the Thompson case sixty years later, 
the bankruptcy reformer, Basil Montagu, opined that “I very much 
doubt whether any man now existing could be induced to proceed to 
execution against such a person for such an offense; it does not 
appear upon the trial, that he had any actual notice.”389 
It so happened, however, that Thompson was a particularly 
unsympathetic character. A reputed playboy, he mistreated his 
 
 384. See SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra 
note 7, at 33 (testimony of Basil Montagu) (using bankruptcy to eliminate competition); id. at 57 
(testimony of Sir Samuel Romilly) (causing competitor expenses and malice). 
 385. PROCEEDINGS OF THE OLD BAILEY, Feb. 26, 1729, at 7. But see the advertisement 
taken out by Essington’s assignees after the publication of the Old Bailey proceedings, DAILY 
POST, Apr. 14, 1729, at 1 (accusing the stenographer, who “was employ’d . . . to take the said 
Tryal . . . fairly and impartially, and not to make (as he has done) the said unjust, or any 
Reflection, on the Gentlemen concerned in the said Prosecution”). 
 386. See supra notes 319–23. 
 387. See PROCEEDINGS OF THE OLD BAILEY, supra note 342, at 3 (where the name is 
spelled Slaorgan); LONDON GAZETTE, Oct. 20, 1707, at 2; THE BANKRUPT’S DIRECTORY 32 
(London, J. Morphew 1708) (listing John Sleorgin, Weaver, London). 
 388. PROCEEDINGS OF THE OLD BAILEY, Jan. 15, 1756, at 85, 87. 
 389. SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note 
7, at 21 (testimony of Basil Montagu). 
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London wife and disrespected her father, the purveyor of mineral 
waters to the King.390 He never overcame the suspicion that he was 
responsible for the fire that burned down his shop and killed two 
servants.391 And when he absconded, he returned to his native 
Scotland and bigamously took a second wife. Her father, hearing 
rumors about Thompson’s London wife, made him return most of the 
marriage settlement. To get the money back, Thompson returned to 
London and hired a woman to go before a justice of the peace and 
swear that she had been living with him but that they were not 
married. But she ended up confessing the trick to a lawyer, who had 
Thompson hauled before a magistrate and arrested.392 It may well 
have been these foibles and frauds, and not his relatively paltry debts, 
that led the jury to decide to hang him.393 This possibility highlights 
the real unfairness of the private prosecution of fraudulent bankrupts. 
Whether or not a bankrupt was going to face death depended a great 
deal upon how angry and insulted his creditors were, and how much 
they preferred revenge to money. As Richard Towne’s prosecuting 
 
 390. 3 SELECT TRIALS FOR MURDER, ROBBERY, BURGLARY, RAPES, SODOMY, COINING, 
FORGERY, PYRACY AND OTHER OFFENCES AND MISDEMEANOURS, AT THE SESSIONS-HOUSE 
IN THE OLD-BAYLEY 270–71, 274 (London, J. Wilkie 1764) [hereinafter SELECT TRIALS] 
(describing Thompson’s treatment of his wife and father-in-law and the threatening letter to his 
father-in-law); PROCEEDINGS OF THE OLD BAILEY, Jan. 15, 1756, at 85 (identifying the father-
in-law as “Mr. Davis”); LONDON GAZETTE, Jan. 31, 1756, at 2 (describing the threatening letter 
sent regarding Thompson to Thomas Davis of St. Albans near Pall Mall); GEN. ADVERTISER, 
July 25, 1751, at 1 (announcing that Thomas Davis, who had a water warehouse on St. Albans 
near Pall Mall, had been appointed purveyor of mineral water to the king); GEN. ADVERTISER, 
Dec. 5, 1751, at 3 (identifying Davis’s water warehouse as in St. Albans Street, Pall Mall); PUB. 
ADVERTISER, May 17, 1756, at 2 (advertisement of Thomas Davis, purveyor to the king). 
 391. See 3 SELECT TRIALS, supra note 390, at 271–73; WHITEHALL EVENING POST, Feb. 21, 
1756, at 3 (“Thompson, one of the Malefactors, who was executed Yesterday, on his being ask’d 
if he set his House on Fire in Bury-Street, St. James’s, declar’d he was innocent.”). 
 392. 3 SELECT TRIALS, supra note 390, at 273–74. The jury may have known what they were 
doing in finding Thompson guilty. While he sat in prison awaiting his execution, an anonymous 
letter believed to have come from Thompson, was sent to his father-in-law, Thomas Davis, 
threatening that: “[If Davis] don’t clear Mr. Thompson (a Person now under Sentence of Death 
in Newgate [Prison],) he, the said Davis, shall have a Present sent him of his Son’s Heart, who is 
a Boy of Twelve Years of Age. That, if the said Thompson suffers, so sure shall one of his, the 
said Davis’s Family, suffer likewise a crueler Death.” LONDON GAZETTE, Jan. 31, 1756, at 2 
(some punctuation adjusted); 3 SELECT TRIALS, supra note 390, at 274. 
 393. His debts amounted to just slightly over the £200 minimum required by statute to be 
proved by the eight creditors who petitioned for a commission. 5 Geo. II, c. 30, § 23 (1732) 
(requiring three or more creditors to prove debts of at least £200). PROCEEDINGS OF THE OLD 
BAILEY, Jan. 15, 1756, at 86 (listing the debts of petitioning creditors); Bankruptcy Commission 
Docket Book (Apr. 22, 1755) (National Archives, B4/13 f. 192) (docketing of the commission 
listing the same petitioning creditors); Fresh Advices from Our Correspondents, WHITEHALL 
EVENING POST, Feb. 21, 1756, at 3 (mentioning Thompson’s execution). 
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creditor said when asked if he would visit the defendant in prison, “he 
would not go to see the Prisoner till he saw him go be hang’d.”394 
Another assignee, less angry or less bloodthirsty, might simply have 
refrained from bringing the indictment in the first place. 
The failure to enforce the capital punishment provision of the 
bankruptcy statutes appears to have had an adverse effect on the 
entire bankruptcy system and not just on the limited set of frauds at 
which the provision was aimed. English bankruptcy was originally 
weighted heavily in favor of the creditors. The creditors chose 
whether to take out a commission, they controlled the bankrupt’s 
estate during the pendency of the proceeding, and they retained their 
rights to pursue the debtor for debts left unpaid after the bankruptcy 
liquidation. When debtors obtained any favors at all they had to steal 
them through illegal collusion. In this system, the penalties prescribed 
in the seventeenth-century statutes were thumbs on the scale, helping 
the creditor by nudging the debtor toward cooperation. But such 
nudging was relatively gentle compared with the fist that, in principle, 
could be brought down on debtors after 1706 and the invention of the 
capital crime of fraudulent bankruptcy. With the introduction of 
discharge, however, the debtor suddenly had some weight on his own 
side of the balance. If the offsetting penalty provision had worked 
effectively, the bankruptcy law might have evolved more quickly 
toward a functioning equilibrium between creditors and debtors. But 
the threat of death proved to be so useless that the fist the legislators 
thought would keep debtors in line ended up being an empty glove.395 
The capital felony provision became “for want of prosecutors, a dead 
letter.”396 
Consequently, with nothing offsetting discharge, the scale 
tipped—or at least contemporaries perceived it to tip—in favor of the 
bankrupts. One member of the 1818 parliamentary committee 
considering bankruptcy reform claimed that in most commissions on 
which he had served as a commissioner, “the bankrupt had acted with 
great injustice towards his creditors, generally with dishonesty and 
fraud . . . and this conduct I can only trace to one cause, and that is, 
 
 394. A Particular Account of the Tryal of Richard Towne, Tallow-Chandler, supra note 319. 
 395. See SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note 339, at 16 (testimony of 
Thomas Nowlan) (“I also consider that enactment, which declares concealment . . . to be a 
capital felony, and which was intended to prevent fraud, operates as its principle 
protection . . . . ”). 
 396. SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note 
7, at 50 (testimony of Sir Samuel Romilly). 
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the facility with which almost every bankrupt goes through the 
operation of his commission.”397 The bankrupt breezed through the 
bankruptcy because most commissions were taken out collusively.398 
The friendly creditor arranged to be elected assignee, and he saw to it 
that the bankrupt, and his concealed goods, were protected. Then, 
using bribes, threats, and persuasion, he influenced the other 
creditors to sign the certificate.399 This was made simpler after 1809 
when Parliament amended the law to require that only three-fifths of 
the creditors in number and value sign the certificate.400 As a result, 
“it was rather more easy for a fraudulent than an honest bankrupt to 
obtain” his discharge, and this greatly irritated both members of 
Parliament and the men involved in the bankruptcy system.401 The 
fraudster felt confident that he could get away with his bribes, false 
debts, and cooked books because no effective checks existed on such 
behavior.402 No one was going to enforce the penalty provisions in the 
bankruptcy statutes such that “nine times out of ten, the commission 
is worked for the benefit of the bankrupt, and not of the creditors.”403 
A bankruptcy procedure with discharge and without the threat of 
 
 397. Id. at 103 (testimony of John Ingram Lockhart). 
 398. Id. at 40 (testimony of Joseph Fitzwilliam Vandercom). 
 399. See id. at 70 (testimony of William Cooke) (“I think the certificate is the great ground 
of fraudulent commissions; it is the great inducement to bankrupts to concert commissions to be 
issued against them . . . .”). 
 400. 49 Geo III, c. 121, § 18 (1809). 
 401. 38 PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES, supra note 312, at 985; see also SELECT COMMITTEE 
APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note 7, at 34 (testimony of Basil 
Montagu); id. at 41 (testimony of Joseph Fitzwilliam Vandercom) (complaining that the 
fraudulent bankrupt was as likely to obtain his discharge as the honest bankrupt). 
 402. This was not a new development in 1818. See CONSIDERATIONS ON THE PRESENT 
ADMINISTRATION OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, WITH SUGGESTIONS FOR THEIR IMPROVEMENT, 
SO AS TO RENDER THEM MORE BENEFICIAL BOTH TO CREDITOR AND DEBTOR 5 (London, 
W. Richardson 1795) (“Lord Hardwicke in his time declared, that ‘the laws had turned the edge 
of commissions of bankruptcy, from being, as they were originally, remedial to the creditors, 
and in the nature of punishment to the bankrupts, whom they considered as offenders, to be the 
accidental occasion of great frauds.’”). 
 403. SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note 
7, at 68 (testimony of Robert Waithman); see also SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO 
CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note 20, at 2 (testimony of Thomas Nowlan 
concerning Irish law) (“The law, instead of preventing, encourages fraud; for it makes no 
adequate distinction between the frugal and honest, though unfortunate, trader, and the 
extravagant, crafty and fraudulent bankrupt; it does not encourage and protect the former, nor 
deter or punish the latter; for in its sanguinary and indiscriminating severity, he calculates upon 
and finds certain impunity.”). 
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punishment for crimes had become, in the eyes of creditors and their 
lawyers, a debtor’s remedy.404 
In 1818, the bankruptcy commissioner, Archibald Cullen, 
sounded the death knell of the bankruptcy system that England 
invented in the sixteenth century and had attempted to triage with 
band-aids ever since: 
The bankrupt law was introduced with a view to prevent and punish 
the frauds of debtors, and to distribute their property equally 
amongst all their creditors; but it has not succeeded; and however 
wise the original plan may have been thought, yet it does not now, 
even with all its subsequent alterations and accessions, appear to 
effect either of the objects which it professed; the property is not 
forthcoming, or it is wasted: the same frauds still exist, neither 
diminished nor punished; and a new class has sprung up, engendered 
by the very proceedings, which have been instituted to prevent 
them; so that the prominent and growing evil of the present day, 
with respect to debtor and creditor, appears to be the bankrupt law 
itself.405 
Faced with such damning testimony, the House of Commons 
immediately took up the mantle of bankruptcy reform. A major bill 
was offered in 1818, then returned to committee, shortened, offered 
again in 1819, and again returned to committee and cut down.406 
Through all the revisions, one set of clauses remained constant. 
Capital punishment for fraudulent bankruptcy was to be abolished 
because the existing law did not deter frauds due to the lack of 
convictions and the excessive severity of the penalty.407 Instead, 
 
 404. SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note 
7, at 44 (testimony of Germain Lavie, solicitor) (“As the bankrupt laws are at present 
administered, I conceive they afford advantage to no one, except the bankrupt.”); 1 OLDHAM, 
supra note 95, at 413 (quoting Lord Mansfield’s complaints before the House of Lords in 1781 
that bankruptcy “made a bankrupt’s fortune” and that “every day proved the increase of frauds 
under the bankrupt laws” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 405. SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note 
7, at 80 (testimony of Archibald Cullen). 
 406. A Bill [as Amended by the Committee] to Amend the Laws Relating to Bankrupts, 
1819, Bill [284]; A Bill [as Amended on Re-commitment] to Amend the Laws Relating to 
Bankrupts, 1819, Bill [339]; LESTER, supra note 30, at 33–34. 
 407. A Bill [as Amended by the Committee] to Alter and Amend the Laws Relating to 
Bankrupts, 1818, Bill [403], at 35 (“[W]hereas the punishment of death awarded by the said 
statute against such persons as should be lawfully convicted of any of the offences mentioned 
therein, hath been found inefficient to deter fraudulent Bankrupts from the frequent 
commission of such flagitious conduct as was intended to be remedied by the said statute, by 
reason of the great difficulty of procuring a conviction of such offenders, and of the reluctance 
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fraudulent bankrupts, defined, as before, as those failing to appear 
before the commissioners or concealing assets in the amount of £20 or 
more, would, upon indictment and conviction, be “adjudged to be 
guilty of felony, and . . . transported for life, or for any period not less 
than fourteen years, according to the magnitude of the offence or 
offences of which such Bankrupt or Bankrupts shall be convicted as 
aforesaid.”408 In addition, a new crime was created for destroying, 
fabricating, or changing books or documents with intent to defraud 
creditors or to obtain a certificate. This misdemeanor was to be 
punished by “transportation for any term not exceeding fourteen 
years, or to solitary confinement and hard labour in any of His 
Majesty’s gaols or houses of correction, in proportion to the enormity 
of the offence or offences.”409 The 1818/1819 bill never passed, and 
fraudulent bankruptcy remained a capital felony for one more year.410 
In 1820, bankruptcy crime was finally removed from the list of capital 
offenses in an omnibus death penalty reform bill.411 The new penalty 
was transportation for seven years to life or imprisonment at hard 
labor for up to seven years. 
Paired with the limited availability of discharge, capital 
punishment failed as the counterbalancing mechanism tasked with 
encouraging reluctant debtors to cooperate in their bankruptcy. The 
assignees’ reluctance to pursue such an expensive and severe penalty 
freed debtors to try to protect their assets, both by concealing and by 
defrauding the discharge process through bribes and collusive 
bankruptcies, knowing that they would likely face no ramifications. 
As a result, according to the witnesses testifying before the House of 
Commons committee in 1817 and 1818, non- or merely partial 
cooperation by bankrupts was endemic and uncontrollable. 
CONCLUSION 
Vengeance and retribution may not have been explicit goals of 
the bankruptcy law, but they have contributed to the manner in which 
creditors and society at large viewed bankrupts. Bankruptcy was 
 
of assignees and others to prosecute such Bankrupts, on account of the too great severity of 
such punishment, to the great discouragement of fair and honest industry, and the increase of 
fraud and immorality . . . .”). 
 408. Id. at 36. 
 409. Id. at 37. 
 410. LESTER, supra note 30, at 33–34. 
 411. 1 Geo. IV, c. 115, § 2 (1820). 
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devised in 1543 to combat the perceived crime of debtors who lived 
large on their creditors’ money or who borrowed money never 
intending repayment. By 1706, the law’s focus shifted toward creating 
a civil bankruptcy system in which insolvents—honest or not—would 
willingly repay their debts in the hope of receiving a discharge, and in 
which only post-bankruptcy fraud would be punished as a felony. 
But the system did not work particularly well. Although 
discharge came to be considered an essential part of bankruptcy,412 the 
failure to enforce the capital felony provision permitted fraud to 
flourish and eventually to undermine the goal of rewarding only the 
cooperative bankrupt. This occurred during an era in which people 
involved in the bankruptcy system understood the need for an 
effective balance between debtors and creditors to ensure voluntary 
cooperation by the bankrupt.413 This understanding raises the 
question: Why, if the nonenforcement of the penalty for fraud led to 
systemic disequilibrium and failed to encourage honest cooperation, 
was capital punishment for bankruptcy not abolished earlier?414 
One part of the answer lay in the work of late eighteenth- and 
early nineteenth-century English reformers advocating generally 
against the death penalty.415 Early eighteenth-century proponents of 
bankruptcy reform had not generally shared the reformers’ 
squeamishness about hanging people. Although many pamphlets and 
broadsides written during the first half of the eighteenth century had 
called for a variety of changes, both minor, such as changes in the 
means of obtaining discharge,416 and major, such as switching to a 
 
 412. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *472 (expressing the view that the English law of 
bankruptcy was based on a give and take between creditor and debtor, where the creditor 
obtained the bankrupt’s cooperation and the debtor obtained a discharge); SELECT COMMITTEE 
APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note 7, at 55 (testimony of Sir 
Samuel Romilly) (stating that discharge was necessary to bankruptcy because it was the only 
justification for taking the debtor’s property and making him answerable to his creditors). 
 413. See, e.g., 38 PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES, supra note 312, at 986 (explaining that the 
bankrupt’s assistance in recovering the debts was so valuable that it was worth giving him 
something significant in return). 
 414. Cf. Douglas Hay, Property, Authority, and the Criminal Law, in ALBION’S FATAL 
TREE: CRIME AND SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 17, 56–59 (1975) (asking the 
same question with regard to capital punishment of theft). 
 415. GATRELL, supra note 6, at 326–30; Hay, supra note 414, at 57–58. 
 416. REASONS HUMBLY OFFERED FOR ALTERING SEVERAL CLAUSES IN THE BILL 
DEPENDING IN PARLIAMENT, RELATING TO BANKRUPTS, supra note 314 (arguing that only the 
chancellor and the Lord Keeper should decide on discharge). 
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voluntary bankruptcy system,417 one provision that most of these texts 
accepted without objection was that fraudulent bankrupts should 
hang.418 
Yet, despite some refinement of tastes in criminal penalties later 
in the century, bankruptcy continued to make people angry, and they 
wanted to see it “properly” punished.419 Even Cesare Beccaria, whose 
book on punishment was relied on by English criminal law reformers, 
felt that fraudulent bankrupts should be punished severely.420 Since 
1543, responses to bankruptcy had been colored by the same human 
impulses that controlled victims’ reactions to other sorts of crimes.421 
Creditors wanted revenge, or they wanted the bankrupt to suffer, or 
they wanted him to serve as an example.422 Creditors wanted the 
 
 417. OBSERVATIONS AND PROPOSALS MOST HUMBLY OFFERED TO THE PARLIAMENT BY 
SEVERAL CREDITORS, MERCHANTS AND TRADERS OF LONDON, RELATING TO THE BILL NOW 
DEPENDING CONCERNING BANKRUPTS (circa 1718) [hereinafter OBSERVATIONS AND 
PROPOSALS] (Lincoln’s Inn Library, MP 100/6); PROPOSALS MOST HUMBLY OFFER’D TO THE 
PARLIAMENT, BY THE MERCHANTS AND TRADERS OF LONDON, FOR AN ACT TO PROMOTE 
TRADE AND CREDIT, AND ENCOURAGE HONEST INSOLVENT, AND FOR SUPPLYING THE 
DEFECTS OF THE LATE ACT FOR PREVENTING FRAUDS FREQUENTLY COMMITTED BY 
BANKRUPTS (circa 1707) [hereinafter PROPOSALS MOST HUMBLY OFFER’D] (Chetham’s 
Library, H.P. 2354); INCONVENIENCES ARISING FROM THE PRESENT METHODS IN TAKING OUT 
AND EXECUTING COMMISSIONS OF BANKRUPT, supra note 331, at 2; Letter to the Author, 
BRIT. J., Feb. 4, 1727, at 1. 
 418. OBSERVATIONS AND PROPOSALS, supra note 417; PROPOSALS MOST HUMBLY 
OFFER’D, supra note 417; PHILLIPS, supra note 356, at 17. But see OBSERVATOR, Feb. 24, 1705, 
at 1 (referring to the idea of making fraudulent bankruptcy a capital felony, “[w]e have too 
much Hanging in England, we might make the Lives of Malefactors more Beneficial to the 
Commonwealth than their Deaths can be”). 
 419. See Letter to the Printer, ST. JAMES CHRON., Dec. 1, 1761, at 4 (writing in response to 
the Perrott case, “[a] fraudulent Bankrupt is one of the worst of Robbers, because he takes 
Advantage of the Trust and Confidence reposed in him by his Creditors”); York Assize 
Intelligence, HULL PACKET, Mar. 30, 1813, at 4 (including the judge’s peroration upon 
sentencing John Senior in 1813: “after having taken advantage of the beneficent provisions of 
the law respecting persons in trade, which in cases of insolvency where all the effects have been 
given up [to] annihilate their debt, and sends them into the world as new men with fresh credit; 
but (addressing John Senior) ‘you, instead of complying with the conditions of the law, 
fraudulently concealed from your creditors a considerable part of your effects, as a fund to 
supply your future want, or perhaps for the purpose of extravagance’” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 420. CESARE BECCARIA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 130 (Philadelphia, 
Philip H. Nicklin 1819); 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *156 (citing Beccaria regarding 
fraudulent bankrupts); GATRELL, supra note 6, at 331–32 (explaining Beccaria’s importance for 
English reformers). 
 421. See, e.g., supra notes 33–35. 
 422. DEFOE, ESSAY, supra note 17, at 205–06 (relating the story of a creditor who 
imprisoned a bankrupt even though he had no money to pay the debts because “[r]evenge is 
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debtor to pay his “victims” figuratively as well as literally,423 and they 
wanted to make sure that bankruptcy was viewed with such horror 
that community pressure alone would deter others.424 At a certain 
rather visceral level, it seems, punishment was more important than 
ensuring cooperation. 
The challenge was finding a penalty to replace death. Ordinary 
imprisonment was no different from what creditors were entitled to 
do on their mere ex parte claim of a debt owed. Some commentators 
thought that fraudulent bankrupts should simply be denied the 
benefits of discharge, even if they later ended up disclosing their 
assets or appearing before the commissioners.425 One Irish solicitor 
testifying before Parliament in 1818 suggested more colorfully that: 
[O]ne fraudulent bankrupt, dressed in yellow trowsers and jacket, 
with the nature of his offence placarded thereon, and sweeping the 
street between the Commercial Buildings and Royal Exchange in 
Dublin, between the hours of two and four o’clock in the afternoon, 
 
sweet”); see also 1 AUTHENTIC NARRATIVE, supra note 233, at i (claiming that the prosecution 
of Perrott was not pursued for vengeance but rather as an example). 
 423. It is, perhaps, significant that it fell to one of the staunchest opponents of the capital 
punishment provision to point out that a bankrupt should not “be put to death for the non-
delivery of his property, particularly when it is remembered that the offender is not the only 
person to blame; there must be a feeling in the community, that the imprudent confidence 
reposed by creditors, is not wholly exempt from censure.” SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO 
CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note 7, at 21 (testimony of Basil Montagu). 
 424. The concern with stigma is of long standing, as is the belief that the stigma of 
bankruptcy is declining. See, e.g., DANIEL DEFOE, THE COMPLETE ENGLISH TRADESMAN, IN 
FAMILIAR LETTERS; DIRECTING HIM IN ALL THE SEVERAL PARTS AND PROGRESSIONS OF 
TRADE 84 (London, Charles Rivington 1726) (celebrating the fact that bankruptcy was no 
longer something to fear because “a Commission of Bankrupt is so familiar a thing, that the 
debtor oftentimes causes it to be taken out in his favour, that he may the sooner be effectually 
deliver’d from all his creditors at once . . . . Some have said, this law is too favourable to the 
bankrupt; that it makes tradesmen careless; that they value not breaking at all, but run on at all 
hazards, venturing without forecast and without consideration, knowing they may come off 
again so cheap and so easie, if they miscarry”); Letter to the Editor, PUB. ADVERTISER, Nov. 1, 
1773, at 2 (“At present Bankruptcy is but a Name; it is become so fashionable and 
countenanced, and the travelling through it is so very easy and expeditious, that few have any 
dreadful Apprehensions from it.”). 
 425. REMARKS ON THE LATE ACT OF PARLIAMENT TO PREVENT FRAUDS FREQUENTLY 
COMMITTED BY BANKRUPTS, WITH PROPOSALS FOR THE AMENDMENT THEREOF, supra note 
103, at 6 (depriving fraudsters of the benefit of the Act is preferable because it is not penal but 
rather “Privative of the Favour of the Act”); REASONS HUMBLY OFFERED FOR ALTERING 
SEVERAL CLAUSES IN THE BILL DEPENDING IN PARLIAMENT, RELATING TO BANKRUPTS, 
supra note 314 (“Exclusion from the Benefits of the late Act, will more effectually answer the 
end designed.”). 
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would make a more salutary impression upon the public feeling, 
than could be produced by a score of executions at Newgate.426 
Long after the punishment for fraudulent bankruptcy was reduced to 
seven years’ imprisonment at hard labor, James Fitzjames Stephen, 
the author of an authoritative early history of English criminal law, 
lamented that this penalty was insufficient. Although he 
acknowledged that the old law was too severe, he believed that many 
instances of fraudulent bankruptcy deserved more than imprisonment 
for even ten years.427 Fraudulent bankruptcy, he wrote, was just like 
“wholesale robbery or theft, and the very fact that it looks a less 
outrageous offence and is one which an apparently respectable 
person may be tempted to commit, is a reason, I think, for punishing 
it with special severity.”428 Parliament had probably felt the same way 
in 1706 when it made fraudulent bankruptcy a felony without benefit 
of clergy, though at that point they could still hope that the penalty 
would effectively deter fraud. 
The impulse to punish bankrupts is not a relic of an 
unenlightened age. Modern American bankruptcy has largely solved 
the cooperation problem by making bankruptcy voluntary, increasing 
the availability of discharge, and limiting the use of criminal sanctions 
to true cases of fraud or crime. Nonetheless, the desire to punish 
bankrupts remains, even when evidence points to the conclusion that 
such punishment does not result in optimal social or economic 
results.429 As Senator Wellstone said during debates over the 2005 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, “[t]his 
debate is about punishing failure.”430 
 
 426. SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note 
20, at 7 (testimony of Thomas Nowlan). 
 427. 3 STEPHEN, supra note 109, at 232. 
 428. Id. 
 429. Megan McArdle, Sink and Swim. Bankruptcy Helps the Undeserving—and That’s the 
Way It Should Be, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 2009, at 30–32; Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth 
Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Less Stigma or More Financial Distress: An Empirical 
Analysis of the Extraordinary Increase in Bankruptcy Filings, 59 STAN. L. REV. 213 passim 
(2006). 
 430. 147 CONG. REC. S7724 (daily ed. July 17, 2001) (statement of Sen. Wellstone). 
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APPENDIX 
EVIDENCE OF FRAUDULENT BANKRUPTCY, 1706–1820 
This chart lists information about persons committing fraudulent 
bankruptcy that can be gleaned from various sources, including the 
Proceedings of the Old Bailey (OBP), manuscript material, such as 
the indices to the Old Bailey indictment books found at the London 
Metropolitan Archives (LMA), and newspaper advertisements giving 
notice that bankrupts had concealed assets or failed to surrender to 
the bankruptcy commissioners. Advertisements calling only on third 
parties to turn over concealed assets and not specifically mentioning 
that the bankrupt was concealing have been excluded. 
 
Year Name Profession/ 
Location 
Crime Outcome 









Unknown LONDON GAZETTE, 







Concealment Acquitted: no 
notice 
LONDON GAZETTE, 
Oct. 20, 1707, at 2 








Unknown DAILY COURANT, 









OBP, May 16, 1711, 
at 3 
LONDON GAZETTE, 
Dec. 14, 1710, at 2 
DAILY COURANT, 
Sept. 12, 1711, at 2  
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Concealment Guilty: hanged OBP, Dec. 10, 1712, 
at 2 
POST BOY, Dec. 16, 
1712, at 1 
A PARTICULAR 






1713 Unknown Tallow 
chandler/ 
London431 
















19 H.L. JOUR. 568 


















Concealment Acquitted: no 
act 
LONDON GAZETTE, 
May 7, 1715, at 4 






Concealment Acquitted: no 
act 
LONDON GAZETTE, 
Feb. 1, 1726 n.s., at 
3 
DAILY COURANT, 
Feb. 28, 1726, at 2 
LMA 
CLA/047/LJ/10/001 
OBP, July 11, 1726, 
at 2–3 
EVENING POST, July 
12, 1726, at 1 
 
 431. This could be Richard Towne, but, if not, it implies that a second tallow chandler 
besides him was committed for concealing effects. 
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1726 John Elliott Warehousman/
London 
Concealment Unknown DAILY COURANT, 





Concealment Unknown WEEKLY J.; OR, 
BRITISH 
GAZETTEER, Nov. 







Concealment Unknown LONDON GAZETTE, 











July 12, 1726, at 2 
EVENING POST, Dec. 
1, 1726, at 1 
LMA 
CLA/047/LJ/10/001 






Concealment Indicted DAILY J., Mar. 3, 









May 11, 1728, at 4 
DAILY POST, July 20, 
1728, at 2 
LMA 
CLA/047/LJ/10/001 





Concealment Acquitted: no 
evidence 
offered 






Concealment Unknown LONDON EVENING-
POST, July 21, 1730, 
at 3 
1733 John Ward London Concealment Unknown DAILY J., Feb. 17, 



















POST, Dec. 14, 





Concealment Unknown LONDON GAZETTE, 
July 17, 1736, at 2 
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OBP, Oct. 11, 1738, 
at 150-51 
THOMAS LEACH, 
CASES IN CROWN 
LAW 11–13 (1789) 
1738 John Baker Hawker of 
Drapers/ 
Swansea 
Concealment Unknown COUNTRY J., July 1, 





Concealment Unknown LONDON EVENING-






Concealment Unknown LONDON EVENING-
POST, June 12, 





Concealment Unknown LONDON EVENING-











OBP, Jan. 15, 1742, 
at 35–37 






Concealment Unknown DAILY POST, Jan. 25, 
1742, at 2 
1742 William 
Abram 
Linen draper & 
mercer/ Exeter 
Concealment Unknown DAILY 
ADVERTISER, Dec. 
23, 1742, at 1 
1743 ___ Brown Newcastle Concealment Indicted LONDON DAILY 
POST, & GEN. 
ADVERTISER, Apr. 





Concealment Unknown LONDON EVENING-







Concealment Unknown LONDON GAZETTE, 





Concealment Unknown DAILY POST, June 7, 
1745, at 1 




Unknown GEN. ADVERTISER, 
Jan. 31, 1749, at 2 
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Concealment Confessed LONDON EVENING-
POST, Oct. 3, 1749, 
at 2 
LONDON GAZETTE, 



































Concealment Unknown LONDON EVENING-
POST, Mar. 8, 1755, 
at 2 
LONDON GAZETTE, 





Concealment Guilty: hanged LMA 
CLA/047/LJ/10/002 
OBP, Jan. 15, 1756, 
at 85–87 
1757 John Davis Linen draper/ 
London 
Concealment Unknown PUB. ADVERTISER, 





Concealment Unknown PUB. ADVERTISER, 
June 6, 1757, at 3 
1759 John 
Britton 
Norwich Concealment Confessed  LLOYD’S EVENING 
POST, Dec. 11, 










Feb. 3, 1759, at 3 
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Concealment Unknown PUB. ADVERTISER, 





Concealment Unknown GAZETTEER & NEW 
DAILY 
ADVERTISER, Aug. 
2, 1765, at 3 
1765 Richard 
Holmes 
















Unknown GAZETTEER & NEW 
DAILY 
ADVERTISER, Oct. 


















Concealment Unknown GAZETTEER & NEW 
DAILY 
ADVERTISER, July 





Concealment Unknown GAZETTEER & NEW 
DAILY 
ADVERTISER, May 
3, 1768, at 2 
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Nov. 6, 1769, at 3 
LLOYD’S EVENING 
POST, Dec. 22, 
1769, at 608 
1774 Derrick 
Martin 






















GAZETTEER & NEW 
DAILY 
ADVERTISER, June 





Absconding Tried before 
Common 
Pleas: found 
not entitled to 
discharge 
ST. JAMES CHRON.; 
OR, BRITISH 
EVENING POST, 






put off suit at 







May 30, 1778, at 4 
LONDON EVENING-





London Concealment Indicted LMA 
CLA/047/LJ/10/002 
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Concealment Acquitted LMA 
CLA/047/LJ/10/002 
OBP, Oct. 20, 1779, 
at 563–69 
GAZETTEER & NEW 
DAILY 
ADVERTISER, Oct. 
22, 1779, at 3 
MORNING POST & 
DAILY 
ADVERTISER, Oct. 






Concealment Unknown LONDON GAZETTE, 












J. Lloyd 1783) 
1784 Thomas 
Rawbone 








Unknown MORNING POST & 
DAILY 
ADVERTISER, Aug. 
11, 1786, at 3 
1790 Thomas 
Evans 





OBP, Feb. 24, 1790, 
at 323 




ST. JAMES’S CHRON.; 
OR, BRITISH 
EVENING POST, 
Dec. 6, 1791, at 1 
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OR, NEW LLOYD’S 
EVENING POST, 
Dec. 27, 1793, at 1 
LONDON CHRON., 
Sept. 14, 1793, at 
265 (notice of 
commission) 
OBP, Jan. 15, 1794, 
at 320–26 












Aug. 1, 1793, at 1 
WHITEHALL 
EVENING POST, 





Concealment Unknown MORNING CHRON., 





Concealment Unknown ORACLE & PUB. 
ADVERTISER, Aug. 










ST. JAMES’S CHRON.; 
OR, BRITISH 
EVENING POST, 
Dec. 24, 1795, at 3 
STAR, Jan. 6, 1796, at 
3 
MORNING POST & 
FASHIONABLE 
WORLD, Jan. 8, 








MERCURY, Dec. 6, 
1802, at 3 
1802 Thomas 
Shiver 









OBP, Apr. 16, 1806, 
at 221  
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Aug. 20, 1807, at 1 
OBP, Sept. 16, 1807, 
at 392–402 
King v. Bullock, 
(1807) 1 Taunt. 71, 
168 Eng. Rep. 595 
(E.C.) 























2, 1807, at 1 












OBP, Sept. 18, 1811, 






Concealment Acquitted  OBP, Feb. 19, 1812, 
at 158 
1813 John Senior Clothier/ 
Alverthorpe, 
Yorkshire 
Concealment Guilty: hanged HULL PACKET, Mar. 
30, 1813, at 4 
HULL PACKET, Apr. 
6, 1813, at 4 
LEEDS MERCURY, 











King v. Forsyth, 
(1814) Russ. & Ry. 
274  
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COM. LITERARY & 
POL. HERALD, 
Mar. 31, 1815, at 
319 
LEEDS MERCURY, 






















OBP, Feb. 17, 1819, 
at 145–50 
King v Page, (1819) 
Russ. & Ry. 392 
 
